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For the Military Inclined

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Since the Hague Convention of 1907 specified that "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions."

This was ratified by most nations in 1910; subsequently, the US military then tested all manner or weapons to determine which bullets they could use within the protocols that were most lethal, directly leading to the adoption of the .45 cal M1911 as the sidearm of choice, with it's heavy, wide, subsonic round.

The British .303 and .38 slugs were specifically designed to keyhole by biasing the weight of the slug to the rear so it would flip around upon impact. It technically met the spirit of the convention while still being designed to increase damage.

The 5.56 NATO round is similar, as it's small size and length causes it to tumble after penetration, especially after going through body armor.

Dean,
I believe that much of what you are saying is in error. The choice of the .45 caliber handgun round by the United States and the adoption of weight-biased, pointed bullets have little to do with the Hague Convention. For one reason, both the .45 pistol round and the .303 were in use long before the 1910 date you give. The .45 was the caliber of the original U.S. handgun cartridge, the .45 Colt. The .45 caliber was chosen because, expanding or not, it was the best disabler and the U.S. was in the process of developing the .45 ACP starting around 1904.
Regarding the tumbling effect of pointed rifle bullets; this is due to ballistic shape; the desire for the bullet to retain more velocity as it travels through the air - any increase to wounding ability is secondary. This isn't to say that subsequent developers have not tried to enhance the distruction caused by this tumbling, Only that pointed bullets existed decades before the Hague convention and only the thickness of their jacket material was effected by it.
 
Dean,
I believe that much of what you are saying is in error. The choice of the .45 caliber handgun round by the United States and the adoption of weight-biased, pointed bullets have little to do with the Hague Convention. For one reason, both the .45 pistol round and the .303 were in use long before the 1910 date you give. The .45 was the caliber of the original U.S. handgun cartridge, the .45 Colt. The .45 caliber was chosen because, expanding or not, it was the best disabler and the U.S. was in the process of developing the .45 ACP starting around 1904.
Regarding the tumbling effect of pointed rifle bullets; this is due to ballistic shape; the desire for the bullet to retain more velocity as it travels through the air - any increase to wounding ability is secondary. This isn't to say that subsequent developers have not tried to enhance the distruction caused by this tumbling, Only that pointed bullets existed decades before the Hague convention and only the thickness of their jacket material was effected by it.

Just because they were using .45 prior to the Hague doesn't mean they still could not adopt it; note it has nothing to do with the actual caliber, but rather the adoption of FMJ rather than soft lead-nosed or expanding hollow-point style bullets. It doesn't refer to the pointyness of the bullet either; round and flat nose jacketed bullets were not excluded.

Furthermore, the British .303 was explicitly designed to increase tumble with penetration by back weighting the bullet; the center of gravity was shifted to the rear the nose, behind the pointed jacked was packed with a lighter material.

I'd dig up the website I found this info on, but frankly I am not in the mood. :( Have a nasty head cold.
 
Actually, the FMJ bullet was adopted for two reasons: 1, it feeds more reliably in semiautomatic pistols than hollow point or soft-nosed bullets - at least in field conditions with weapons that may be wet and dirty. And 2, to further enhance the reliability of semiauto's (and full autos) using the FMJ means less lead fouling in the barrels and actions than soft-nosed bullets.

It really had nothing to do with any treaties - it was, and still is, for merely reasons of reliability. Even with today's more efficient weapons.
 
Just because they were using .45 prior to the Hague doesn't mean they still could not adopt it; note it has nothing to do with the actual caliber, but rather the adoption of FMJ rather than soft lead-nosed or expanding hollow-point style bullets. It doesn't refer to the pointyness of the bullet either; round and flat nose jacketed bullets were not excluded.

Furthermore, the British .303 was explicitly designed to increase tumble with penetration by back weighting the bullet; the center of gravity was shifted to the rear the nose, behind the pointed jacked was packed with a lighter material.

I'd dig up the website I found this info on, but frankly I am not in the mood. :( Have a nasty head cold.

Sorry about the head cold dean:( I hate those things and hope you feel better soon.

Regarding the specific history of the .303 I am not particularly familiar. If it was deliberately designed to fragment I would be interested to document that information. Most jacketed, soft-metal core bullets will fragment if they strike flesh at high enough velocity. Indeed, at hyper-sonic velocities almost any substance will fragment to the point of vaporizing (I'm speaking of orbital velocitys and not small arms here). I do know that the British continued to use lead bullets in their handguns until the Germans protested in WW1 even though these are not, by the Hague definition, specifically designed to expand or fragment.

The concern that prompted the Hague prohibition was the invention, in the very late 19th century of hollow point bullets. International agreement had already prohibited exploding bullets for anti-personnel use and, with the Hague, was prohibiting rapidly expanding bullets for the same reason; not that lethality was the concern, but rather the maiming potential to those who survived being struck; arms and legs would be lost to otherwise debilitating, but non-crippling, wounds.

That the pointed Spitzer ballistic shape would tumble when it hit something was secondary to the increase in effective range that it produced. Indeed the Nazi V2 missle was based, in shape, upon the 7.92mm Mauser bullet then in use and, of course, this was not because it tumbled; likewise artillery shells share the same shape.

Short stubby pistol bullets, even if they do tumble, act more like a round ball; rarely having more than half again the diameter in length. For this reason, it is best to use the largest diameter you can in order to produce as large a wound as you can. The United States went from a .45 to a slightly higher velocity .355 lead round (whaich would have had a greater chance of expanding) and found it inadiquate - they then returned to the .45 and jacketed it, like all semi-automatic pistol bullets of the day, not necessarily for military use, but for reliable feeding in the mechanism and, due to higher velocities, less metal fouling of the bore.

In a rather alarming trend the rise of body armor has cause weapons designers to design bullets which skirt the Hague conventions. This is because the armor is easily pierced by rounds designed as armor piercing (which have been around for about a century); however they also glide through the person inside doing minimal damage (especailly since the calibers used now are small). It is not that these armor piercers don't tumble - they do. But, because they are generally soft coated hard metal, they do not fragment like soft-metal core bullets. To make up for this designers have designed bullets with cores that bend once they tumble. This means that rather than stablizing in a "base-first" condition as the old bullets would they continue to twist and hook their way through a body. Unfortunately they are completely "Hague Legal" as they do not expand or fragment.
 
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...

Regarding the specific history of the .303 I am not particularly familiar. If it was deliberately designed to fragment I would be interested to document that information. Most jacketed, soft-metal core bullets will fragment if they strike flesh at high enough velocity. Indeed, at hyper-sonic velocities almost any substance will fragment to the point of vaporizing (I'm speaking of orbital velocitys and not small arms here). I do know that the British continued to use lead bullets in their handguns until the Germans protested in WW1 even though these are not, by the Hague definition, specifically designed to expand or fragment. ...

It's not that the .303 fragments. The majority of the mass of the bullet was put to the rear; when the nose hit and began to penetrate the target, the bullet's inertia and center of mass would begin to rotate and cause the bullet to tumble end-over-end, keyholing and spinning it's way through the rest of the target- causing a larger hole and a more randomly destructive path. Or so I have read :p

Now that body armor is common, that's an undesirable characteristic.
 
This thread ended up going in a direction which I did not intend. In the future, I will refrain from making any comments on posts by other readers, and confine my posting strictly to hard military and other data that may be of use to Game Masters and gamers.
 
This thread ended up going in a direction which I did not intend. In the future, I will refrain from making any comments on posts by other readers, and confine my posting strictly to hard military and other data that may be of use to Game Masters and gamers.

Sorry about that. Guilty.

As the OP, you can always ask the mods to divest an offshoot from your thread as so to keep it on-topic.
 
Thanks Sabredog for your posts. I've recently taken over my department's SWAT (we call it SRT) so I don't consider myself stupid when it comes to guns. Even so, I still learned something from your posts. It's obvious you are a knowledgable and thinking-man's instructor. I wish you served in my neck of the woods.
 
I just finished reading this book:

149377609.JPG

http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/the-last-full-measure-michael-stephenson/1110776460?ean=9780307952776&itm=2&usri=+last+full+measure

Covers soldiers from antiquity to the present.
 
Thanks Sabredog for your posts. I've recently taken over my department's SWAT (we call it SRT) so I don't consider myself stupid when it comes to guns. Even so, I still learned something from your posts. It's obvious you are a knowledgable and thinking-man's instructor. I wish you served in my neck of the woods.

Thanks for that, I wish I did too. I have relatives in a couple of agencies in Iowa and Wyoming and they have said the same thing, but I'm out of the game now. It wouldn't be fair to the other guys working with me. Too much wear n' tear to slow me down. Knees, damaged discs in the neck...crushed discs in the back...and I'm getting a little too old for it though I must say the years fall off and I want to join in whenever I hear a siren or see one of the patrol cars from around here go tearing by. What you say means a lot, though.
 
Hmmmm....how does it compare with The Face Of Battle by John Keegan?

Can't be any worse for post-1900... Keegan thinks the Somme was "modern" tactically. (Admittedly, he was writing it before 'Nam was over... but even then, tactical doctrine was radically different than the Somme.) The Somme is really not modern - the tanks were essentially mobile machine gun revetments, and so few as to make little difference overall. Aircover was minimal. Infantry fought from trenches as well as field positions. All in all, it's pre-blitzkrieg, and pre-air-war in character.
 
I think by "modern", Keegan meant that the Somme, and WWI in general was the first time that the war found you no matter where you went on the battlefield. You couldn't just maneuver out of range, veer off into the woods or other cover or concealment, and the range and intensity of the killing power was such that radical re-thinking of tactics and strategy were needed to overcome it. Not to mention new technology.

He might also have been referring to it being the first war of The Moderns, and it certainly was, but I think my first explanation is truer.

The ACW has been called the first industrialized war, but that is only due to the logistics and weapons development side of it. WWI became a modern war when the old tactics ran straight into machineguns, minefields, barbed wire, and artillery barrages throwing so many tons in so short a time the British actually ran out of ammo in 1915. Artillery was hitting Paris even and had become less of a direct fire weapon than it was prior to then.

Just because panzers and Spitfires weren't wheeling around a mechanized battlefield yet only points up that it was because they hadn't been developed yet. But the seed for the tactics for blitzkrieg and air dominance were certainly growing by 1918. Zeppelin and Gotha raids on London, tanks, gas, etc..
 
And as a thank you for all the stuff I've learned on this thread, here is a factoid about how the horse chestnut came to the rescue when the British ran out of cordite during WWI which in turn indirectly led to the the creation of the state of Israel.

At the beginning of the First World War, cordite - the smokeless powder used as a propellant in small arms ammunition and artillery - was imported mainly from North America, but when blockades made shipping difficult Britain needed to produce its own cordite. One of the ingredients required for making cordite is acetone, a volatile liquid compound used as a solvent. Acetone is made from starch and Britain needed to look for sources of starch. At the beginning of the war we relied on imported maize and even potatoes for starch. But when supply routes were cut, Lloyd George, as Minister of Munitions, required that starch should come from closer to home. He asked Professor Chaim Weizman of Manchester University to come up with an alternative way for making acetone. Weizmann, the leading Zionist and later the first president of Israel, devised a process to extract the solvent not only from maize but also from horse chestnuts - conkers. There were factories at Poole in Dorset and by the dockside at King's Lynn in Norfolk, producing as much as 90,000 gallons of acetone a year. When supplies of maize ran short, it was supplemented with horse chestnuts collected by schoolchildren. The factory locations were top secret and schools that collected conkers sent them to London to be passed on to the factories. Because the process was being kept secret, there were local suspicions that private profit was being made from voluntary efforts.


It is said that because so many conkers were collected around the country there were transport problems and piles of rotting conkers were left at railway stations. The King's Lynn factory began production in April 1918 and closed a few months later - conkers were found to be a poor source, though they were collected again in World War Two for the same reason.
Lloyd George's gratitude to Weizman was such that it led directly to the controversial 1917 Balfour Declaration which set out British approval for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people - the state of Israel.
 
I think by "modern", Keegan meant that the Somme, and WWI in general was the first time that the war found you no matter where you went on the battlefield. You couldn't just maneuver out of range, veer off into the woods or other cover or concealment, and the range and intensity of the killing power was such that radical re-thinking of tactics and strategy were needed to overcome it. Not to mention new technology.

He might also have been referring to it being the first war of The Moderns, and it certainly was, but I think my first explanation is truer.

3 'Nam Vets and I got our tuition refunded for History of War because we used the professor's reliance upon Keegan as the sole source for "modern" to impeach the professor's credibility for the modern era. Keegan is, like the professor I had, very much ivory tower. (The professor was a draft dodger... by his own admission. And was also one of Keegan's own students.)

It also doesn't help that "modern" for historical purposes is generally 1965-on... and the tactical paradigm has changed drastically thrice since the Somme... Mechanized blitzkrieg and the bomber warfare of WWII; the guerilla warfare, Strike aircraft and close air support of Vietnam; and the drone and missile warfare, shoot-on-the-move tanks, and digitally connected infantry of the 2nd Gulf War...
 
Can't be any worse for post-1900... Keegan thinks the Somme was "modern" tactically. (Admittedly, he was writing it before 'Nam was over... but even then, tactical doctrine was radically different than the Somme.) The Somme is really not modern - the tanks were essentially mobile machine gun revetments, and so few as to make little difference overall. Aircover was minimal. Infantry fought from trenches as well as field positions. All in all, it's pre-blitzkrieg, and pre-air-war in character.


Very much like the US Civil war.

The book I listed isn't a thesis on general tactics & strat but, just what the sub head suggests. Quite interesting read. Gotta love ebooks. Click and read without waiting for mail.
 
It also doesn't help that "modern" for historical purposes is generally 1965-on... and the tactical paradigm has changed drastically thrice since the Somme... Mechanized blitzkrieg and the bomber warfare of WWII; the guerilla warfare, Strike aircraft and close air support of Vietnam; and the drone and missile warfare, shoot-on-the-move tanks, and digitally connected infantry of the 2nd Gulf War...

Guerilla warfare was used during the Napoleonic wars during the Peninsular War in Portugal and Spain. It was when and where it was invented so that is hardly modern. Tanks and their tactical uses were developed in WWI and their tactical uses still a developing theory even after WW2. Strategic bombing (at least as a means of inflicting morale casualties upon civilians) began in WWI with Zeppelin and Gotha raids on London. And to a certain extent with the shelling of Paris by Big Bertha. Weapons of Mass Destruction in the form of gas was developed and used in WWI.

All of those are "modern" concepts and development which began with WWI or even earlier. Combined arms theory has been around for as long as archers supported sword-swinging infantry or horsemen advancing on the enemy. Napoleonic warfare involved set piece maneuver, but relied heavily for success on the supporting functions of each of those pieces for any one of them to be successful. So combined arms isn't exactly Modern either.

You are correct in that the theories of strategic and tactical warfare have changed since WWI, but they have changed every time a new weapon, supply system, or other materials technology has been developed. The really game-changing changes that change the entire nature of warfare is why Keegan broke them down into three (and he even admitted them to be arbitrary) categories with WWI being the first "modern" war. The reasons for the modern term are more than just tactical, but also for the nature of war itself - what made it different from everything that came before? And how the Battle of the Somme exemplified that changed nature of warfare.

I would just call anything from the 80's forward "digital warfare" given the heavy reliance from that time forward on electronic management of the battlefield in all #I concepts and in tactical and strategic areas. WW2 is just an advancement of the same concepts developed (even if at the end) during WWI and expanded to their logical conclusions. The much-vaunted blitzkrieg is oversold and didn't work very well against manuevering opponents. Against the French - yes, while they relied on set fortresses, but against the British, Russians, and even the Poles - not so much...even the Polish campaign lasted a lot longer and was a much harder fight than pop history claims it was. Nothing really new happened in warfare to dramatically change the paradigm and nature of war itself until smart weapons and space technology were developed.
 
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The myths and realities of “stopping power”,

Heck, three years ago one of our officers shot a guy three times with .40SW at 15’ with his Glock. The guy had come out of his car on a stop with an AK-47 in his hands so he kind of asked for it. He was adrenalized and task-focussed when he was shot. He was hit all three times in the abdomen and none did more than tear up his intestines because the temporary cavity created by the hollow point rounds just shoved his liver to the side; a hardball round would have perforated it. Anyway, the guy dropped his rifle and just stood there until the officer grabbed him and took him to the ground.
Anyway, that’s my 2 ½ cents on the subject.

Isn't this a contradiction of terms? Here in your own example, you have demonstrated the effect of being 'stopped' by being shot.

Back in the 1950's when the FBI agents carried 5-shot .38 caliber snubbed nosed revolvers, they were taught to shoot the 'Inverted T' ~ Two shot to the chest/abdomen and one to the head. The round fired at the head was not meant to kill, but merely 'incapacitate'.

Of course if the criminal died as a result of being shot in the head, that was too bad. He should not have been in a shootout with the FBI.

Riik O'Shae
 
One interesting item from the Korean War is that of those wounded, 92% were from fragments from artillery and mortar shells, or grenades, with 7.46% due to small arms fire. A substantial number of the Killed in Action were from small arms fire. Basically, if a soldier or Marine was hit by small arms fire, he had a pretty high chance of being killed. If hit by fragments, he was more likely to be wounded, rather than killed.

There is also this interesting comment:

Note: Wound Ballistics was published by the US Army Medical Corps, and is a public domain document.

For those interested in speeding up the game, you might want to figure that if someone is hit by small arms fire, he/she is dead or at least incapacitated, if hit by fragments, he/she may still be able to fight.

The Body Armor discussion and its effects on wounding is interesting as well.

Even more interesting, imo, was the study released by US Army Ordnance in 1954 elucidated everyone about distances at which the average firefight took place ~ approximately 50 yards.

They based their findings on all battles American soldiers took part in ~ from the Revolutionary War, through the various Indian Wars, the Civil War, Boxer Rebellion, WW I and II, through the Korean Conflict.

It was This Study that Eugene Stoner based the creation of his AR-15 Combat Rifle (do not confuse with the current AR-15) chambered for the 5.56 x 45mm cartridge.

Riik O'Shae
 
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