• Welcome to the new COTI server. We've moved the Citizens to a new server. Please let us know in the COTI Website issue forum if you find any problems.
  • We, the systems administration staff, apologize for this unexpected outage of the boards. We have resolved the root cause of the problem and there should be no further disruptions.

Some Interesting Military Data

Do you have a copy of the 1920 USN cookbook?

U.S. Navy cook-book 1920

Yes, I have that one, and copies of the Army cookbook from 1883, 1910, 1916, and 1944, along with the Navy Cookbook from 1944. I also have the a copy of the Apicius Roman Cookbook, several cookbooks from the Elizabethan period, the White House cookbook from 1887 (both hard and downloaded copy), a Confederate cookbook, a Civil War period cookbook, and a bunch of other ones. I have done a reprint of the 1883 Manual for Army Cooks, which is quite interesting for what it has and what it does not have. One major item totally missing is Pasta and tomato sauce. There are a considerable number of recipes for cooking game, and detailed instructions on how to butcher your beef, sheep, or hog. I keep thinking about posting a couple as samples. One very interesting comment, with which I start the book off, is one by General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the best British commander of the period.

If we offered the British soldier the same pay and rations that are given in the United States army, the number of desirable young men anxious to enlist would be so much larger than at present that we could afford to reject a larger percentage than we do.

My added emphasis. Given what I know of the US Army rations of the period, I hate to think what the British soldiers were getting. As for pay, I think that the British private was still getting a shilling a day, or 30 shillings or a pound and a half for the month. As a British pound was worth $4.86 US, that would equate to $7.29. The US Private was getting $9.00 per month. The amount of money budgeted for rations for a month in the US Army was also $9.00.

Oh, one last confession, I collect the cookbooks, but on occasion I do make something from them. I forgot to include the Narnia cookbook and the Harry Potter one. The buttered eggs in the Narnia cookbook are really buttered.
 
Last edited:
Do you have any details of food concentrates, like those used to feed astronauts?

Hmm, I will check in my volume on Special Rations for the Army, but I think that I have something in one of my books on space travel. The Army did work on concentrated rations for use in the Arctic. The World War 2 "D" ration for emergency use weighed 12 ounces and contained 1800 calories, which on a weight basis is quite a lot. It consisted of three 4-ounce bars wrapped in a waxed paper wrapper.

This website gives you a quick overview for Space rations.

http://www.qmfound.com/subsistence_in_space.htm

And this site gives you an overview of the history of Army rations through the development of the MREs and feeding the troops in Desert Storm.

http://www.qmfound.com/army_subsistence_history.htm
 
As this appears to have turned into a discussion of rations which, while near and dear to my heart, is not the purpose of the thread, would it be possible for one of the moderators to move everything including post 248, excepting post 250, to another thread specifically for rations?

I must apologize for this post, as I forgot, for which I must plead old age or something, Napoleon's Dictim:

An Army marches on its stomach.
 
There is another factor that is often overlooked - sanitation.

Armies back through history used to suffer more casualties from disease and infection due to poor hygiene than they did from combat.

Waste management and personal hygiene during field exercises are a basic training requirement.
 
There is another factor that is often overlooked - sanitation.

Armies back through history used to suffer more casualties from disease and infection due to poor hygiene than they did from combat.

Waste management and personal hygiene during field exercises are a basic training requirement.

Having been in in recent times and back to the 80s, the quality of design of the [crapper] and the quality of the chow and water has been a lot more of a concern to me than the quality of the rifle, sights, NVGs, and squad automatic weapon. (We used a different term for crapper). Female troops are also very concerned about places to urinate.

That being said, the current flat top, ACOG, and 240 are pretty darn good. Ma Duece, with proper headspace and timing, still brings the freight.
 
I came across this in an intelligence bulletin from World War 2, and found it quite interesting as I have not see this mentioned before. It comes from the Arakan Front in Burma.

The Japanese used dogs on this front. Those observed had the appearance of the ordinary village mongrel or so-called "pi" dog. In the day time these dogs were seen coming up to our forward defended positions and when they discovered our men, they barked and went back. This may be fanciful and simply a coincidence. On another occasion, one dog and two men formed a scouting party, the dog preceding the men, and when he encountered the smell of our nearby troops he was observed to run back and warn the approaching Japanese scouts. On another occasion, six Japanese in an open glade of the jungle were observed to halt while passing through and their leader barked like a dog several times. Several minutes later a dog appeared with a scrap of paper, probably a note, tied to his neck. After looking at the piece of paper the patrol set off again accompanied by the dog. In no cases did the dogs appear to be imported but from their looks were those indigenous to this section of Burma. (It is believed that these dogs are not highly trained but that their propensity for friendship to man is being utilized as described. No dogs were on duty with the British forces).

As these did not seem to be highly trained "war dogs", but those locally available, I could see something similar in Traveller, using local animals of sufficient intelligence.
 
There is another factor that is often overlooked - sanitation.

Armies back through history used to suffer more casualties from disease and infection due to poor hygiene than they did from combat.

Waste management and personal hygiene during field exercises are a basic training requirement.

My first trip out to sea on a U.S. Navy destroyer, one of the evaporaters failed. We were in the Mediterranean Sea when it happened.

We had two of them. Each could turn 10 000 gallons of sea water to fresh water.

One fed the ship's boilers, the other fed everything else.

No showers, water fountains turned off except during meals. Coffee pot use decreased. Laundry cut back.

This went on for the last two months when we were deployed.

One days, as we were out on single ship exercises... a rain cloud appeared.

Smoe of the guys, all male crew back then, ran up on deck and got soaped up. Then the rain moved away. The Exec talked the Captain into allowing the guys to use the showers to get rid of the soap.

I was told the officers did contact a civilian shipyard in the Med, and the cost was either too high, or the ship would have been dry docked too long and the Fleet admiral said no.

So we had to wait until we got back to the states to get enough water for what the Navy calls a 'Hollywood shower', i.e. more than 30 seconds of cold water to soap up, and 30 seconds of hot to rinse off with.
 
Last edited:
There is another factor that is often overlooked - sanitation.

Armies back through history used to suffer more casualties from disease and infection due to poor hygiene than they did from combat.

Waste management and personal hygiene during field exercises are a basic training requirement.

Hmmm, I do have some good figures on losses from battle deaths and losses from disease. It gets a bit grim in some areas and climates. More Japanese may have died on Guadalcanal in the South Pacific from starvation and disease than died in battle, and the same would hold true for New Guinea.
 
There is another factor that is often overlooked - sanitation.

Armies back through history used to suffer more casualties from disease and infection due to poor hygiene than they did from combat.

Waste management and personal hygiene during field exercises are a basic training requirement.

The following is the data on US Army casualty deaths during the Spanish-American War of 1898, taken from French E. Chadwick's Spanish-American War, Vol. 2, copyright 1911. The casualties figures are taken from a table, while the following paragraph is a quote.

Killed: 23 Officers, 257 Enlisted Men
Died of wounds: 4 Officers, 80 Enlisted Men
Died of disease: 80 Officers, 2,585 Enlisted Men
Total Deaths: 107 Officers, 2,803 Enlisted Men


Of deaths by disease, it is estimated that 37.3 per cent were from typhoid fever, and 5.7 per cent from malarial fevers (which would include yellow fever). If all of the malarial cases had been yellow fever, this would make a total of 160 deaths from this cause. As from February, 1895, to December, 1897, inclusive, the deaths from yellow fever in the military hospitals of Cuba (Edit Note: These would have been the Spanish military hospitals) were 13,808, or an average of 391 a month (see the report of the surgeon-general of the army for 1899), the losses of the American army from such cause must be regarded as moderate.
 
The following is the data on US Army casualty deaths during the Spanish-American War of 1898, taken from French E. Chadwick's Spanish-American War, Vol. 2, copyright 1911. The casualties figures are taken from a table, while the following paragraph is a quote.

Killed: 23 Officers, 257 Enlisted Men
Died of wounds: 4 Officers, 80 Enlisted Men
Died of disease: 80 Officers, 2,585 Enlisted Men
Total Deaths: 107 Officers, 2,803 Enlisted Men

How does the ratio of officers to enlisted disease deaths compare to the ratio of officers to enlisted in the units themselves? I'm wondering if the officers had access to preventive measures or treatments that weren't available to the rank-and-file.
 
How does the ratio of officers to enlisted disease deaths compare to the ratio of officers to enlisted in the units themselves? I'm wondering if the officers had access to preventive measures or treatments that weren't available to the rank-and-file.


The Army began pushing for Congress to adopt a three battalion organization (each with four companies) for each of its infantry regiments, but these regiments continued to be authorized only eight manned companies (Companies I and K were at zero-strength), with only 46 privates in each company.
[...]
Of the roughly 2,100 officers and 26,000 enlisted men in the Army on 1 Apr 1898, almost 900 officers and 13,000 enlisted were infantry, and another 400 officers and 6,000 enlisted were assigned to the cavalry.(http://www.history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/usa-1890.html)​


The company is 4 squads, each with an NCO (1895 Regulations ¶267)

The nominal company is 5-7 NCOs (at least 1 1Sgt, 2 Sgt, 2-4 Cpl), 2-3 officers, and 46 privates, plus possibly an artificer and an attached musician, but with an authorized strength of up to 108 men with 2-4 officers.

About 1:12 officer:enlisted in the infantry. The disease death rate is about 1:32 O:E, the killed outright is about 1:11... so, yeah, it looks like reduced exposure and better access to medical care.
 
Last edited:
There is an extensive discussion of the disease issue in the War in Russell Alger's book on the Spanish-American War, Alger being Secretary of War during that time. Quickly looking through it, a large part of the problem of disease was camp sanitation, compounded by the large numbers of volunteer troops. I will see what I can come up with, but a large number of the deaths from Typhoid occurred while still in the US.

Also remember that the Spanish-American War included fighting in the Philippines as well.
 
Also remember that the Spanish-American War included fighting in the Philippines as well.

Mostly on or near the ocean (Manila Bay, etc) by ships and crews of the U. S. Navy - and thus under far different sanitary, dietary, medical, and operational conditions.


Virtually all of the land fighting in the Philippines came after the end of the SAW - and is counted under the heading of "Philippine-American War" (also called the "Philippine Insurrection").

This covered 1899-1902 - although actions by/against the Moro tribesmen in the southern islands ("Moro Rebellion") continued until 1913.
 
During that time period, a once a week bath was considered normal.

My mother told me they had a wash tub to bathe in up until about 1938-40 when her mother had a bathroom installed with an actual tub in it.

I remember in the 1950s, when I was a kid, there were still people who only cleaned up once a week.

All of that would have a big impact on the spreading of disease.
 
During that time period, a once a week bath was considered normal.

My mother told me they had a wash tub to bathe in up until about 1938-40 when her mother had a bathroom installed with an actual tub in it.

I remember in the 1950s, when I was a kid, there were still people who only cleaned up once a week.

All of that would have a big impact on the spreading of disease.

In barracks, Officers would bathe separately, mess separately, and in some cases, had separate latrines. Officers had separate quartering with private rooms; men had bunks in bunkhouses.

In the field, officers still bathed separately and/or first, and if more than a single company encamped together, usually would mess as a single officer's mess, separate from the individual company messes.

Further, when in barracks, the surgeons messed with the officers; this would mean earlier spotting of illness due to familiarity and visibility.

Not a few field grade and general officers had personal surgeons, as well.
 
In Stalingrad people preferred weapons that could sharpened and swung like a spade or crowbar, or preferred weapons that could be thrown. If you miss with a bayonet, you're highly exposed and probably need some movement in order to correct and attack a second time and as the Falkands report states, people can grab the weapon.
 
In Stalingrad people preferred weapons that could sharpened and swung like a spade or crowbar, or preferred weapons that could be thrown. If you miss with a bayonet, you're highly exposed and probably need some movement in order to correct and attack a second time and as the Falkands report states, people can grab the weapon.

Man, I can't imagine bathing with a bayonet OR a spade! :D
 
It has been a while since I posted anything here, so here is some new data from World War 2.

This following data is drawn from the National Defense Research Committee Final Report of September 1945 on Weapon Effects:▮ Fire, Impact, Explosion, and the Dept. of Army (U.S. in this case) Technical Manual 9-1907, September 1948, Ballistic Data:▮ Performance of Ammunition.▮ I would tend to view both as reasonably reliable.

In the case of brick load-bearing buildings, as found in World War 2 Europe, the effective damage radius of various sized bombs, loaded with TNT is given. Different explosive loadings would change the effective damage radius, increasing or reducing it, depending on the explosive. The GP in the bomb designation indicates a bomb with approximately 50% of the weight comprising the explosive filling, making it suitable for both blast and fragmentation use. It was the most widely used variety of bomb by the United States. The British GP bomb contained an explosive loading of 30%, which considerably reduced the blast effect while enhancing the fragmentation effect. The British designation for the equivalent of the US General Purpose or GP bomb was MC for Medium Case.

100 pound GP bomb, AN-M30, loaded with 57 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 7 feet, visible damage radius of 16 feet.

250 pound GP bomb, AN-M57, loaded with 129 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 13 feet, visible damage radius of 28 feet.

500 pound GP bomb, AN-M43, loaded with 267 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 20 feet, visible damage radius of 45 feet.

1000 pound GP bomb, AN-M44, loaded with 558 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 33 feet, visible damage radius of 72 feet.

2000 pound GP bomb, AN-M34, loaded with 1117 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 54 feet, visible damage radius of 118 feet.

4000 pound LC bomb, M56, loaded with 3362 pounds of TNT: total demolition radius of 120 feet, visible damage radius of 265 feet.

The LC for the last bomb indicates that is was a light case bomb, with a very thin case thickness, giving maximum blast and basically very little direct fragmentation effect. The secondary fragmentation effect could be quite considerable however. The lack of the AN designator indicates that the bomb was only used by the US Army Air Force and not the US Navy. Bombs common to both services had the AN designator (Army-Navy).
 
Back
Top