General Army Promotion Rates

[Timerover51]

Normally, I post military data in another thread, but after reading this, I felt that it needed as wide an audience as possible, as it has clear relevance to the Character Generation Rules for all of the various editions and permutations. The data comes from an Army Ground Forces Observer Team that accompanied the 24 Army Corps prior to and following the invasion of Okinawa in April of 1945. As it was done by and for the Army Ground Forces, the promotion rates would not include the Army Air Force units in the Pacific Ocean Area.

The Pacific Ocean Area analyzed the time in grade of all officer ranks from 2nd Lieutenant up to Colonel in the Army units within its command. The study showed the time in grade of the various ranks as of 1 September 1944, so it would not have picked up the casualty promotion rate for the Philippines campaign. The following is the average time in grade for officers in the Army from 2nd Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel. Time in grade represents the time from promotion from one grade to a higher one.

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for 2nd Lieutenants is one (1) year, four (4) months.

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for 1st Lieutenants is one (1) year, one (1) month.

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grades for Captains is one (1) year, three (3) months.

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for Major is one (1) year, three (3) months.

Pacific Ocean Area average years in grade for Lt.Colonel is one (1) year, six (6) months.

This matches up with a comment by Ernie Pyle about officers in North Africa in late 1942, where an officer made Lieutenant Colonel at the age of 27, 13 years faster than his father. Assuming that he was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant at the age of 21, he made Lieutenant Colonel in 6 years.

In the Pacific, an officer could go from 2nd Lieutenant to Major in 45 months, or within a Traveller 4 year term. To reach Colonel would take another 33 months on average, again well within a Traveller 4 year term, or within 2 terms upon being commissioned. This is significantly faster than shown in say The Traveller Book. Now, these are rates of wartime promotion rates in a major war against an enemy that literally fought to the last man, so quite intensive combat.

However, from looking at this data, which does cover a fairly large sample, it appears that the normal promotion rate in Traveller reflects a peace-time or minor warm-war situation, compared to the above promotion rate which would reflect a major hot-war situation. Basically, you could go from Rank 1, Lieutenant, to Rank 5, Colonel, in two terms, compared to 4 terms per the rules as given. You also might want to give serious thought to making promotion to General a bit more difficult, otherwise, you would have an awful lot of Generals in your campaign.

For those interested, you can download the entire report from archive.org at the following location: https://archive.org/details/a438976
Note, it is a wartime mimeograph, so not the easiest reading, but a lot better than some that I have encountered.

 

[aramis]

At one point, I looked up the numbers for the 'Nam era; the Traveller numbers are a rather close fit to the 'Nam promotion rates.

Given that Frank and Marc both served in the Vietnam War Era... As did at least one other member of the GDW team... it's no surprise.

 

[AnotherDilbert]

The data comes from an Army Ground Forces Observer Team that accompanied the 24 Army Corps prior to and following the invasion of Okinawa in April of 1945. As it was done by and for the Army Ground Forces, the promotion rates would not include the Army Air Force units in the Pacific Ocean Area.

The data is from WWII, hence when the armed forces were expanded rapidly. Of course promotions comes more rapidly when there are suddenly many more slots for higher grade officers that needs to be filled.

That is very far from "normal" promotion rates. Look at the twenties or early thirties, or perhaps the last few decades, and you will find much lower promotion rates?

Looking at my experience of the Swedish Army, a 27 y.o. officer is a Lieutenant, not a Lt. Colonel...

 

[kilemall]

Simple mechanic-

Determine if war is part of your universe backstory.

Increase the survival roll for a wartime term by whatever risk factor the player chooses.

For every -1 to survival roll taken per war term, one of the following choices are available-

• An extra promotion roll
• +1 to promotion rolls that term, including multiples
• An extra benefit roll

For non-hierarchical careers like Scouts in many versions, the extra benefit rolls are the only choice possible.



The other part is lining up the rest of the chardev with your universe's war dates. A little fudging may work as prewar shadow struggles before the 'main event', or cleanup of messy postwar conflicts, but the character's age and war service shouldn't be more then one term off.

Reshuffling some of the terms' order or requiring a certain set of terms to be survived for the results to stand may be required.

 

[chipla]

The other part is lining up the rest of the chardev with your universe's war dates. A little fudging may work as prewar shadow struggles before the 'main event', or cleanup of messy postwar conflicts, but the character's age and war service shouldn't be more then one term off.

Reshuffling some of the terms' order or requiring a certain set of terms to be survived for the results to stand may be required.

It also depends what you mean by war. Famously since 1914 Britain has spent something like a single year without engaging in military conflict somewhere but has for much of the post 1945 period been ‘at peace’. Pre-1914 the figures for British warfighting aren’t much better. During the Pax Britannia the British were constantly at war. In the 64 years of Victoria’s reign for instance Britain fought 230 wars.

While a character might not have fought in the nth interstellar war or the fourth frontier war they’re very likely to have fought in the 17th SpaceAfgan War or the Defence of the Legations in the SpaceBoxer Rebellion.

That said promotion rates also depend on the size of your army and if there’s expansion or contraction. An alternative system might be to look at where wars and expansions/demobilisations occur within a character’s lifetime and allow for an extra promotion roll for each expansion/war period…

 

[Condottiere]

It is a question of expansion, contraction, stagnation and/or tempo.

You also have to categorize it as junior, field and general officers, and the need to have critical masses of each, in order to ensure that institutional knowledge and esprit de corps is preserved and passed on.

Also, if you lead from the front, you do need to be able to replace casualties.

I think the current policy in America is up or out; empires like Britain could farm out their officer corps to their colonial forces to gain that experience and fill up command slots.

It seems to me that in the Great Patriotic War, American commanders were judged very much on results, so if one didn't seem to work out, he got replaced.

Gavin was promoted to Major General at thirty seven; Custer was a brigadier general at twenty three.

Second lieutenant, 2nd Cavalry: June 24, 1861
First lieutenant, 5th Cavalry: July 17, 1862
Captain staff, additional aide-de-camp: June 5, 1862
Brigadier general, U.S. Volunteers: June 29, 1863
Brevet major, July 3, 1863 (Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania)
Captain, 5th Cavalry: May 8, 1864
Brevet lieutenant colonel: May 11, 1864 (Battle of Yellow Tavern – Combat at Meadow)
Brevet colonel: September 19, 1864 (Battle of Winchester, Virginia)
Brevet major general, U.S. Volunteers: October 19, 1864 (Battle of Winchester and Fisher's Hill, Virginia)
Brevet brigadier general, U.S. Army, March 13, 1865 (Battle of Five Forks, Virginia)
Brevet major general, U.S. Army: March 13, 1865 (The campaign ending in the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia)
Major general, U.S. Volunteers: April 15, 1865
Mustered out of Volunteer Service: February 1, 1866
Lieutenant colonel, 7th Cavalry: July 28, 1866 (killed at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, June 25, 1876)

Brevetting is a simple way to give officers temporary authority, without committing the Army into actually promoting them. Currently, the problem seems to be that pay is tied to grade, so if retention requires a salary raise, you have to promote those individuals.

 

[Dominator]

It would be interesting to know how many of those officers were allowed to stay in the regular army and keep their rank once the war was over.

 

[whartung]

I always thought it would be interesting to have a personnel model for the fleet.

Simply, you have a fleet of everything from Destroyers to Carriers to Battleships as well as auxiliaries and fleet tenders etc.

They all need to be crewed.

Simply, take a "starter fleet", crew it up, and then run a, say, 50 year simulation of the staff.

Only, you have to have ships to actually fill. New ships need to be crewed, old ships needs to be retired, battle losses.

This more stemmed from a game like Starfire, where the fleet is nothing but expanding and contracting with battle. Where do you get the officers? Who are chosen? Who gets promoted? Who got the "Battle at Star Junction" combat ribbon? Who died in the battle? Even down to having to have folks transfer from one ship to another. How long does it take them to get there? Should someone be overlooked if they're 6 months of travel away from the post? "We were going to promote you, but you were on the wrong side of the galaxy."

I was hoping to discover a couple of things. Those crazy success stories of crewmembers that started on deck and rose to Admiral. Accelerated career paths filling battle loses, etc.

Even if it's all "random", it would be an interesting way to add a story to each ship. You could see the service history of each ships commander.

 

[Condottiere]

 

[aramis]

There are statutory requirements for US promotions; 10 USC §619

O1 to O2: 1.5 years
O2 to O3: 1.5 years (before 1 Oct 2008) or 2 years (after 2008)
O3 to O4: 3 years
O4 to O5: 3 years
O5 to O6: 3 years
O6 to O7: 1 year
O7 to O8: 1 year.

Since 1925, up or out has applied. Up until after WW II, if you failed promotion twice, you were either discharged ( under 10 years total service) or retained non-promotably (over 10 years total service). Non promotables may not extend past their next separation date unless exempted by the department secretary, or in an LDO position. LDO's don't get automatic consideration. Everyone with a full commission and in the zone is required to be considered unless an LDO.
Army regs currently permit skipping a board despite being in the zone; this cannot be done consecutively except by those exempted from boards or in particular understaffed fields.

Note that the up or out without skips puts an O1 to a maximum of 4 years in grade, and O2 the same. O3 to O5 to 5 years in grade, and O6 and O7 3 years in grade... but there are provisions for O6's and O7's to be excluded from promotion at the service secretary's order. (most commonly, no slots to promote to.)
LDOs are exempted. Reserve commissions on reserve duty are also exempted.
By statute, Marine LDO's are not exempt until O4. Unlike the other services.

 

[whartung]

How do they make room for those who "must" be promoted? Because if you're promoted, don't you typically change positions?

 

[Condottiere]

Depends on attrition.

If I recall correctly, the number of general and flag officers is strictly controlled by Congress, and the joke in Britain was, you had more admirals than warships.

It also appears that another solution is rank inflation for command positions.

 

[aramis]

Depends on attrition.

If I recall correctly, the number of general and flag officers is strictly controlled by Congress, and the joke in Britain was, you had more admirals than warships.

It also appears that another solution is rank inflation for command positions.

I would say "Capped" or "limited" rather than "Controlled" - as the Army has, at times, not used all the eligible slots. Or has filled them with Brevets/"Temporary Appointments"

Then again, Congress also has actively limited all officer ranks. Including Warrant Officers.

Not all the congressionally allocated slots are used. EG: The USAF is authorized a significant number of Warrants/Chief Warrants, but stopped making new ones in 1959, retired the last Active Duty CWO in 1980, and the last Air Force Reserve CWO retied and was promoted to CWO5... in 1992.

Be interesting to see if the USSF retains the "no warrants" policy of the USAF.

 

[Condottiere]

I'm not too familiar with the Air Force, assuming it's not some way of screwing the rank and file out of money, it could be creating a culture, not necessarily of equality, but everyone's special.

 

[MThompson016]

The thing about Classic Traveller character generation is that in makes people who are adventuring for a reason, in my humble opinion.

The Army is just after a major war where a number of officers are either discharged from a RIF. It's easy in to become an officer, and get promoted, but staying in is cutthroat. As said above, it's a product of the time, by Vietnam veterans.

 

[aramis]

The thing about Classic Traveller character generation is that in makes people who are adventuring for a reason, in my humble opinion.

The Army is just after a major war where a number of officers are either discharged from a RIF. It's easy in to become an officer, and get promoted, but staying in is cutthroat. As said above, it's a product of the time, by Vietnam veterans.

CT didn't have a major war just ended in the rules. It barely had setting at all in the core, and the default timeline for CT is before the 5FW.

Until VERY late in the line, the 5FW was purely in JTAS.

In the "default" of 1101, the 4FW is 20 years past, and is the largest imperial action since the Solomani Rim War, over a century before.

While I agree that the post war drawdown probably influenced the retention numbers, but good luck getting Marc to explicate the design decisions.

 

[JimCook]

USAF changes

I'm not too familiar with the Air Force, assuming it's not some way of screwing the rank and file out of money, it could be creating a culture, not necessarily of equality, but everyone's special.

The USAF has always maintained that to fly an aircraft you had to be a commissioned officer. They have always struggled to keep flight officers for transport and utility aircraft. Most officer joining the USAF want to be fighter pilots.

Now with drones, they are having even more issues. Few pilots were willing to give up flying real aircraft and fly drones. They have grudgingly start allowing enlist personnel to fly some classes of drones. There is at least some consideration to bring back WO to be drone pilots.

 

[whartung]

As I understand it, in the Army, helicopter pilots are Warrant Officers.

They're technically officers, but barely, and not for command per se. I don't know what makes an officer an officer and better qualified for flight duties vs, say, commanding a tank.

 

[Enoki]

As I understand it, in the Army, helicopter pilots are Warrant Officers.

They're technically officers, but barely, and not for command per se. I don't know what makes an officer an officer and better qualified for flight duties vs, say, commanding a tank.

This was done because of pay issues. Think of it this way. To fly a helicopter you have to reasonably smart and capable intellectually. The Army isn't getting people like that in large numbers enlisting. Using officers requiring a college education and degree is expensive.
So, the resulting choice is to give helicopter pilots a warrant commission to get them higher pay and benefits without the need for a degree. It is an enlistment incentive to get people that can learn to fly a helicopter to join to begin with.

The Navy does the same with a number of programs giving accelerated advancement for the same reason. They know getting people into those programs is difficult and want to keep as many as they can. The major way to do that is offer them a pile of money and other benefits to join and stay.

An example of doing it wrong is the USAF and ballistic missiles. These units require a fair number of officers sitting at the control panels ready to nuke the planet. But the potential for promotion is low and cross specialty movement into areas that have better opportunities is low. The result is the USAF has great difficulty retaining missile officers.

The same thing happens in most, if not all, militaries. I'd say that in the Traveller universe the same thing happens. This really isn't reflected in the way characters are generated, but I think it could be.

 

[Condottiere]

Originally, I would have said the trend was a case of rank inflation, but if you reflect that aircraft are becoming increasingly expensive, justified in terms of authority and responsibility.

Pay and social status that come along with a commission might also be a reason.


Enlisted Pilots (1912-42)
The first enlisted U.S. Army pilot was Corporal Vernon L. Burge, a crew chief at the U.S. Army's flight school in the Philippines.[2] When Captain Frank P. Lahm, the school's commander, couldn't find enough commissioned officer applicants, he trained Burge, who received his FAI pilot's license on 14 June 1912. Although the practice was officially condemned, the Army later relented, as Burge was already a trained aviator.

The second was Corporal William A. Lamkey. Lamkey entered the Army Signal Corps in 1913, but had already received his FAI license from the Moisant Aviation School in 1912. Lamkey later left the Army to work as a mercenary pilot.

The third pilot was Sergeant William C. Ocker. Ocker was denied pilot training because he was an enlisted man, so he became an aircraft mechanic instead. In his off hours he exchanged work for flight lessons from the nearby Curtiss Flying School. Eventually, he qualified for his FAI license on 20 April 1914, receiving certificate #293.[3]:23–24 Ocker did mostly test pilot work to accrue flight hours and tested many experimental or early prototype aircraft. He is famous for inventing "blind flying" training to teach pilots to fly by instruments in cloudy or dark conditions.

World War I (1914-18)
Only 29 enlisted pilots were created by 1914 and most were commissioned as second lieutenants in 1917.

From 1914 to 1918, sixty mechanics were trained as pilots. They were used as ferry pilots and did not fly in combat. Their primary job was to transfer new and repaired aircraft from rear areas to air bases and forward air fields. They would then fly patched-up damaged aircraft back for more thorough repairs.

The Army Air Corps Act of 1926 set certain standards as part of a five-year program to expand and improve the aviation arm of the U.S. Army. It set a quota that 20% of a tactical aviation unit's pilot billets must be manned by enlisted pilots by 1929. By 1930, only 4% of all pilots were enlisted. New pilots were usually commissioned to meet the need for pilot-rated officers in Air Corps administrative and command billets. Enlisted pilots didn't have a place in the hierarchy when they stopped flying and either reverted to their old pre-flying trade or were discharged.

In 1933, the training and creation of enlisted pilots was discontinued due to budget cuts and lack of funds.

World War II (1939-45)
In 1939 there were only 55 enlisted pilots in the then-U.S. Army Air Corps (USAAC).

On 3 June 1941, Public Law 99 was enacted, allowing enlisted men to apply to flight training. Candidates had to be between the ages of 18 and 22, have a high school diploma with at least 1.5 credit hours worth of math, and have graduated in the top half of their class. In November 1941, this was reduced to being at least 18 years old and possessing a high school diploma. After demand lifted in mid-1944, the requirements went back to college-educated or college graduate candidates.

Enlisted pilots were called flying sergeants.[4] Graduating enlisted pilots were graded as flight staff sergeants while pilots who graduated at the top of their class were graded as flight technical sergeants. They were usually assigned to flying transport and liaison aircraft. Their pilot status was only indicated by their pilot's wings, often leading to enlisted aviators being mistaken for air crew or harassed for impersonating a pilot. This caused a lot of bad feelings between the enlisted pilots (who had more dangerous jobs for lower pay and no privileges) and the officer pilots (who received the same pay, promotability, and privileges as officers).[5]

The first enlisted pilot cadets were part of class 42C (enrolling in November, 1941 and graduating on 7 March 1942), which trained at Kelly Field and Ellington Field, Texas. 93 enlisted graduates became P-38 fighter pilots and were assigned to the 82nd Fighter Group in North Africa. Members of this class shot down 130 enemy aircraft and nine became aces.[6]

The program created 2,576 enlisted pilots from 1941 to 1942. 332 enlisted pilots served overseas and 217 of them flew combat missions. Enlisted pilots destroyed 249.5 enemy aircraft and 18 became aces. Lt. William J. Sloan was the leading ace of the 12th Air Force with 12 victories.[6]

When Public Law 658 (Flight Officer Act)[7] was passed on 8 July 1942 most enlisted pilots were promoted to the new rank of flight officer and newly-graduating enlisted pilots were graded as flight officers or second lieutenants depending on merit.[5] This ended the creation of enlisted pilots in the U.S. Army.

Overview
The U.S. Army created almost 3,000 enlisted pilots from 1912 to 1942. Seven pre-War enlisted pilots and four World War II enlisted pilots became U.S. Air Force generals.[6]

Last Enlisted Pilot
The U.S. Air Force's last enlisted pilot was Master Sergeant George H. Holmes (b.1898-d.1965). Holmes had enlisted in the Army as a mechanic in 1919, became a pilot with the rank of corporal in 1921, and was promoted to lieutenant's rank in the Army Reserve in 1924. The Army later made Holmes an enlisted man and he served as both a mechanic and a pilot in the 1920s and 1930s. He was promoted to captain in 1942 and achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1946. He resigned his commission and reverted to his enlisted rank of master sergeant in 1946. He continued to fly as a non-commissioned officer until he retired in May 1957.[4]


It seems more a question of wartime necessity.

Even if you switch mostly to autonomous drone operations and artificial intelligence, you're going to need manual monitoring and that human in the middle of the kill chain, which might go from a container in the Nevada desert, to a call centre in Bombay.