question regarding differing squad t.o.e.'s

[flykiller]

near as I can figure, a modern u.s. army squad looks like this:

squad leader

fire team leader
grenade launcher
saw
rifleman/comms

fire team leader
grenade launcher
saw
rifleman/comms

while a modern u.s. marine squad looks like this:

squad leader

fire team leader / grenade launcher
saw
rifleman/saw ammo bearer
rifleman

fire team leader / grenade launcher
saw
rifleman/saw ammo bearer
rifleman

fire team leader / grenade launcher
saw
rifleman/saw ammo bearer
rifleman

are there reasons for the differing t.o.e. and differing number of fire teams?

 

[aramis]

Different force projection techniques, different deployment needs.

Marines leapfrog squads by 3, army by pairs or quads (section = 2 squads), depending upon unit and placement.

Further, the Army infantry is focused upon a 10 or 11man pair of squads deployed, the infantry above, and a vehicle squad of 2-3 for the Bradley crew.

 

[flykiller]

Different force projection techniques, different deployment needs.

Marines leapfrog squads by 3, army by pairs or quads (section = 2 squads), depending upon unit and placement.

is there any objective reason for this, or is it a "we're marines, we do things by 3's" and "we're army, we do things by 2's" thing?

reason I'm asking is I'm wondering how a mercenary infantry unit tech 7-10 would organize and perform. I'm assuming the marines and army do what they do because they're implementing a doctrinal concept that utilizes a large military force and that operates against inferior opponents, but I doubt an isolated company of for-profit infantry operating against who-knows-who have the same doctrine. so, would they operate in the same way regardless because it's simply the best way, or would they do something different? and if they do operate the same, would they be like the marines, or the army, or something else? and why?

 

[Captain Midnight]

is there any objective reason for this, or is it a "we're marines, we do things by 3's" and "we're army, we do things by 2's" thing?

There are differences of opinion about how many things one leader can keep track of, and about what size unit is most flexible. Generally, though, you're going to have each leader responsible for somewhere between 3 to 5 subordinate units. One of the usual tactics will probably be to have one element pin the enemy with fire while another element advances; if more elements are present, you can either keep a reserve, reinforce another element, or envelop your opponent. James Webb wrote an interesting article in 1972 on reorganizing USMC fire teams, though it doesn't seem to have ever gotten serious consideration. The problem with splitting a squad into many smaller units is that the smaller units can become ineffective or even totally disappear if they take casualties, and there's no consensus on just what the optimum mix is for balancing flexibility and resistance to damage.

Your weapons mix will also affect your TO&E (Table of Organization & Equipment) -- if you can only afford two "heavy weapons" per squad, it makes little sense to split into three elements. There's also the problem of transportation; it's a bad idea to have a squad so large that it needs 1.5 APCs to carry it, for example. If your available vehicles put restrictions on you, that may solve your problem; if you can customize your vehicles to your ideal squad, you're a lucky commander indeed.

It's also not always easy to ignore the influences of tradition, whatever the tradition is that they're coming from. It's possible that a certain organizational structure may be adopted because that was the structure that the CO trained with, and he's not comfortable with (or willing to) adopt anything else.

I would expect a lower-tech mercenary company like the one you're describing to be a specialist in some particular field, whether it's protected-forces operations, city fighting, special ops, reconnaissance, or something else like that. Their organization will probably be determined by their specialty and the gear and tactics required for that job.

If you did run across a unit that was strictly line infantry... I'd expect them to be mechanized infantry, and so the carrying capacity of their vehicles would be a major factor. One squad per APC, with additional vehicles for HQ troops, would be my guideline. If you are customizing the APCs, come up with a number that makes you happy and meets any transport requirements; I like a capacity of 16, which allows for a driver, gunner, squad leader, 3 4-man fire teams, and a casualty/prisoner/observer. It's also pretty damn huge for an APC, which is a disadvantage; as an example, a Stryker only carries a 9-man squad plus two vehicle crewmen. Instead, you're looking at something more like the size of a USMC AAV, which carries 25 combat-loaded Marines. Sure, advanced technology will enable you to cut the size somewhat, but it's still hard to cram that many guys into a tiny hull.

There may be limits on the maximum size of an APC, depending on your requirements -- does it have to be amphibious? Does it have to fit in a C-130? Does it have to be airdroppable? What sort of firepower should it provide? Your vehicle design rules will help you define the possibilities, and without some idea of what you're using, I can't speak to what's going to be optimal.

 

[aramis]

Force deployment schemes in the US have varried widely.

At one point, a regiment was defined as "8-16 companies under a Colonel" and a brigade as 2 to 5 regiments under a brigadier. Companies at that time were lead by Captains with 2 or 3 lieutenants, and the 3 or 4 platoons were 60 men each, lead by a Platoon Sergeant... with a corporal for each of the 3 or 4 squads (3 of 20 or 4 of 15)... Battalions were ad hoc...2 to 4 companies under a major. This is the pattern of the USCW...

Now, a platoon is often 4 squads of 8, or about 32... but it's got far more firepower than a USCW era Regiment!

Changes in technology, changes in comm tech especially, have altered unit sizes. In the USCW, Corps and Divisions would often march en mass (in long collum), as it was the only way to ensure they would remain in comm...

Now, platoons are often considered independent maneuver elements.

As the field of battle changes, each independent service changes with it.

IMTU, I've seen 3 plt of 3sq of 5 men ea companies (Battle Dress) in the same unit with 4 Plt of 2 sec of 2 sq of 14 men each companies of line foot. The player chose to organize his unit for roughly similar firepower...

 

[flykiller]

The problem with splitting a squad into many smaller units is that the smaller units can become ineffective or even totally disappear if they take casualties

yeah, it seemed that way to me. I'm no expert on the subject, but I sat and stared at the army arrangement for about half an hour and eventually thought, "the firepower is undeniable, but it sure looks fragile. and just why is the 16 being deprecated?" I supposed that maybe the marines had three fireteams so that they could take casualties and still mix-and-match to achieve two remaining teams.

(I see this everywhere. so much of our military doctrine, rdt&e, and procurement seems to assume that the enemy will hold still and can't shoot back. I'm afraid our next encounter with a serious opponent will be excessively bloody for us.)

thanks for the link, it seems to discuss the same thoughts I had. the wikipedia article fireteam discusses the marine practice of automatic responses which seems to address some of webb's concerns about the fire team leader sometimes being in a less than optimal position - but the formation still seems fragile. I don't know if webb's suggestions are an answer but I hope there's some attempt at making the squads more robust before we face a real opponent.

thanks.

 

[jec10]

Other countries have other ideas. For a long time the British Commonwealth used the infantry section sub-organised into three groups - scout, rifle and gun. The gun group had the section's rapid fire support weapon. Numbers per section vary from country to country and from era to era.

While I recognise that Traveller is a US-originated game, it always bothers me that Traveller military units seem almost exclusively built on US principles (taken to the extreme in GURPS Traveller).

 

[pendragonman]

Ahh, well. I have never limited MTU to US military doctrinal sections. I pull what I like of any country's doctrine that I like.

For instance, I like the make up of the Soviet motorized rifle regiment for mainline Army units up to tech 11-12, the make up of the S.A.S. for Battledress units. The modern German army's approach to armor units, etc.

Traveller, IMHO, is doctrinally limited by the GM, not the books. But then I am a CT person, so we are a bit more used to using what we want and not being limited to a books description.

 

[Kharum1]

I just thought that every planet government structured their units according to their terrain and cultural archtype. A pre-designed unit will not work the same in all locations. Flexibility is a requirement, fighting in a flat desert might require less high tech men then fighting in a jungle. These numbers might increase the further down the tech ladder you go. I guess my suggestion would be to know the planet they are going to be active on and tailor them to it. If they are a merc unit then flexibility would be the norm. JMO

 

[flykiller]

I like the make up of the Soviet motorized rifle regiment for mainline Army units up to tech 11-12, the make up of the S.A.S. for Battledress units. The modern German army's approach to armor units, etc.

I never seem to be able to find any basic descriptions of military doctrines, could I ask you to explain each of these? I'd especially like to hear why you like the soviet model for anything. as I understood it their entire organization was driven by the need to make use of uneducated and potentially hostile peasants many of whom didn't speak russian.

 

[aramis]

The soviet model was shown to be dangerously effective, especially their armor model, by the US Army OpFor Regiment.

Said regiment used US soldiers, but soviet doctrine, equiment, and tactics. and had better than 100:1 success (from 1977-1988, undefeated...) when equivalent strength units were fielded. To defeat them required either equipment failure or massive numbers superiority.

The Soviet Military, outside the 1919-1930 window, was essentially the Imperial Russian Army, part II... (My bachalaureate thesis was on the re-tsarification of the Soviet Army.)

From a merely abstract point, 5 categories seem to exist:
Conscripts
Yefreytor
NCO
Praporshiki
Officers

Conscripts generally are in for 2 years; Initial entry training is specialized to the unit, and done by the regiment, not in centralized centers.

Yefreytor (Corporal) is an anomaly. THe best conscripts in the regimental Initial Entry Training go to centralized yefreytor schools, and also many renlistees. A few remain privates upon reenlisting, but those are supposedly few.

NCO's are renlistees, usually conscript-yefreytors. In the Tsarist period, they were usually the best yefreytors having served 2+ years as such...

Praporshiks are roughly equal to warrant officers in the brittish model. The very best of the yefreytor school graduates go on to praporshik schools, and some cadet programs send candidates direct to praporshik schools.

Officers are trained in schools modeled after the Junker schools. While not so well educatedas western officers, they are more directed in their training than many US officers. I've read also that failed officer candidates can wind up as Praporshiki, but not in high-reliability soviet sources. I know that it was done in later period Tsarist Army.

As to tactical organization, their armor traveled in long column, and was higly effective in that role.

Russian infantry models ... I've forgotten too much to be specific... are generally praporshik and officer lead. NCO's are not leaders, per se, more simply supervisors and technicians.

One other thing; under the Imperial Russian model, there were 20 year privates, and sometimes, brilliant NCO's could rise to become officers.

 

[flykiller]

The soviet model was shown to be dangerously effective, especially their armor model, by the US Army OpFor Regiment.

Said regiment used US soldiers, but soviet doctrine, equiment, and tactics. and had better than 100:1 success (from 1977-1988, undefeated...) when equivalent strength units were fielded.

(laugh) yeah man, I was there. my reserve unit ran an exercise with one of those opfor groups, kicked our ass. of course the opfor boys were primarily senior sergeants with years of training, study, and experience at running both our doctrine and soviet doctrine. it was their duty station, to do precisely that, and they probably were the most experienced men in the u.s. army. I don't think a soviet division would ever have implemented soviet doctrine nearly as well as opfor did, so I don't think opfor's record is indicative of what actual field results might have been.

as for the soviet army, it was draftee and 99.9% left after their two year term was up. the officer corps was the only reliable feature of the red army, and I just don't see the practices necessary to make such a situation work as being any kind of model for any kind of voluntary sub-national military organization.

As to tactical organization, their armor traveled in long column, and was higly effective in that role.

I'm sorry, you're saying it would deploy into combat in a column?

 

[aramis]

Capping the T was their official doctrine, when possible. When not, deploy in column from the mouth of a valley, firing on anything in sight.

As to the soviet draftee ratios... 100% of the Soviet Army was conscript.

Among the enlisted, about 90-95% left, from sources I used in college (covering 1960-80), leaving the NCO corps fairly well staffed, and almost all NCO's went career.

Navy had even better stats.

 

[flykiller]

Among the enlisted, about 90-95% left, from sources I used in college (covering 1960-80), leaving the NCO corps fairly well staffed, and almost all NCO's went career.

Navy had even better stats.

well this is certainly contrary to everything I was taught by opfor specialists in both the army and the navy. we were told that in the soviet army, an "nco" was an otherwise ordinary draftee who had been trained in a short course, that virtually all draftees left as soon as their service was up, and that in the soviet army officers frequently performed functions that in western armies were performed by non-comms or less, such as radio operator. and we were told that the navy was the worst of all in terms of retention. the reasons given all made sense to me.

well, anyway. soviet military practices were driven by poor quality soldiers, poor quality nco leadership, a need for absolute political control, and a need for total offense 24/7. they did very well with what they had to work with, and some of it was even admirable in theory, but I can't imagine any voluntary sub-national military unit emulating soviet practices by choice.

 

[flykiller]

A pre-designed unit will not work the same in all locations ... If they are a merc unit then flexibility would be the norm.

of course, almost doesn't need to be said. but I'd imagine that modern u.s. marines are as flexible as you can get outside of a vacc suit, and they seem to have made a transition from open desert to close urban quarters without major change in their squad t.o.e.

one must be flexible within the range of what works, and the range of what works doesn't seem to be very extensive.

... it always bothers me that Traveller military units seem almost exclusively built on US principles ....

there are other ways, yes, but it's hard to disregard a record of proven combat success.

it would be interesting to table-top wargame at a company level the various approaches to squad and platoon t.o.e. maybe even as a field exercise.

 

[flykiller]

marine tactics in iraq

 

[Gallowglacht]

there are other ways, yes, but it's hard to disregard a record of proven combat success.

Really? I actualy think it would be quite hard to quantify the value of modern US doctrine in that record of success. How much is doctrine? How much is technology? How much is due to professional versus draftee/guerillas? Until the US fights the likes of the UK again, I dont see recent record a reliable measure of the effectiveness of US military principles over that of other proffesional armies.
There may be other ways of proving such a superiority however.
58th century organisation is as likely to be French as American.

 

[flykiller]

Really? I actualy think it would be quite hard to quantify the value of modern US doctrine in that record of success. How much is doctrine? How much is technology? How much is due to professional versus draftee/guerillas?

it's always fun to speculate and theorize, yes.

58th century organisation is as likely to be French as American.

(laugh). maybe. stranger things have happened.

 

[Kharum1]

58th century organisation is as likely to be French as American.

I have to bit my tongue on this one.