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Space Shuttles Under Protective Order

saundby

SOC-14 1K
It appears the Space Shuttle orbiters Atlantis and Endeavour are the objects of a protective order that prevents their being processed for retirement as museum exhibits. There appears to be a potential bid to use them as commercial vehicles.

It's too late for Discovery. She's well along in Transition & Retirement processing.

Sorry to be so vague, but I haven't found any public sources with more info. All I know at this point is what''s above plus that T&R processing work for Endeavour and Atlantis is on hold as a result of an order from NASA HQ, which has been publicly confirmed by John Shannon (though I haven't seen that reported yet, either.)

A very interesting 11th hour development!

Edit:

Found a brief (too brief) mention here.
 
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It appears that they will be dismantled to a point putting dummy engines for display and things like that. With the actual engines to be put aside for possible future use along with many other components.
 
I wonder if Virgin Galactic is trying to buy them.

Boeing had a plan to continue to fly them to fill the gap between now and the first new commercial launches to ISS. They also produced a study and cost estimate for converting shuttle parts (ET, SRBs, SSMEs) into a medium/heavy lift rocket (ballpark 50 to 130 metric tons to LEO vs 10-25 metric tons for existing rockets).
 
This is something aside from the planned decommissioning with the SSMEs being laid aside for SLS.

The teardown on Endeavour and its components is being halted, except for standard postflight decontam it won't be started on Atlantis while the order is in effect. I haven't heard what the effect is on teardown of pad 39A. Pad 39B is already stripped to something close to the "clean pad" configuration they're planning for commercial operations.

The scuttlebutt I've heard is that United Space Alliance has a package they want to propose for commercial ops, the proposal is supposed to be reviewed very soon. Time may be given after the review for pulling together the necessary underwriters, partners, etc. if things go favorably for the presenters.

This would put the Shuttle, as Shuttle, back in operation in about 2 years if the proposal uses the existing design. Perhaps a smidge sooner, if one ET article that's available can be used for flight. It would take a couple of years to get any other ETs, though.

There's also the possibility of using the Orbiter as part of a new launch system. I can't see that being any faster or better than an SLS/Orion-MPCV plan, though. Then there's also the very considerable possibility that there's something else driving this that I know nothing about. Political maneuvering, a particular national defense requirement, or someone's come up with a totally different use for the Orbiter.

But at any rate, this is an interruption of the work to transition the Orbiters to museum exhibits with parts being laid aside for possible future use. It's an order to stop work to preserve the two last Orbiters as potentially working spacecraft.

The order isn't secret, but there's been surprisingly little talk about it. (Perhaps because the proposal is seen as pretty well doomed, despite the order to perform no unrecoverable T&R work on Endeavour and Atlantis.)
 
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One of the shuttle's primary design requirements (indeed compromised a lot of the civilian desires) was being able to retrieve military 'packages' of a size and mass and return them to earth. Objectives and requirements changed during the development program (the delayed shuttle proved much less useful/required than originally planned).

No other launch vehicle has this capability, IIRC. I would expect a good possibility that at least one shuttle would be mothballed in return to service condition.

As to commercial endeavors - maybe one launch, and parts more likely. The shuttle is just way to expensive to 'turn around' for launch to normally be profitable (unless someone has a unique use for the cargo hold - like drug manufactoring). Likely, the military would have to have reason to subsidize it.
 
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^ agree with BytePro above. The shuttle is a very expensive loss leader, but has the biggest payload capacity around. The engines are perhaps useful for other things, but the shuttle itself would only be affordable by the military.
 
All it would take for a shuttle flight to pay of is 100K doses of some miracle drug. Or one military cargo.

That said, there are FAR better heat shield options than the current ceramic; a producer of same could replace the tiles FAR cheaper, and due to the level of hands-off-the-tech at NASA, even having been shown it's superiority, the contracts were in-place and inviolate for the tiles. Same with a number of other elements. The shuttle was price gouged from the get go, and a commercial supplier should be able to do the refurb for about 80% of the cost or less, and in half the time, by elimination of a lot of the in-house NASA red tape.
 
Yep - any commercial operation should strip off the tiles and go with something sane (even completely replaced spray on every mission would be far better). That one political boondoggle was the largest contributing factor to the delays, cost overruns, relaunch expense - and ultimately, several deaths. :(

It would also help relaunch costs, but that whole system would need to be overhauled - there are over a million certs for each launch! Unfortunately, that still leaves an enormous expense and risk - the payload capacity comes at a cost that is non-linear. The cargo hold is both a boon, and a huge liability - most especially because of the doors. The extremes of launch and near space would necessitate the like of the VAB and many of the prep that is necessary today - and that would still be extremely expensive.

The military - which provided over 60% of the funding (initially) - dictated a design that was not NASA's first, second or third choice for a re-useable vehicle. The tradeoff was funding, but also increased inherent costs (and risks) for turnaround.

On the plus side, the ending of the shuttle program may help spur private enterprise even more - especially if the military and politicians have a 'need' to do something with funds they already 'have'...
 
Yep - any commercial operation should strip off the tiles and go with something sane (even completely replaced spray on every mission would be far better). That one political boondoggle was the largest contributing factor to the delays, cost overruns, relaunch expense - and ultimately, several deaths. :(

The Titanium/Silica weave-then-bake was one of several I've heard of... lighter, tougher vs impact, just enough less rigid, AND better insulation, and about 1/10 the cost, plus it would install in large (1m^2+) sized panels...

Hidebound...
 
The Titanium/Silica weave-then-bake was one of several I've heard of... lighter, tougher vs impact, just enough less rigid, AND better insulation, and about 1/10 the cost, plus it would install in large (1m^2+) sized panels...

Hidebound...

There are several insulation technologies available today that would work - some have be incorporated in specific areas already. (Lockheed made advancements even during the 70's on their own funding, that were not applied - having been locked into the boondoggle contracts). They would be, however, initially quite expensive (possibly prohibitively) in terms of retro-fitting.

The original tile system was hailed for its lighter mass, lower 'cost' (neglecting actual total costs - of course), less stability risks (drastically overplayed), and dual function (as insulator on re-entry as well as in orbit).

Though 're-usability' was touted publicly as the main benefit - the biggest of these was invariably mass, as Military requirements demanded a specific lift capacity.

A commercial endeavor, without the development or construction costs of an orbiter (NASA usually 'sells' this stuff at less than scrapyard prices), could do well with highly proven, lower cost/tech shielding - at a tradeoff of lift capacity. Though I doubt, even with lowered turn-around costs this would bring it anywhere near competitive. However, the shuttle would still offer unique advantages. Perhaps even as a tourist bus - remove the doors and seal the bay - another major part of the cost and technical support requirements (especially in the VAB) of turn around is tied to those seals and other weaknesses inherent in having doors that present a tremendous safety risk. Of course, this is even more engineering and other upfront costs.

NASA was quite aware of the weaknesses in terms of both actual costs and risks of the tile system. They spent a ton of time and research to come up with tools and techniques to support repairing failed thermal protection in space years before STS-1 (but dropped most of it as infeasible till after the 2003 disaster).

One of the cameras my father built for the first three STS missions was mounted on the underbody to take pictures as the external tank was 'released'. I remember remarking how bright the stars looked in the photos (my dad still has some kodaks of this I believe - not sure any of those pictures were ever released to the general public :) ). My dad laughed and explained that the stars weren't visible in that picture - the bright points of light were debris (mostly ice) from the explosions that released the tank. Knowing how fragile the tiles were - the reason for this camera (no small undertaking I assure you) were immediately evident. :(
 
But at any rate, this is an interruption of the work to transition the Orbiters to museum exhibits with parts being laid aside for possible future use. It's an order to stop work to preserve the two last Orbiters as potentially working spacecraft.

The order isn't secret, but there's been surprisingly little talk about it. (Perhaps because the proposal is seen as pretty well doomed, despite the order to perform no unrecoverable T&R work on Endeavour and Atlantis.)

Well, given the relative nearness of the oh-so-infamous 2012 and it's conspiracy-theorists' ill-fated predictions for December, I can't resist:

Someone has obviously spotted a ridiculously huge planet-killer, due to make a 'close call' in late 2012, and they're not taking any chances, in case they need to re-enact good old Armageddon's shenanigans and fly some oil drillers to a space rock. And since this would obviously stir a panic as surely as fiercely covering it up might result in re-enactments of Deep Impact's reporter chasing what she thought was a sex scandal and uncovering the government's survival plans, they're keeping it sorta quiet. Like everyone involved is semi-miraculously agreeing that not saying anything is the best policy right now. Yep. That's my story and I'm sticking to it. That, or some variant of Robert Buettner's Orphanage. And before anyone asks, of course I haven't been binging on science fiction disaster/invasion novels and movies! Why would you think that?

-:rofl: asp
 
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On commercial operations, yeah, there are a number of improvements that can be made to reduce the costs. In the past I think that it would have been completely foolhardy to consider running a commercial Shuttle under the theory that "it's so broke it ain't worth fixing" financially, I think the last few launches have given program managers a new look at how Shuttle could work.

For one thing, we've seen the workforce reduced dramatically while still supporting flight. The flight rate is low, but the flight rate has never been high enough to reach the break even point for maintaining the "standing army" of Shuttle support staff. The high point was 1985, leading up to the Challenger disaster (9 flights.) The draw-down in personnel at NASA over the past couple of years has shown that low flight rates can be supported with far, far fewer personnel. This is a _huge_ factor in Shuttle costs.

Also, the last three flights have been exceptionally clean with respect to tile damage. This has reduced turn-around work significantly. So it's been demonstrated that the best way to deal with heat shield damage is to prevent it from happening in the first place. The managers on Shuttle have been absolute bulldogs on this point, primarily driven by a safety perspective, but the economic impact hasn't gone unnoticed.

So actual operations have demonstrated two key factors to reducing Shuttle costs.

I suspect the ability to acquire the hardware at fire-sale prices is another positive factor for commercial operation. Whoever gets it won't have to amortize the development and construction costs for their ship, unlike all the other commercial operators coming along. However, they will have to pay to put a lot of the infrastructure back into place, and pay to use some unique government facilities for which there is competition both in government work and commercial use--the VAB, at least one OPF, at least one pad, and LC-39A. The use of the SLF shouldn't conflict significantly with any other use.

Still, they could have a commercial ship flying before anyone else is ready (about 2 years). I'd expect their first customer would be ISS resupply, but they could do both resupply and crew transfer with a Shuttle, something nobody else will be ready to do for quite some time.

An advantage of flying to ISS is that they don't have to take along a bunch of extra weight in the form of the boom system. Plus Endeavour can use station power while it's there (Atlantis doesn't have a station power adapter. Of course, that could be changed.) Plus they get heat shield inspection support. Plus the repair kit is already on board (assuming they aren't packing it back down with Atlantis, I haven't seen the downmass manifest to that level of detail.)

On independent missions they'd have to carry along a robot arm, boom extension, and the full repairs kit as well as the suits for EVA (EVA suits are different than the full pressure suits they wear during launch and re-entry, so they're extra mass.)

As to sealing the cargo bay for passenger use--can't do that. Opening the doors within 20 minutes or so of reaching orbit is critical. The heat radiator panels are inside the doors. But there have been several proposals to build 30-passenger or so containers for the bay. I'm not sure if those designs include space for the airlock, which would be required on all flights now for safety reasons.

Heat shield improvements--there have already been some. The present tiles are lighter and stronger than the originals. There's probably some room for improvement, almost all Shuttle systems have had improved versions developed up to the point of flight readiness without being actually used for flight. There have been a lot of improvements to how tiles are made, fitted, and applied that reduce costs significantly. Laser scanning has made the design of replacement tiles a lot faster, more accurate, and cheaper than the old hand-sculpting methods. If the briefing I saw is correct, they can routinely expect sub-millimeter accuracy on the first fitting of a new tile. Also, tiles are replaced less than one third as often as they were even just a few years ago.

There are probably some potential revolutionary improvements, like replacing the tiles with larger sectional elements. I don't know that a commercial operation would foot the bill to test and qualify such a large change unless they saw the change paying for itself in the first few flights. Presently both orbiters have heat shields that are in great shape, good for many flights. In fact, both are in really good shape overall, another ten flights apiece without any major rework would not be a stretch.

I expect ATK wouldn't been super enthusiastic about continuing low-rate production of SRB booster segments for another 5-10 years, though. I could see them being willing to foot the bill to convert over to either 4-segment versions of the Ares/SLS SRB or to some other motor that is common with another system. As it is, they've been opposed to the use of Shuttle SRBs on SLS.

I expect that a commercial operator would be able to trim a lot of costs off of the supplier contracts. There's a lot of cruft and foo-foo in those contracts, and it's pretty well impossible to make any changes to them under government management, since even small changes open up the whole thing to renegotiation. Example: the doofus who wrote the contract for OMS engine testing wrote in the model of strip chart recorder used during sea level testing. We would happily have upgraded our recorders to more modern equipment, except that the contract called for this particular old, cantankerous unit. And yes, the USAF QA guy walked through the control room and checked.

We could have replaced the entire wall of recorders with new ones of much greater utility and lower operating cost for the price of calibrating one of the old ones. (I once saw a picture of one of the old units when it was new. President Eisenhower was standing next to it in the photo.)

That's not even getting into the expense of unnecessary tests. The old canard about someone not being sure about the specs so they just bump it up one notch and pass it along is in fact true. On one piece of avionics I worked on, we got a specification that it operate under unimaginable temperature and vibration specifications, designated by single letters then cross referenced in another document. "You are planning on putting this in the cockpit, right?" we asked.

We called the integrator's keeper of the system standards, and asked what areas of the craft had those temp and shake specs. "The rotating machinery inside the engine," was what he told us. We went back to our contract's QA person and kicked up a fuss. They tracked back along the line, and found that the temp and shake specs had been bumped up a total of 13 times as they'd been passed along for review, when the original spec had been sufficient.

In most cases, however, the contractor just delivers to the given specs without any challenges. Even if you're testing space equipment for operation at overpressure under water (no joke, I've performed such tests because I was informed it would literally take an act of Congress to change the contract requirements.)

So commercial = more efficient? You betcha.

;)

-Mark G
 
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It's non-trivial but simple to add a passenger module to the cargo bay, even tho the radiators have to be deployed. Plus, it's quite possible (in the design plans) to rig another 4 seats for lift-off in the extant cab space. Getting TO these seats, however, is problematic in vertical position, and they can't use the bailout options, either. Cargo bay seating means opening the airlock doors... and then closing them again... during load-up. Unfun. And progress through them during vertical phase is not a pleasant thought, either, especially in the rather ungainly TL7 LD vacc suits they wear as a "just in case" during TO and Landing.
 
Hey - thanks for that saundby!

Very insightful - not to mention the amusing (though frustrating, to be sure) anecdotes.

A pre-existing reduction in personnel costs for turnaround is certainly a positive for potential commercial takeover. The ROI may still not be there, but there is also the experience aspect - and potential to demonstrate ability with regards to attracting investors when ROIs and risks are projected.

...As to sealing the cargo bay for passenger use--can't do that. Opening the doors within 20 minutes or so of reaching orbit is critical. The heat radiator panels are inside the doors. ...
:o I felt when I wrote that short, glib, bit about sealing the cargo bay that there was some big fly in that ointment! A sealed internal compartment might help, but most of the potential advantages I was thinking about would be lost. Seems the safety requirements plus accessibility and life support for any extended duration, could make this impractical, anyway.

Though, the ability to carry even a dozen passengers would be impressive and good PR and 'proof' of ability for a company looking for capital, perhaps.

The SRBs could definitely be an issue though - as well as the launch facilities. The KSC VAB and 39A are the only ready-made options for shuttle launches, IIRC - 39B was re-tooled several years back and Vandenburg was out of the picture after the Challenger disaster and not optimal in most cases anyway.
 
I always wondered if there were some drop in military modules for the shuttle. Maybe thay are still viable.

Or more likely NASA just wants to keep a life boat or two on hand in case the ISS needs to be evacuated or quickly repaired.

Then there is the possibility the U.S. wants to have some heavy lift ability to take up more modules or put up another telescope.

Sounds like someone is keeping his options open for some reason.

Different then the normal political burn the bridges than spend 3 times as much to rebuild them programs we are used to.

Commercial can be well and good but these are good to go now.
 
Hey - thanks for that saundby!

Very insightful - not to mention the amusing (though frustrating, to be sure) anecdotes.

A pre-existing reduction in personnel costs for turnaround is certainly a positive for potential commercial takeover. The ROI may still not be there, but there is also the experience aspect - and potential to demonstrate ability with regards to attracting investors when ROIs and risks are projected.


:o I felt when I wrote that short, glib, bit about sealing the cargo bay that there was some big fly in that ointment! A sealed internal compartment might help, but most of the potential advantages I was thinking about would be lost. Seems the safety requirements plus accessibility and life support for any extended duration, could make this impractical, anyway.

Though, the ability to carry even a dozen passengers would be impressive and good PR and 'proof' of ability for a company looking for capital, perhaps.

The SRBs could definitely be an issue though - as well as the launch facilities. The KSC VAB and 39A are the only ready-made options for shuttle launches, IIRC - 39B was re-tooled several years back and Vandenburg was out of the picture after the Challenger disaster and not optimal in most cases anyway.

Thanks.

Safety for a passenger module?

"Exits from the cabin are located in the front..."
Stewardesses point foreward.
"...and in the back."
Stewardesses point sternward.
"In the event of an emergency, bits of you will exit to the left..."
Stewadesses point to port.
"...and to the right..."
Stewardesses point starboard.
"...and up and down..."
Stewardesses point Z+ and Z-.
"...and every which way..."
Stewardesses fingers swing in wild circles.
"...and bits of you will be incinerated in place."
Stewardesses wave their arms and mime screaming.
"Please sit back and enjoy your voyage."

SRBs would not be too big an issue, except for the fact that ATK thinks that if they resist them enough they'll get more money to make the new ones, at least on the SLS (the new U.S. heavy lifter that is supposed to be under development except for the back and forth between NASA and Congress right now as they try to agree on a design and funding level.) The cases are still available, and good for more flights. It may be that they're straining at the contract requirements, and they perceive the problem to be closely enough tied to the booster that even a contract rewrite won't solve the problem. Or there may be some handling issue or something else that makes it a PITA to deal with that I'm not aware of (perhaps its a mix process they don't want to keep doing, I don't know. I've known some mix and casting processes that I would find something to do in another part of the plant at certain points if I wasn't directly involved.)

On pads, SLC-6 at Vandenberg has been rebuilt for the Delta-IV and IV Heavy. There was a hydrogen entrapment problem that was used as an excuse to stop work on the pad after Challenger. In fact the problem was solvable but the AF had already been looking for a way out of Shuttle that left them with enough resources for something else. That led to Titan IV. SLC-6 was really far along, and I was really looking forward to seeing Shuttle launches there (I lived just north of the base then.) Pad 39B is being prepared for commercial launches, as are at least two of the mobile launch pads.

In related news, it looks like a man-rated Atlas V is moving forward. This is the prospective launch vehicle for both the Sierra Nevada Dream Chaser and the Boeing CST-100 commercial capsule, both being developed for Commercial Crew Vehicle (CCDev-2).

Wild Speculation Department

Yesterday I was playing with the numbers for using the Shuttle in a totally different launch configuration. I played with several ideas, the one that interested me most was this:

Lose the ET and SSMEs. That way you don't need any more ETs manufactured, and you don't get in the way of SSME availability for initial SLS flights (the plan is to make a "disposable" SSME for later flights for SLS.) Then make a circus-stand adapter for the aft end of the Orbiter, to adapt it for inline launch on a cluster of 3 RSRMs (current generation Shuttle SRBs.) They'll give enough thrust to get this package to orbit. The OMS engines will still be there to give the orbital "kick" (or better yet, my Uprated OMS engines. Does the same job for 3Klb less mass at takeoff, already through fllght qualification, just never flown.)

No worries about FOD damage--the Orbiter is in front of all the other debris sources.

No more worries about SSME heat exchanger fires, propellant leaks, etc., etc. You're down to one rocket type at liftoff--the well proven solid motors.

On overall safety I could see this rating as about an order of magnitude better on baseline than the standard configuration. It would even be possible to have a real launch abort with this config. Heck, the OMS may be able to do the job (or the Uprated OMS, which is a completely different engine and much more efficient engine, with significant thrust potential over what's required for the baseline OMS mission profile), meaning no extra mass for a launch abort system.

I can't claim originality for this idea, it was actually one of the original study configs in one of the late Shuttle studies back before the Shuttle design was settled on. The F-1 inline configuration rated a little better in that study--it used 4 F-1 engines in a liquid first stage, but both large diameter solid booster and a solid booster cluster were considered. All rated higher than the parallel configuration we ended up with. But the cost estimates, which have flaws that stand out starkly today, made parallel solid/liquid stages look cheaper.

Just something to throw into the mix. :)
 
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Or more likely NASA just wants to keep a life boat or two on hand in case the ISS needs to be evacuated or quickly repaired.

Then there is the possibility the U.S. wants to have some heavy lift ability to take up more modules or put up another telescope.

Sounds like someone is keeping his options open for some reason.

Those are valid possibilities, but it's probably just an instruction from the Pentagon not to surrender the high ground...
 
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