Timerover51
SOC-14 5K
I received a question on this in a private message, and ran into a character limit in answering. Given that the "Teeth to Tail" ratio is not going away, and will exist in the Traveller universe, I thought that the following would be a good piece to start a discussion with.
The following data is taken from FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual-Organization, Technical,and Logistical Data. Part I -Unclassified Data, February 1959, Headquarters, Department of the Army. There are a couple of caveats in the introduction which bear quoting.
The Army used the concept of the “division slice”, and included for planning the Air Force “wing slice”, as the Army would be supporting the Air Force logistically, for planning for major overseas deployment.
The following definitions are again taken from the Field Manual.
Having defined, to a degree, what is meant by the “division slice” and “wing slice”, the following is the number of men in each slice and where they are located based on 1959 calculations.
The Division Slice: Average basic division 13,960 troops, with additional Corps and army troops totaling 18,540. This is the Combat Zone slice of 32,500 troops. To this you add the Communications Zone troops of 10,750 to get the Theater Division Slice of 43,450. Lastly, you have the Zone of Interior slice of 20,000 men for a total Worldwide Slice of 63,450 troops. The total Worldwide Slice does include replacements totaling 10% of the entire slice, or 6,345 troops.
It should be noted that these figures are for a combat theater such as Europe or Korea involving a large land mass, and not for a division attacking an island in the Pacific. There you would have significantly less army and corps troops, and basically no Communication Zone troops. Many of those roles would be filled by Naval units, with cargo shipping replacing the Communication Zone logistic support troops.
The Air Force Wing Slice: The Wing is broken down into two sections, a combat portion of 1,300 and a service portion of 1,250, for a basic wing portion of 2,550. There would be additional Air Force support units totaling 3,450 and approximately 1,000 Communication Zone Army troops supporting the Air Force. This gives a total Wing Slice of 7,000, of which 6,000 are Air Force and 1,000 are Army.
In World War 2, the Theater Division Slice for the Army was approximately 40,000, with an additional Army Air Force Group (equivalent to a Wing) of 5,000. The British Division Slice was about the same as the United States.
Now, the Field Manual does give a detailed breakdown as to how many of what type of troop would compose the slice, but I suspect that would be going into too much detail. For those who wish to take a look at the manual for themselves, it can be found online at the following site. I also have it in hard copy, along with the 1949 and 1956 editions. The 1987 version is also online, but is not quite as useful. Most of the really good stuff is not there, i.e. still classified.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/523/rec/8
I should note that the manual is intended for use by staff officers who have been in the Army a while, and who understand the terminology. It is not exactly the most exciting reading on the planet. However, having been trained as a supply officer, I find it totally fascinating.
The following data is taken from FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual-Organization, Technical,and Logistical Data. Part I -Unclassified Data, February 1959, Headquarters, Department of the Army. There are a couple of caveats in the introduction which bear quoting.
“This volume is for use as a planning guide only. It provides general planning data for staff officers of all echelons.”
[Editor Note: Bold is in the original.]Caution: Data contained in this volume are based on experience principally from World War II and Korea, and can be applied to the future only with judgment and discrimination. Whenever a known factor is available, it should be used instead of one from this manual.
The Army used the concept of the “division slice”, and included for planning the Air Force “wing slice”, as the Army would be supporting the Air Force logistically, for planning for major overseas deployment.
The following definitions are again taken from the Field Manual.
The division slice includes the strength of an average combat division plus proportionate shares of the total corps,army, communications zone, and zone of interior (for worldwide slice only) units operating to the rear of the division (and of Naval units directly supporting the Marines in case of Marine divisions). The division slice for any given force is equal to the total strength of the force divided by the number of combat divisions in the force.
The wing slice includes the strength of an average wing plus a proportion-ate share of the Air Force and Army units engaged in developing or operating the airbases (and of Naval units which directly support the Marine or Naval air units).
Relation Between Division Slice and Wing Slice. The 7,000-man wing slice includes about 1,000 Army communications zone men not counted in a division slice. These 1,000 Army men are required for communications zone support of Air Force units and installations present in the theater of operations. In the charts in d below, and in a and b above, this same assumption is made-the wing slice and not the division slice contains the communications zone support for Air Force. This allows troop planners to use these tables with varying ratios of air wings to Army divisions in any specific force.
Having defined, to a degree, what is meant by the “division slice” and “wing slice”, the following is the number of men in each slice and where they are located based on 1959 calculations.
The Division Slice: Average basic division 13,960 troops, with additional Corps and army troops totaling 18,540. This is the Combat Zone slice of 32,500 troops. To this you add the Communications Zone troops of 10,750 to get the Theater Division Slice of 43,450. Lastly, you have the Zone of Interior slice of 20,000 men for a total Worldwide Slice of 63,450 troops. The total Worldwide Slice does include replacements totaling 10% of the entire slice, or 6,345 troops.
It should be noted that these figures are for a combat theater such as Europe or Korea involving a large land mass, and not for a division attacking an island in the Pacific. There you would have significantly less army and corps troops, and basically no Communication Zone troops. Many of those roles would be filled by Naval units, with cargo shipping replacing the Communication Zone logistic support troops.
The Air Force Wing Slice: The Wing is broken down into two sections, a combat portion of 1,300 and a service portion of 1,250, for a basic wing portion of 2,550. There would be additional Air Force support units totaling 3,450 and approximately 1,000 Communication Zone Army troops supporting the Air Force. This gives a total Wing Slice of 7,000, of which 6,000 are Air Force and 1,000 are Army.
In World War 2, the Theater Division Slice for the Army was approximately 40,000, with an additional Army Air Force Group (equivalent to a Wing) of 5,000. The British Division Slice was about the same as the United States.
Now, the Field Manual does give a detailed breakdown as to how many of what type of troop would compose the slice, but I suspect that would be going into too much detail. For those who wish to take a look at the manual for themselves, it can be found online at the following site. I also have it in hard copy, along with the 1949 and 1956 editions. The 1987 version is also online, but is not quite as useful. Most of the really good stuff is not there, i.e. still classified.
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/523/rec/8
I should note that the manual is intended for use by staff officers who have been in the Army a while, and who understand the terminology. It is not exactly the most exciting reading on the planet. However, having been trained as a supply officer, I find it totally fascinating.
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