Some Interesting Military Data

[Timerover51]

As some of the other threads have discussed troop ships in Traveller, here is an example of a troop ship in the American Revolution, one bringing Hessian troops to fight for the British in North America. Not exactly the nicest trip in the world. The account comes from the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Voyage of The First Hessian Army from Portsmouth to New York, 1776, by Albert Pfister and Johann Gottfried Seume.

On the English transporter we were pressed and packed like salted herrings. To save room the deck, low as it was, had been partitioned off, and we lay instead of in hammocks, in these bunks, one row above the other. The deck was so low that a grown man could not stand upright, and the bunks not high enough to sit in. These bunks were intended to hold six men each but after four had entered, the remaining two could only find room by pressing in. The situation was, especially in warm weather, decidedly not cool: for one man to turn from one side to the other alone was absolutely impossible, and to lie on one’s back was an equal impossibility. The straightest way and the hardest edge were necessary. After having roasted and sweated sufficiently on one side, the man who had the place to the extreme right would call: round about turn! and all would simultaneously turn to the other side, then having received quantum sabis on this one the man to the left would give the same signal. The maintainance was on an equal scale. Today bacon and peas—peas and bacon [30]tomorrow. Once in a while this menu was broken by porridge or peeled barley, and as an occasional great feast by pudding. This pudding was made of musty flour, half salt and half sweet water and of very ancient mutton suet. The bacon could have been from four to five years old, was black at both outer edges, became yellow a little farther on and was white only in the very centre. The salted beef was in a very similar condition. The biscuits were often full of worms which we had to swallow in lieu of butter or dripping if we did not want to reduce our scanty rations still more. Besides this they were so hard that we were forced to use canon balls in breaking them into eatable pieces. Usually our hunger did not allow us to soak them, and often enough we had not the necessary water to do so. We were told (and not without some probability of truth) that these biscuits were French, and that the English, during the Seven Years’ War had taken them from French ships. Since that time they had been stored in some magazine in Portsmouth and that they were now being used to feed the Germans who were to kill the French under Rochambeau and Lafayette in America—if God so wotted. But apparently God did not seem to fancy this idea much.

What can be said of the British Quartermasters-Department which sent these people to sea without proper food and drink? What of the Duke of Brunswick who sent his subject to Canada without durable boots or stockings and without overcoats? Often enough have men borne a hard life cheerfully, because they knew the why and wherefore, but these poor fellows suffered on account of a quarrel which was not their own, suffered only that their masters might pay their debts or enjoy new pleasures.

This individual was not a happy camper.

 

[selunatic2397]

Definitely not a happy camper.

 

[Timerover51]

I have been posting a lot of more historic data here, so here is a change of pace. A while back, someone messaged me as to the amount of ammunition actually carried by combat infantry. The following data is taken from a study done by S. L. A. Marshall during the first year of the Korean War. SLAM has his detractors, especially about his comments in Men Against Fire, but this is an operational research study, and it contains a lot of detailed interviews of combat infantrymen, which mesh with data that I have from other sources doing similar interviews. The source document is available for download, and has a lot of material pertinent to a mercenary campaign in terms of actual combat descriptions. It is also available in hard copy. The document is ORO R-13, "Commentary on Infantry Operations and Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51," by S. L. A. Marshall, (October 1951).

We can take one company as an example.

The arms and munition load of the company as it moves into the attack is approximately as described in Chapter V, "The Natural Load." The men with carbines carry four clips apiece, the M1 carriers average just above 100 rounds. Each man carries two grenades; company supply has brought forward as many more all around. The machine guns average between 3 and 4 boxes of ammunition on hand. The 60-mm mortars have between 50 and 75 rounds per tube. There are about 10 rounds apiece for the two bazookas. If there is a 57 recoilless, it may have from 10 to 20 rounds. The 4 to 6 BARs have from 4 to 8 magazines each.

The Korean research indicated that there is a natural limit imposed on what the average infantry soldier carries in fighting supply by what he has discovered about his own physical resources under varying conditions of stress. This is best judged by what happens within the average infantry company after it has been through repeated engagements, has shaken out all excess material, and has got down to fighting weight.

The infantry soldier will not carry more than two grenades, even though his senses tell him he is heading into a fight where grenades will be needed. In fact, though Korean operations are a grenade-using type of warfare, there was not found one infantry soldier in the whole of the Eighth Army who consistently carried more than two grenades. The average was slightly under two per man, since some individuals carried only one. The fatigue of the march was the determinant in this requirement. Decision as to what munitionment (sic) should be carried rested usually with the company commander, and after he became broken in he did not press men to carry more than they thought they could handle without risking exhaustion. It remained for the unit to take care of the reserve through company supply.

Riflemen in the squad were markedly willing to carry extra ammunition for the BAR man.

The clips for the carbine would have been the 30-round banana clips, while the M-1 used an 8-round clip. The BAR, Browning Automatic Rifle, used a 20-round clip. A box of .30 caliber machine gun ammunition would have contained 100 belted rounds.

Generally, this load was good for between 2 to 8 hours of combat, although the expenditure of ammunition during night combat was between 2 and 4 times as high as daylight combat. Rifle and carbine fire was effective out to about 200 yards, but adding BAR and machine gun fire to that stretched it to 400 yards. The BAR was very effective at boosting the fire of the M-1 and carbine.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

Modern equipment being different (lighter weapons, load-bearing gear, etc), the numbers here will change, obviously. But this is what I found really interesting:

The infantry soldier will not carry more than two grenades, even though his senses tell him he is heading into a fight where grenades will be needed. In fact, though Korean operations are a grenade-using type of warfare, there was not found one infantry soldier in the whole of the Eighth Army who consistently carried more than two grenades.

Even when he's going into an engagement where he might need those grenades, he'll only carry the two. The infantryman - throughout the ages - learned rapidly what he really thought he needed and what was just extra weight. And - throughout the ages - he discarded the extra weight, sometimes foolishly, often not.

 

[Timerover51]

Modern equipment being different (lighter weapons, load-bearing gear, etc), the numbers here will change, obviously.

You have lighter ammo, but you are also probably wearing an armor vest, which adds to the load. Generally, you cannot put much more than 40 on a man and still expect him to function well in combat. In Vietnam, a typical load of 5.56mm ammo for the M-16 was about 160 to 180 rounds, with some going as high as 210, representing six 30-round clips carried and a 30 round clip in the rifle.

But this is what I found really interesting:

Even when he's going into an engagement where he might need those grenades, he'll only carry the two. The infantryman - throughout the ages - learned rapidly what he really thought he needed and what was just extra weight. And - throughout the ages - he discarded the extra weight, sometimes foolishly, often not.

As near as I can tell, that two grenades per man held true in World War 2 as well.

 

[Carlobrand]

It's interesting that the soldiers would only carry two grenades but that, in the American example, the soldiers were quite willing to carry extra ammo for the BAR man.

Other than dry facts - statistics, weights, and such - I know next to nothing about real combat except that, from the occasional comments of those who've been through it, wargames very rarely get it right. Grenades in wargames have certain defined effects, but there are bits of data - the problem with the fragmentation of the casing in the WW-II American grenade, for example - that suggest the weapons may not have been as effective as they are portrayed to be in games.

I wonder if this two-grenade thing indicates the experienced soldier's opinion of their value in combat. I wonder if, perhaps, the soldiers willing to carrying BAR ammo felt that the things were more valuable in battle, that keeping the BAR man supplied was an important part of keeping themselves alive, while the grenades - well, if you've got two grenades and everyone else does too, then there are 16 grenades available to an 8-man squad, and their experience might be that this is enough to see them through collectively until someone comes forward with more ammo.

 

[Timerover51]

It's interesting that the soldiers would only carry two grenades but that, in the American example, the soldiers were quite willing to carry extra ammo for the BAR man.

Other than dry facts - statistics, weights, and such - I know next to nothing about real combat except that, from the occasional comments of those who've been through it, wargames very rarely get it right. Grenades in wargames have certain defined effects, but there are bits of data - the problem with the fragmentation of the casing in the WW-II American grenade, for example - that suggest the weapons may not have been as effective as they are portrayed to be in games.

I wonder if this two-grenade thing indicates the experienced soldier's opinion of their value in combat. I wonder if, perhaps, the soldiers willing to carrying BAR ammo felt that the things were more valuable in battle, that keeping the BAR man supplied was an important part of keeping themselves alive, while the grenades - well, if you've got two grenades and everyone else does too, then there are 16 grenades available to an 8-man squad, and their experience might be that this is enough to see them through collectively until someone comes forward with more ammo.

Well, if you are role-playing or war-gaming, getting too accurate can really frustrate the players. If you are really interested in getting a better idea of how things actually work, send me a PM with an email address and I will send you some PDF files to read.

 

[Timerover51]

A brief account of the first jet-to-jet air kill in history, on November 8, 1950. Taken from MIG ALLEY: The Fight for Air Superiority, by the Air Force Historical Center.

Several MiGs made passes on the F–51s with no success. The Mustang pilots, however, reported damaging three of the jets and claimed as a probable a fourth MiG which was last seen over the Yalu, smoking heavily. Meanwhile, Lt. Col. Evans G. Stephens, the commander of the 16th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (FIS), was leading three other F–80s on a strafing run on antiaircraft positions. As the Shooting Stars climbed back to 18,000 feet, the Americans noticed eight MiGs across the river at about their altitude. Oddly, the enemy pilots appeared to be showing off, doing loops and barrel rolls.

The MiGs suddenly broke off their aerial show to dive into the F–80 formation. Stephens’s wingman, 1st Lt. Russell J. Brown, on detached service from the 26th FIS, got on the tail of a MiG as it swept past him. The MiG banked to the left, and Brown was able to cut the corner and catch the fast-moving fighter. Brown fired four short bursts, followed by four more. A plume of smoke gushed from the right side of the MiG–15’s fuselage. Brown then fired a long burst, and the enemy plane exploded. The first all-jet air-to-air combat in history had ended in a victory for Brown and the USAF.

 

[JimMarn]

For Infantry level information, I was born after WW2, I find Charles B. McDonald's book 'Company Commander' to be very good. He details his life as a company commander in Europe in WW2. Part of it deals with his units actions during the Battle of the Bulge. He discusses his use of the company 60mm mortars and the M-1 Garand rifle grenades.

 

[Timerover51]

For Infantry level information, I was born after WW2, I find Charles B. McDonald's book 'Company Commander' to be very good. He details his life as a company commander in Europe in WW2. Part of it deals with his units actions during the Battle of the Bulge. He discusses his use of the company 60mm mortars and the M-1 Garand rifle grenades.

McDonald's book is viewed as one of the minor military classics, but is not, to the best of my knowledge, available online. I have been posting material which is available online for those who might be interested in additional knowledge. Another very good book covering small units and weapon use in World War 2 is Shots Fired in Anger by Lt. Col. John George, who served on Guadalcanal and with Merrill's Marauders in Burma.

 

[JimMarn]

Ah, sorry, I didn't realize you were posting online info only.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

Nothing to be sorry about, really. A reminder on other literary sources isn't a bad thing.

 

[Timerover51]

Nothing to be sorry about, really. A reminder on other literary sources isn't a bad thing.

I have a lot of those other literary sources too, like a couple of thousand of them. My wife keeps talking about a house addition for a library. The main problem there is the amount of time it takes to transcribe something from hard copy to online text. Then there is also the copyright issue, which is not the easiest thing to deal with.

There is some really good data on Korean War era aircraft online as well, but it is not in a form that can be copied and pasted somewhere, as it is straight PDF image. That takes a while to transcribe as well, but I am working on it, and also post where it is located online.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

My wife keeps talking about a house addition for a library.

Heh, I understand that!

 

[JimMarn]

I'm not the only one ? I have around a thousand books currently. Around 200 of them about WW2. Small apartment. Most of my books are in a relatives storage shed, in their back yard. sigh, my first ereader holds as many books as I have read over a lifetime. So many books, so little time.

For aircraft books I highly suggest Martin Caidin's books. He also wrote the only good book, in my estimation, about The Eastern Front. Title is 'The Tigers are Burning'. He mentions the Stavka Reserve, which no other WW2 book I had read up to that point mentioned. And lots of info about the seige of Stalingrad i haven't encountered elsewhere. He interviewed survivors on both sides.

 

[rancke]

I'm not the only one ? I have around a thousand books currently. Around 200 of them about WW2. Small apartment. Most of my books are in a relatives storage shed, in their back yard. sigh, my first ereader holds as many books as I have read over a lifetime. So many books, so little time.

And the ******** keep writing new ones!!!


Hans

 

[Timerover51]

And the ******** keep writing new ones!!!

Hans

Problem is, Hans, just about all of the stuff that I buy is out-of-print books, and I keep getting them at a steady rate. Do you have any idea how many books covering military history, ecology, technological development through the ages, and how people lived in earlier times, along with old cookbooks, are out there for purchase?

 

[Timerover51]

World War One Air Units Costs

I found another massive source of information in The U.S. Air Service in World War One, published by the Air Force Historical Center. The following quote comes from Volume 4.

In February 1919 Maj. P. H. Jennings, Chief of the Disbursing and Legal Division of the Air Service, AEF, completed an estimate of the cost of establishing aero squadrons, balloon companies, and training centers, and maintaining them for the first year. The figures-$6,000 for a pursuit plane, $2,800 for a spare engine, $75 for a bomb sight, $9 for a pair of fur-lined flying boots, and $0.57 a day for a man’s rations-are interesting in this age of much more sophisticated equipment and greatly inflated prices. More important, however, is the information the estimates provide about the character and status of the U.S. Air Service at the end of World War 1. They show, for example, that a day bombardment squadron with 18 Breguet 14 82 aircraft with Renault 300 motors and a reserve of 7 additional planes could be expected to require 72 more planes a year for replacements, 49 extra motors, and spare parts amounting to almost 50 percent of the total cost of all 97 planes and 146 motors. The same attrition rate, 33 percent per month (figured on a basic allowance of 18 planes) was used for observation planes, but the rate for pursuit was higher-50 percent per month. Estimates for [Edit Note: the cost of] a day bombardment squadron have been selected for inclusion as an appendix to this volume.

The attrition assumption is that you would loose all of your original equipment of aircraft every three months of day bombing and observation, observation being of major importance in World War One, and you would loose all of your original equipment of fighters every two months. That means a high rate of replacement for both aircraft and air crew. The spare parts budget for the year of the ground motor equipment is 24% of the cost of the original equipment.
,
Air Power, even in World War One, is not cheap.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

along with old cookbooks

:rofl: OK, you *have* to start a thread on Vilani recipes, now! Remember to make them as elaborate as possible, with some amount of danger thrown in if not prepared correctly!

In a risk averse culture that exists nowadays within the US military (not cowardice, but building weapon systems and designing strategies to minimize risk and losses) that expected loss ratio seems horrendous. But it was the expected toll on the Western Front. It continued to be the philosophy for the Soviet Union almost to the end - flood the battlefield and expect to lose almost all of it; as long as they were the only ones left standing at the end, nothing else mattered.

One of the benefits of being at the US Air Force Academy was access to the library's special collections, which include things like volumes of letters written home from the front by flyers in the Lafayette Escadrille and unit histories and such. (The media section also had great original gun camera film and things.) It really gave an interesting perspective on what was a true frontier in warfare - aviation. Even training squadrons expected to replace all their planes every so often due to crashes. If a training unit commander laid out a budget with that expectation today, he'd not only be relieved of duty, but taken to be fitted for a coat with really long arms.

One "advantage" of playing in a lower tech ATU is the idea that some technology is still untrustworthy or fragile. The OTU gives an impression of (other than misjumps, which are seldom deadly in their own right) technological stability that makes it almost background to everything else going on. If you play in a less reliable universe, you can turn the interaction with the technology into a much larger portion of the game.

 

[aramis]

ook into which culture/polity in my ATU sector might have this sort of tradition. Might fit very well with the Marañon warlords. Maybe some other folk, too.

writeup is on the board somewhere...