Some Interesting Military Data

[Timerover51]

First I've heard of that one. Again, most of my info on WW1 is the trenches of Europe, Galipoli, and the Africa campaign between the British and the German Colonies. I do know the British blockade was busted when 3 British cruisers were sunk by U-boats.

I assume by the 3 British cruisers you mean the HMS Aboukir, HMS Hogue, and HMS Cressy, sunk by Otto Weddigen in U-9 in September of 1914. The cruisers were not on the blockade, but were maintaining a patrol against German surface ships interfering with the movement of British troops to Dunkerque, France to assist in holding the northern coast of France for the Allies.

The British blockade of Germany was never broken by any German action, as it was maintained by the British fleet from Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands off of the north coast of Scotland. The primary hole, such as it was, in the blockade was the movement of Swedish iron ore in the winter from the Norwegian port of Narvik by freighter through Norwegian territorial waters in the winter when the Baltic was frozen, and from Sweden in the summer through the Baltic. The British did closely monitor shipping going to the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden for any excess of imports over the normal pre-war level to avoid having material go through those countries to Germany.

So, do you where I can get info on WW1 U-boats and destroyers ?

For U-Boats, the best single source is Eberhard Rossler's The U-Boat, published here by Naval Institute Press. For destroyers, the best single source is Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1906-1921, again published here by Naval Institute Press. For British destroyer development during the World War One period, I would recommend D. K. Brown's book, The Grand Fleet, again published by Naval Institute Press. It would be best to get those on interlibrary loan.

If you are interested in the East African campaign in World War One, you can download Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck book, My reminiscences of East Africa, here.

https://archive.org/details/myreminiscenceso00lettuoft

 

[Condottiere]

As I recall, one of the reasons the Germans decided to skip over the Netherlands in the Great War was to provide them a pipeline to neutral shipping and imports of strategic materials.

As regards to those unlucky British cruisers, they had inexperienced reserve crews onboard, though the command teams should have been a bit more on the ball.

 

[Timerover51]

As I recall, one of the reasons the Germans decided to skip over the Netherlands in the Great War was to provide them a pipeline to neutral shipping and imports of strategic materials.

The British worked very hard to make sure that was not the case. As the Dutch were dependent on food imports, the British had the whip hand in that situation.

As regards to those unlucky British cruisers, they had inexperienced reserve crews onboard, though the command teams should have been a bit more on the ball.

Churchill took a lot of heat for the cruisers being there, but after the war, Corbett, in his Naval Operations, published a dispatch written by Churchill on 18 September, ordering the cruisers to be moved to the Western Approaches and the patrol be maintained by destroyers and the new Arethusa-class light cruisers. The ships were sunk on 22 September.

That problem, giving an order and then following up to make sure that it is obeyed is a major problem in any form of bureaucracy, be it military or civilian. Given the lack in Traveller of any form of Faster-Than-Light communication short of courier ships, that should be a major problem in the Imperium. The same would hold true for issuing an order, and then trying to countermand it.

 

[JimMarn]

I believe it was those 3, and the U-9, is mentioned in the WW 1 documentaries I've seen on television. I thought they said they were part of the blockade. Of course, they could have shown them sinking and mentioned the blockade, leading me to believe the two events were tied together. That East Africa campaign is also mentioned and how he was never caught during the war by the British.

I've downloaded the pdf. Thanks !

 

[Timerover51]

A great description of a World War One canteen of the American Expeditionary Force. This is from The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Uncensored Letters of a Canteen Girl, by Katharine Duncan Morse

Back of the wash-house lies a group of long French barracks, and here lives Company A of the —— Regiment, infantry and “regulars.” Beyond the mess-hall is the hut, a French abri tent with double walls. Ducking under the fly, one finds oneself in a long rectangular canvas room, lighted by a dozen little isinglass windows. The room is filled with folding wooden chairs and long ink-stained tables over which are scattered writing materials, games and well-worn magazines. Opposite the door, at the far end, is the canteen counter, a shelf of books at one side, a victrola and a bulletin board, to which cartoons and clippings are tacked, on the other. Back of the counter on the wall, held in place by safety pins, are the hut’s only decorations, four of the gorgeous French war posters brought with me from Paris. There are two stoves resembling umbrella-stands for heating in the main part of the hut and behind the counter another, about the size and shape of a man’s derby hat, on which I must make my hot chocolate. For lights at night I am told that occasionally one can procure a few quarts of kerosene and then the lamps that stand underneath the counter are brought out and for a few days we shine; but usually we manage as our ancestors did with candle-light. Our candlesticks form a quaint collection; some are real tin bourgeois brought from Paris, some strips of wood, some chewing-gum boxes, while others are empty bottles, “dead soldiers” as the boys call them. As for the bottles, I am particular about the sort that I employ and none of mine are labeled anything but Vittel Water. Others I observe are not so circumspect,—yesterday I chanced in at a canteen in a neighboring village kept by a Y man; on a shelf three “dead soldier” candlesticks stood in a row and their labels read; Champagne, Cognac, Benedictine! For the rest, the hut is equipped with a wheezy old piano,

The book may be downloaded here: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/51495/51495-h/51495-h.htm

A "canteen", for those unfamiliar with this use of the word, was basically a military recreation hall operated by a volunteer group or the YMCA. With respect for the candles, at this time, they were still provided for as part of the ration of the enlisted men.

 

[Blue Ghost]

Just to add to the Swentzel story;

http://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient.php?recipientid=21002

 

[JimMarn]

There are times I'm glad to look at discard books from a library, but not that other reades wont see the books.

Anyway, I bought a discard book about the first battle off Guadalcanal and Savo Island in 1942.

'Disaster in the Pacific' (New Light on the Battle of Savo Island) by Denis and Peggy Warner with Sadao Seno.

This about the battle between USS Astoria, Vencennes, Chicago, Blue, Ralph Talbot, Patterson, Canberra, etc. and the IJN Yunagi, Yuban, Chokai, Aoba, etc.

Mostly one-sided battle due to mass confusion and lack of preparedness on the US Navy side. The incredibly bad radar gear and lack of night training didn't help either.

A number of first person statements, so someone interviewed both sides.

The Austrailin pilot didn't stop for tea, he hates the stuff, but it was claimed he did by Adm. S. Morison in his official history of the USN in WW2.

The Australian Coast Watchers are also mentioned, and the warnings they gave.

 

[Timerover51]

There are times I'm glad to look at discard books from a library, but not that other reades wont see the books.

Anyway, I bought a discard book about the first battle off Guadalcanal and Savo Island in 1942.

'Disaster in the Pacific' (New Light on the Battle of Savo Island) by Denis and Peggy Warner with Sadao Seno.

This about the battle between USS Astoria, Vencennes, Chicago, Blue, Ralph Talbot, Patterson, Canberra, etc. and the IJN Yunagi, Yuban, Chokai, Aoba, etc.

Mostly one-sided battle due to mass confusion and lack of preparedness on the US Navy side. The incredibly bad radar gear and lack of night training didn't help either.

A number of first person statements, so someone interviewed both sides.

The Austrailin pilot didn't stop for tea, he hates the stuff, but it was claimed he did by Adm. S. Morison in his official history of the USN in WW2.

The Australian Coast Watchers are also mentioned, and the warnings they gave.

The Battle of Savo Island was a real mess, but I am not sure I would blame part of the problem on bad radar gear, but more of a lack of understanding of the new technology. Lack of night training was definitely a problem, but the really inexcusable action was that of the captain of the heavy cruiser, USS Chicago, who totally failed to inform the other US cruiser force that he had been engaged by the Japanese. According to Morrison, he later committed suicide.

 

[Timerover51]

I came across this while reading a collection of Abe Lincoln anecdotes on Project Gutenberg.

SORRY FOR THE HORSES

When President Lincoln heard of the Confederate raid at Fairfax, in which a brigadier-general and a number of valuable horses were captured, he gravely observed:

"Well, I am sorry for the horses."

"Sorry for the horses, Mr. President!" exclaimed the Secretary of War, raising his spectacles and throwing himself back in his chair in astonishment.

"Yes," replied Mr. Lincoln, "I can make a brigadier-general in five minutes, but it is not easy to replace a hundred and ten horses."

 

[aramis]

The Battle of Savo Island was a real mess, but I am not sure I would blame part of the problem on bad radar gear, but more of a lack of understanding of the new technology. Lack of night training was definitely a problem, but the really inexcusable action was that of the captain of the heavy cruiser, USS Chicago, who totally failed to inform the other US cruiser force that he had been engaged by the Japanese. According to Morrison, he later committed suicide.

Naval Radar in WWII was pretty dicey stuff. Low probability of detection of surface targets, no IFF systems, limited discrimination. Not good for observing and backtracking incoming fire, either.

Without the sonar, surface contacts were just a range and bearing. Good enough to shoot at, not good enough to justify shooting.

Essentially, all surface radar was "Bad"... just a matter of how bad.

 

[Timerover51]

Naval Radar in WWII was pretty dicey stuff. Low probability of detection of surface targets, no IFF systems, limited discrimination. Not good for observing and backtracking incoming fire, either.

Without the sonar, surface contacts were just a range and bearing. Good enough to shoot at, not good enough to justify shooting.

Essentially, all surface radar was "Bad"... just a matter of how bad.

I would suggest that you do some reading on the later night battles in the Solomon Islands campaign, in particular the Battle of Vella Gulf, where a US destroyer division sank three Japanese destroyers by torpedoes fired under radar control. Then I would suggest reading about the Battle of Surigao Strait, part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, which was entirely a night surface engagement. The Battle of Empress Augusta Bay would also prove fruitful to read about.

Also worth reading are the accounts of the night engagements between the British Navy and the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean, and then there is the Battle of North Cape, occurring on December 26, 1943, where the HMS Duke of York sank the German Scharnhorst with the assistance of British cruisers and destroyers. This occurred well to the north of North Cape, Norway, where there is a singular lack of daylight at that time of year. Norman Friedman's book, Naval Radar, has an excellent discussion of the development of naval radar during the World War 2 period, and is well worth the read.

As for sonar, during World War 2, it was limited to range and bearing only, with depth determination being estimated by the distance at which the contact was lost, and until the very end, when the US began to introduce a 360 scanning system, was basically a searchlight only unit. Norman Friedman's book, US Naval Weapon Systems, has an extended chapter on US sonar development and World War 2 system capability. Norm autographed my copy. W Hackmann, Seek & Strike: Sonar, anti-submarine warfare and the Royal Navy 1914-54, HMSO, London, 1984, is an excellent history of the development of British sonar during World War 2.

Additional data on the development of radar during World War 2 is available in the US Army official history of the Signal Corps during the war. The Signal Corps was the US agency in charge of radar development. The volumes can be downloaded from the Center for Military History, and are in searchable, copy and paste, PDF files.

http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-ts.html

The following three publications are available for download from HyperWar.

The publication "U.S. Radar - Operational Characteristics of Available Equipment Classified by Tactical Application", short title FTP 217, is issued for the guidance of those concerned in planning of future operations.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/Radar/index.html

US Night Fighter Radars of WW II

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/NightFighterRadars/index.html

The AN/APS-6 Pilot's Manual. This is a downloadable PDF file.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/NightFighterRadars/APS-6PilotsManual.pdf

I would be remiss if I did not recognize our British Allies' contribution to the development of radar, which is covered in the following volume.

THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, By Basil Collier

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Defence-UK/index.html

The book by Bill Gunston, Night Fighters, is also very useful in its discussion of night fighter operations from World War One on, and has a lot of useful diagrams of the various radar displays used during World War 2.

The US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narratives are also quite useful for looking at radar use in World War 2. Some of them are available on HyperWar at the following link. They can also be obtained directly from the US Navy.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/index.html

I should note that I own all of the books in hard cover, and have downloaded all of the digital files, so that I am only recommending what I have read and view as useful. I would imagine that forum users in the US should be able to obtain all of the books via interlibrary loan. British Forum members should be able to obtain most of them the same way, as Norm's books were also published by Conway Maritime Press in the UK.

 

[aramis]

The thing is, sonarmen (My grandfather was one - one of the DD's in BG Enterprise) could listen and determine class of vessel, sometimes individual vessel, by listening with the passives. The combination of sonarmen ID'ing with the directional hydrophones and the radar locating the targets with much greater range accuracy than active sonar, was a potent combination.

Compared to modern radars, the best in WW II was absolute crap.

 

[Condottiere]

Radar removed the element of surprise; even submarines have to occasionally surface.

 

[JimMarn]

The Battle of Savo Island was a real mess, but I am not sure I would blame part of the problem on bad radar gear, but more of a lack of understanding of the new technology. Lack of night training was definitely a problem, but the really inexcusable action was that of the captain of the heavy cruiser, USS Chicago, who totally failed to inform the other US cruiser force that he had been engaged by the Japanese. According to Morrison, he later committed suicide.

Yeah, he was questioned by Admiral Hepburn, who was just on a fact finding tour. After that, he comitted suicide.

For some reason, Adm. Morison claimed the pilot of the Hudson drank tea before amking his report. The Japanese Admiral Mikawa informed Adm. Morison after the war he heard both Hudson pilots break radio silence to raise the alarm while they were overhead of his battle group. Thats why the second Hudson crew saw the IJN ships going a different direction. It was to throw them off. So, Adm Morison's book claiming the pilots didn't raise the alarm is false.

The book points out how the radar was very flakey. They also didn't have enough people to operate the radar sets. ( At this time, electricians took care of the radar gear. There were no specially trained radar repair people. ) And it couldn't cover the area that opened up between the two destroyers. As much as 17 miles. They were 15 miles apart when the IJN ships slipped past the picket destroyers. The Chicago had the best radar.

The officers of the USN ships, except for one, didn't trust the air contacts by the Hudsons. Were certain that the Japanese couldn't attack at night and do it with surprise. Due to earleir reports of IJN subs, the USN officers played down any possibility of a surface IJN attack. There were two officers placed in Flag Rank positions by circumstances, and they had no training leading groups of ships at that level.

One officer did load his guns. And put his crew on alert.

The aircraft overhead didn't raise alarms on any of the ships. The flares should have, and didn't.

 

[JimMarn]

Radar removed the element of surprise; even submarines have to occasionally surface.

This early in WW2, no Allied radar sets could pick up a periscope.

From the books I've read, written by submariners, they would get ahead of the ships they wanted to attack. Raise periscope, figure out the info to fire, and fire their torpedoes.

The August, 1942 battle at Savo Island the Long Lance torpedoes were used. Much heavier warhead than the US ones and didn't leave a wake.

The book mentions the US ships looking for the wakes and flash of the torpedo launchers.

 

[JimMarn]

Even when I was in , around 1970, I saw crud on radar that the radar operators, some with years of experience, had no idea what it was. Some interference, called 'running rabbits' because thats what it looked like, was well known. (A suprious signal skittering across the radar scope as the sweep goes around the circular screen.)

Most of the time, they could tell. We had IFF to.

From other books I've read about WW2 and sooner, IFF could be knocked out if the antennas were blown off by ack-ack or the gear inside an aircraft, ship, etc. was damaged.

 

[Timerover51]

This early in WW2, no Allied radar sets could pick up a periscope.

From the books I've read, written by submariners, they would get ahead of the ships they wanted to attack. Raise periscope, figure out the info to fire, and fire their torpedoes.

Were these US submariners against the Japanese? While the Japanese did have some microwave radar by the end of the war, being ahead of the Germans in that respect, their units were still using a simple horn antenna, which was more of a searchlight unit than the rotating antenna used by the British and the US.

It took microwave radar, which was just coming into use in 1942 to pick up periscopes. That became common by 1943 and 1944, in 1945 when the airborne APS 20 system began to be used, which used a data link from the carrying Avenger aircraft to the aircraft carrier Plan Position Indicator screen, and was credited with a 30 mile range on a submarine snorkel, or an effective sweep diameter of 60 miles. That data comes from Norm Friedman's US Naval Weapons Systems, page 252.

The August, 1942 battle at Savo Island the Long Lance torpedoes were used. Much heavier warhead than the US ones and didn't leave a wake.

The book mentions the US ships looking for the wakes and flash of the torpedo launchers.

I would have to read the book to get a better idea of it, and see what sources the author cites. The Long Lance warhead did contain over 1200 pounds of Shimose, or Picric Acid, comparable to TNT in blast effect. Later war US torpedoes, when loaded with Torpex, had a very comparable punch.

As for the use of Long Lance torpedoes, given the Japanese ships involved in the battle, the torpedoes used may have been either 24 inch Type 8 or 24 inch Type 90, which carried smaller warheads and were not pure oxygen users, as the Type 93 was. The ships included the four oldest heavy cruisers in the Japanese Navy, along with two old light cruisers. Does the book offer any source or hard evidence for the use of the Long Lance? The light cruiser Nagara was still carrying Type 8 torpedoes at the Battle of Guadalcanal in November of 1942.

The following link is to the Office of Naval Intelligence Combat Narrative covering Savo Island, which was written shortly after the battle.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN-Savo/index.html

 

[JimMarn]

The book did mention that not all IJN ships carried the wakeless torps.

Everything I've read on picking up periscopes was done in the Atlantic.

Naval Institue Press at Annapolis, MD is who printed the book.

 

[Timerover51]

The book did mention that not all IJN ships carried the wakeless torps.

Everything I've read on picking up periscopes was done in the Atlantic.

Naval Institue Press at Annapolis, MD is who printed the book.

Okay, so it was the German boats then.

The big problem the US Navy had was the Japanese were apparently homing in on the transmissions of the submarine SD aircraft warning radar, which was a long-wave set operating in the metric band. The Japanese also had microwave radar detectors by about mid-1943, long before the Germans had them.

 

[Timerover51]

Compared to modern radars, the best in WW II was absolute crap.

Based on the above statement, it would appear that you view the radars used in World War 2 as worse than useless, a waste of resources, and worse than the sound locators, human eyes, and searchlights that they were supposed to replace. It this is not your view, then kindly explain what you mean.

It would also be helpful if you give examples as to the uselessness of World War 2 radars, and how they did not function properly. I am certain that the British members of the forum would be glad to hear that the Chain Home network used during the Battle of Britain was

absolute crap

and that they would have been just as well protected by the sound locators, ground observers (especially at night), and searchlights.

I would also appreciate your analysis as the the use by the US Navy of radar picket destroyers during the Okinawa Invasion to detect kamikaze raids coming in and then vectoring out Combat Air Patrol aircraft to intercept them and break them up. As the radar were

absolute crap

. clearly the destroyers would have been better used in anti-aircraft defense of the combat transports and supply ships, as any interception of the kamikazes would be by total accident. And clearly the use of the proximity fuze, using a very small radar set, had no effect whatsoever on the efficiency of US anti-aircraft firepower, along with the radar fire control for the 5 inch and 40mm batteries being totally useless, as that was evidently

absolute crap

as well.

Now, if you do not mean this, then again, exactly what do you mean by your comments?