Some Interesting Military Data

[Timerover51]

Service and supply troops do not always have it easy. The following comment pertains to the Anzio beachhead in World War 2 in 1944. It is taken from the US Army Official History series, THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS: OPERATIONS IN THE WAR AGAINST GERMANY, which is a public domain document and not covered by any copyright.

Anzio was a landmark in Quartermaster operations. But it was memorable for another reason. During the 125 days on the beachhead the falling bombs, artillery shells, and flak failed to distinguish between service and combat troops. Here, along with men on the line, 10 percent of the troops under control of the 249th Quartermaster Battalion were killed or wounded.

 

[Timerover51]

The following comment comes from the same source as the previous post. It represents something that no pre-war training or planning could have covered. The French Expeditionary Corps, which fought under the US 5th Army in Italy in 1943-44, was recruited from the military and civilians in French North Africa, which the US and the UK had occupied in earlier in 1942-43. With the invasion of Southern France in August of 1944, the Corps was transferred to the US 7th Army, and fought in France.

Sullivan found that he had left behind one completely unsolved matter. The burial of Moslem troops of the French Expeditionary Corps created an unforeseen problem of cemetery design. Deceased Moslems had to face Mecca. A simple solution appeared to be for all grave markers to face in an eastward direction. But this was not always possible when such matters as adequate drainage and easy access to graves were considered. Sullivan solved the problem by dividing Fifth Army's future layouts into three separate sections. One contained American and Allied dead, another enemy remains, and the third Moslem bodies.

 

[mike wightman]

Hmm, now there is a thought, burial customs for Traveller cultures.

Thank you for finding this stuff, it stimulates the old grey cells.

 

[Timerover51]

The following account of the loss of the aircraft carrier IJN TAIHO is not made up. This is a case where fact is far, far stranger than fiction. It does not appear that the Japanese "damage control" officer survived the explosion and sinking.

Loss of IJN TAIHO

7. After launching aircraft, the formation cruised north at 26 knots. At about 0830 a single torpedo struck TAIHO on the starboard side in the vicinity of the forward gasoline tanks. Various accounts place the center of impact at about frame 54, although the exact location is of little importance.

8. The damage was considered minor. The forward elevator, in the up position at the time, fell about two meters (6.5 feet) and jammed. The deck of the elevator pit (the top of the compartment containing the forwardmost set of tanks; see Plate V) was ruptured over a large area. As TAIHO changed trim, going down by the bow about 1.5 meters (4.9 feet), the elevator pit flooded with liquid gasoline, water, and fuel oil. TAIHO reduced speed only one knot, however, continuing with the formation as it moved north. There was no fire.

9. The crew decked over the forward elevator opening, and the remaining 16 aircraft were launched prior to 0900.

10. Gasoline fumes permeated both the upper and lower hangars, which had large openings to the elevator well. Recognizing the danger, efforts were made by damage control personnel to rid the ship of fumes. At first, all possible doors and hatches were opened in the hope that natural draft, due to TAIHO's speed, would remove the fumes. The effect was to spread the fumes to spaces not previously exposed. The fact that hangars were completely enclosed was a major obstacle to gas-freeing them. Efforts to pump the free gasoline overboard from the elevator pit were bungled.

11. Finally, it was decided to operate every ventilation set on the ship, both supply and exhaust. This was done. This had the effect of spreading fumes even more widely. The ship literally was reeking with gasoline.

12. At 1330 a gigantic vapor explosion occurred. The Navigator, on the top of the pilot house at the time, stated that the explosion appeared to be centered in the vicinity of the forward elevator opening. The armored flight deck was split down the center, and both side bulkheads of the hangar were blown out. The heavy flight deck seemed to deflect the force of the blast downward, according to the Navigator. In any event, the only survivors from the engineering spaces were from No. 2 fireroom. These few men escaped by crawling straight up over masses of tangled wreckage. Some survivors from the crews spaces on the orlop deck (the next deck below the lower hangar deck) escaped by crawling through holes in the side of the ship. Much below water-line damage was done. TAIHO started to settle and list to port.

13. The whole ship was engulfed in flames. This fire never died down. It apparently was fed by gasoline from the ruptured tanks.

14. Further damage control efforts were useless. TAIHO was abandoned, with all engineering spaces dead and the fire raging unabated. About 1500 she lurched to port, capsized and plunged by the stern (the Navigator was certain she did not go down by the bow). More than 1000 of her crew perished, survivors totaling less than 500. Almost all survivors were from topside spaces.

The above report on the loss of the IJN TAIHO is taken from the REPORTS OF DAMAGE TO JAPANESE WARSHIPS - ARTICLE 2: YAMATO (BB), MUSASHI (BB), TAIHO (CV), SHINANO (CV) "INTELLIGENCE TARGETS JAPAN" (DNI) OF 4 SEPT. 1945 FASCICLE S-1, TARGET S-06, published in January 1946 by the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan.

It does have some relevance to Traveller in that an undetected hydrogen leak would be similarly deadly to a starship. Hydrogen does have a very wide range of explosiveness of 18.3% to 59% by volume.

 

[Carlobrand]

...It does have some relevance to Traveller in that an undetected hydrogen leak would be similarly deadly to a starship. Hydrogen does have a very wide range of explosiveness of 18.3% to 59% by volume.

A detonation would be deadly, but the spacegoing craft has the advantage that it can extinguish a fire by opening the affected compartment to space. In fact, the detonation may well do that job for them, depending on how strong one sees the hull as being. One big boom, and then it's a matter of seeing who's left alive, what still works, and what can be fixed.

Hydrogen in Trav is stored as a very cold liquid. I would think that a leak would reveal itself as a significant drop in temperature in the affected compartment, frosting at the leak and fogging of the air around the leak. Maybe like this image of leaking nitrogen, except of course that hydrogen likes to go up:

http://kdfw.images.worldnow.com/images/22846240_SA.jpg

Hydrogen likes to rise. A network of vents through the ceiling could draw away any leaked hydrogen to be dealt with elsewhere. Of course, that same network would be the first point at which the hydrogen might reach dangerous concentrations if that venting process were inadequate, leading to a detonation that starts in the ceiling and blasts downward, the vents and ceiling being presumably weaker than the deck the folk above are walking on. On the other hand, because the vents would presumably be a smaller volume than a compartment, the detonation would be less powerful. Might be the difference between a damaged ship and a gutted ship.

 

[Timerover51]

Blasting through the hull would depend on how strong you have the hull. If you have a hull equal to Armor 40, as claimed by some, then the blast wave will not rupture the hull, but reflect off and reinforce the blast effect inside the ship.

 

[Timerover51]

Here is some data that might be of interest that I am putting together for a handout for the trip to the 1st Division Museum at Cantigny Gardens in Wheaton, Illinois (see thread in Random Static).

On 31 October 1918 the AEF had a strength of 81,800 officers, with 1,037,000 men in the zone of the armies, and 855,600 men in the rear (including combat replacements as well as service troops), together with 47,700 civilian workers, and 35,000 prisoners of war being used as laborers. It had 20,000 saddle horses, 94,000 draft animals, and 2,500 pack animals in the zone of the armies, and 25,000 saddle horses, 21,500 draft animals, and 87 pack animals in the rear. It had on hand 70,000,000 rations, including 15,500,000 in the zone of the armies, for the men, and 4,500,000 rations of forage for the animals. 1t had a total of nearly 30,000 trucks, 7,800 motor cars, and 13,700 motorcycles. The AEF was operating, partially, 6,000 miles of standard-gauge and 1,400 miles of narrow-gauge railroads; it had in operation 1,380 locomotives and 14,000 cars for standard-gauge, and 450 locomotives and 3,300 cars for narrow-gauge railroads. Its weapons included 1,400 pieces of heavy artillery, 1,890 pieces of field artillery, 1,362,000 rifles, 68,000 machine guns and automatic rifles, 1,000 trench mortars, and 240 tanks, and it had 868 airplanes and 79 balloons in the zone of the armies and 1,092 airplanes and 140 balloons in the depots and rear areas. Its ammunition supply included, in the zone of the armies, 122,400 rounds for heavy artillery, 2,500,000 rounds for field artillery, and 166,000,000 rounds for rifles and machine guns; in the rear areas, 310,800 rounds for heavy artillery, 6,470,000 rounds for field artillery, and 716,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition. Hospitals at that time included 153 in the zone of the armies, with beds for 48,520 patients of which 30,241 were occupied; hospitals in the rear areas had a capacity of 224,330 beds of which 133,526 were occupied.

Source: THE SINEWS OF WAR: ARMY LOGISTICS 1775-1953, by James A. Huston, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1997, pages 385-86.

 

[selunatic2397]

I am continually amazed at how much "Stuff" is needed to run an army!

In a CT based aftermath game I run off and on for my gamers, they tend to ignore the very much needed aspects of logistics...they win their battles but then run out of pert near everything afterwards and get their behinds beat on something fierce.

Thanks again for posting all this useful and interesting stuff!

 

[Timerover51]

I am continually amazed at how much "Stuff" is needed to run an army!

In a CT based aftermath game I run off and on for my gamers, they tend to ignore the very much needed aspects of logistics...they win their battles but then run out of pert near everything afterwards and get their behinds beat on something fierce.

Thanks again for posting all this useful and interesting stuff!

Thank you for your kind words and encouraging interest. I will get back to posting more here.

 

[Timerover51]

Ah, the plight of the Military Police doing Traffic Control. The following is a translation of a captured German document furnished the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War 1 by the British.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT. FROM BRITISH G. H. Q.
July 15, 1918.
1. Officers, non-commissioned officers and men employed in controlling the traffic are superior authorities in the sense laid down ifi the Regulations for the Military Police. Officers, non-commissioned officers and men must obey their orders. They are entitled to demand passes. They wear a white band on their right arm as a distinguishing mark and possess a stamped permit signed by the commander of the traffic control police.

2. The traffic control police are authorized, in cases of urgent necessity, to make use of their weapons in order to compel compliance with their orders. They will demand three times that their orders shall be obeyed, pointing out that they will make use of their arms in case of necessity. If this does not prove effective, the policemen on duty, or other official, will first, as far as possible, make use of his side arm. He must only use firearms if other weapons prove ineffective. It is not a question of killing the offender, but only of rendering him harmless (firing at his legs, etc.). A report must be sent in as soon as possible to the Commander of the Ammunition Columns and Trains No. 36 of each occasion on which arms have been employed, stating the reason, as well as the name and unit of the person who refused to obey orders.

The source is as follows: Summary of information, Second section, General Staff, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, nos. 92-250.

This item can be found at the Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library. An immense amount of very interesting information can be found there is one is patient enough to look.

 

[Timerover51]

How one dedicated individual can boost morale for a military unit. Note the targeting of the Germans by the way.

Report: SUPPLY OFFICER, 111TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

"When the battalion first went into action north of Verdun the rolling kitchens were placed in a valley very near to the front lines. By aerial observation the enemy soon located these kitchens and put down a very heavy shell fire upon them. In spite of this, the mess sergeants and their kitchen details contrived to cook one or two meals during the next 24 hours, at the end of which time the kitchens were ordered moved about 1 1/2 miles further back.

“At this time the exploit of the Mess Sergeant, Company A, 111th Machine Gun Battalion, attracted my attention. His rolling kitchen was almost destroyed by shell fire during the early part of the shelling. I first noticed it when it was on its way to the new location farther back. I talked to the Mess Sergeant about it and told him that I would give orders that his company be fed by one of the other kitchens which had not been hit. It appeared to me that his kitchen was far past any usefulness, for the firebox looked more like a sieve than a stove. But he said he would like to make an effort to use it for he felt that his company would get better service if he could cook for them with his own equipment..

"With the aid of a mechanic he flattened out the twisted and torn sides of the firebox and next morning cooked breakfast for his men, and, in fact, continued to use this wreck so efficiently that his company was as well fed as usual, until nearly a month later, when, in the rest area, I was able to secure a new rolling kitchen for his company. I say his company was as well ted as usual, because I had occasion several times, when hunting for a meal, to go to his kitchen and I always marveled at the production of such good grub from such a scrap heap. But after all, I shouldn’t have been surprised for this kind of thing was only consistent with everything in his previous service, which had earned for him the name of being the best mess sergeant in the 29th Division."

From: EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER - 29TH
DIVISION, A. E. F.

The above comes from the report on OPERATIONS OF THE QUARTERMASTER CORPS, U. S. ARMY DURING THE WORLD WAR, Monograph 9. The World War referred to was World War 1.

 

[Timerover51]

And from the same report comes the following. Not all field kitchens during World War 1 were located in the rear. I suspect that the kitchens mentioned in Barbonval were very likely ahead of the battalion command post.

"The first wheeled transport of the 77th Division to cross the Vesle was that of the 308th Infantry Supply Company. Engineers fairly cleared by two o’clock on the morning of September 5th, It was necessary to use four mules on the limber of a British ration cart to pull over the grades, .The supply company with the field rations went forward with the combat train to Blanzy about two and one-half miles beyond where the supply company had established its dump. The infantry had only established their line that morning. About four o'clock on the afternoon of September 6th, ammunition and field rations had been carried as far as Barbonval where patrols were out of the town. On the night of September 6th the kitchens, water carts, and garrison rations of fresh meat and vegetables were sent in to Barbonval despite shells, bombs and machine gun fire from airplanes. Our men in the front lines were then getting hot coffee three times a day and kitchens were established within three or four hundred yards of the first line at Barbonval. This was rather a curious situation inasmuch as some of the men in the reserve were thirty minutes walk from their kitchen, but this was due to the condition of the ground.

“Two kitchens were maintained in Blanzy, about two and one-half miles directly north of Fismes, despite the constant shelling that the town received due to its exposed position on the crest of a hill and its close proximity to the German line.

"One of these kitchens, which was being operated in a wrecked stone hut when the writer visited it on September 9th was cooking delicious apple fritters and coffee, which were being served to troops in dug-outs just across the road. The shells which were dropping about seemed to give an added zest to the appetite of the men, who were particularly enthusiastic about the fritters.

“The other kitchen, which was visited two days later by the writer, had been set up in a wrecked house, where the cook had improvised a stove in one of the few fireplaces that was still standing in the town. This kitchen had bean established there to provide for a detachment of the 308th Ambulance Company which had set up a dressing station in an old barn a few yards away. The ruined town was under particularly vigorous shell fire at the time but even when a shell landed just across the debris–strewn street the cook, who was preparing supper, went on calmly with his work. He explained with some pride that for supper that night they were having salmon salad, peas, fresh bread, butter, and coffee, and that for dinner that day there had been beef stew, bread, butter, tomatoes, coffee and doughnuts.

"The rations were taken each day to this advance kitchen in a little Ford ambulance from Field Hospital 307, which was located at Chery-Chartreuve.

“The task of carrying these rations over the exposed roads was one that was particularly hazardous at the time, but all of the supply company officers and men who had anything to do with the transportation of food to the troops at the front took pride in the fact that the soldiers never went hungry.”

From: EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF THE DIVISION QUARTERMASTER, 77TH DIVISION, A. E. F.

I suspect that there were few, if any, complaints about quality of food in these units. Donuts and apple fritters would be a treat even today.

Edit Note: How many of the forum in the course of an adventure consider that their player's characters might need to eat sometime?

 

[JimMarn]

I check with the players from time to time, and ask them if their characters have any food ?

 

[Timerover51]

The following comes from a U.S. Army Ground Forces report on the Okinawa operation in World War 2. It is most decidedly NOT a critique of the officer mentioned, as he was just following his orders. The interview on March 8th was prior to the invasion on April 1. It does show how stretched manpower can get in a prolonged war, or with a very large military. You may wish to consider such things if running a Traveller military campaign.

c. The only objection to graduates from OCS shipped overseas direct upon graduation was made during a conference with General Randall, Assistant Commander, Colonel Crechter, Chief of Staff, and Lt. Colonel Manuel, G-1 of the 77th Division on 8 March 1945. They all agreed that officer replacements were being received who are totally lacking in proper instruction on infantry tactics and leadership. Upon questioning it, was found that one such officer, 2nd Lieutenant P. Boyd Austin, 013291307 had just reported for duty. Upon questioning this officer, I found that he received his basic training at Fort Knox, upon completion was sent to the radio school there, and after graduating was assigned to the 14th Armored Division, in January 1944. He left there in July to attend the 376th OCS at Fort Benning. Graduated from OCS on 19 December 1944 and sent to Replacement Depot #2. Was there five (5) days and sent to Fort Lawton where he remained twenty-four (24) days during which time he acted as information and education officer. From there was sent to 13th Replacement Depot and finally to the 77th Division where he arrived three (3) months after graduating from OCS.

Lieutenant Austin was a fine appearing officer, apparently in perfect physical condition and talked intelligently. I discussed this subject later with General Bruce and he stated that he was perfectly satisfied with the officer replacements he had received,

The G-1 mentioned about is the division staff officer in charge of personnel and administration. For a period of about a year, I served as the S-1, Admin and Personnel officer of my supply battalion while in Alaska.

 

[BlackBat242]

As long as he listens to the "advice and guidance" of his Sgts...

Jon A. Sgt, USMC 1981-89

 

[Ulsyus]

A colleague of mine did national service in the Finnish army some years ago. He mentioned that the most significant thing to raise morale was having the mess truck rock up to a position at meal time in the middle of winter. He described the sides coming down and big baymaries loaded with rich hot steaming food being available to the troops. The way he talked about it made it plain to us that these experiences had quite an impact on him!

 

[Timerover51]

As long as he listens to the "advice and guidance" of his Sgts...

Jon A. Sgt, USMC 1981-89

Any 2nd Lieutenant who does not listen to his sergeants is in my view, and I have been there, a complete and utter fool, and likely a dead one to boot if in combat.

A colleague of mine did national service in the Finnish army some years ago. He mentioned that the most significant thing to raise morale was having the mess truck rock up to a position at meal time in the middle of winter. He described the sides coming down and big baymaries loaded with rich hot steaming food being available to the troops. The way he talked about it made it plain to us that these experiences had quite an impact on him!

We had the same experience when I was in Alaska, when the mess truck showed up with the hot food and coffee in the Marmite cans. Beats heated MCI (Meal, Combat, Individual: I was a Quartermaster officer so have to use the correct terminology) hands down.

Note: I was sufficiently strange in taste that I actually enjoyed the canned fruit cake. However, the peanut butter was definitely NOT up to Skippy standards.

 

[aramis]

Any 2nd Lieutenant who does not listen to his sergeants is in my view, and I have been there, a complete and utter fool, and likely a dead one to boot if in combat.

Keep in mind: as recently as WWII, there were units whose sergeants had less time in uniform than that LT, and equally as little in the field. Some of the youngest NCOs were 18 year old enlistees... often with 16 to 18 yo privates serving under them. It's not a given that a Sergeant is an experienced soldier. (Well, it is in the current, post 1948 US army, but...)

(When companies, battalions, or regiments were raised as a whole, often, the only actual veterans were the Platoon Sergeants and up. Brevet promotions for the best soldiers resulted in some sergeants with less than a year in. The system was slowed in 1947 (OPA), 1954 (OGLA) and then unified and regularized with DOPMA in 1980. More recently, the enlisted promotion has been regularized, as well.)
During WWII, 29 YO colonels were not unheard of, either. Especially in the USAAC.

 

[Timerover51]

Some wise and interesting words from the US Army Manual for Subsistence Department in 1902. The Subsistence Department, which was in charge of Army rations, was merged with the Quartermaster Department to create the Quartermaster Corps in 1912.

725. Rations may be issued by a commissary to a recruiting officer to enable a cook, before enlistment, to give a practical exhibition of his ability to cook. —G. O. No. 94, A. G. O., 1898.

A very wise man, or one with a bad experience, must have put out that order.

714. Enlisted men, prisoners of war, military prisoners at posts, hospital matrons, and nurses in the nurse corps, are each entitled to one ration in kind per day,

Emphasis added, and note, this was 1902, well before the Geneva Convention dealing with the treatment of prisoners of wars. The General Order providing for this was promulgated in 1895.

73S. In camp or barracks, where companies are not joined in a general mess, a company commander will supervise the cooking and messing of his men. He will see that his company is provided with at least two copies of the Manual for Army Cooks (which contains comprehensive instructions in cooking, which will be observed as far as practicable), and that suitable men in sufficient numbers are fully instructed in managing and cooking the ration in the field ; also that necessary utensils in serviceable condition are always on hand, together with the field mess furniture for each man.

The Army of the Potomac, under Major General McClellan (great administrator, lousy combat commander) issued a cookbook to its troops in 1862. The first US Army Manual for Army Cooks was published in 1879, and revised in 1883 (I have copies of that one), with new editions in 1896, 1910, and 1916. I have copies of the latter two as well. While complaints about army cooking and rations are legion during the late 1800s, it was not for lack of effort on the part of the Army to do better.

758. Where the exact quantity of canned meats, canned baked beans, or canned tomatoes, to which a company or detachment is entitled can not be furnished without breaking a can, an overissue of one can of the smallest size on hand will be allowed. Trade packages of canned baked beans and tomatoes being of varying weights, contents of cans will be estimated as follows in making issues: Baked beans—So-called 1-pound cans at 10.5 ounces; 3-pound cans at 34.5 ounces. Tomatoes—So-called 2.5 pound cans at 2 pounds; 3-pound cans at 2.25 pounds; gallon cans at 6.75 pounds. Issues of canned tomatoes will be made in the full weight of that vegetable allowed to the ration. In making issues of canned jam as a component of the field ration the contents of the so-called 2-pound cans will be estimated at 1.75 pounds.
—Regs. Subs. Dept. Vide G. O. No. 56, A. G. O., 1901, and G. O. No. 34, A. G. O., 1902.

I suspect that someone spent some time with a lot of canned goods and a good scale to come up with the above corrects. Note, these would be the canned goods sold on the civilian market, purchased in bulk by the army for its supplies. Remember, in 1902, we were still involved in the Philippines, and had just finished participation in the expedition to rescue the Legation at Peking from the Chinese Boxer Rebellion.

 

[Timerover51]

Keep in mind: as recently as WWII, there were units whose sergeants had less time in uniform than that LT, and equally as little in the field. Some of the youngest NCOs were 18 year old enlistees... often with 16 to 18 yo privates serving under them. It's not a given that a Sergeant is an experienced soldier. (Well, it is in the current, post 1948 US army, but...)

(When companies, battalions, or regiments were raised as a whole, often, the only actual veterans were the Platoon Sergeants and up. Brevet promotions for the best soldiers resulted in some sergeants with less than a year in. The system was slowed in 1947 (OPA), 1954 (OGLA) and then unified and regularized with DOPMA in 1980. More recently, the enlisted promotion has been regularized, as well.) During WWII, 29 YO colonels were not unheard of, either. Especially in the USAAC.

My experience was in the post-Vietnam army. The unit mentioned, the 77th Division had been in combat and this was just before the invasion of Okinawa. I am not sure how many 18-year old sergeants with limited combat experience would have been in that division. I am also aware that Audie Murphy enlisted at the age of 16, and before his 20th birthday, was a 1st Lieutenant and also one of the US Army's most decorated soldiers of World War 2, to include the Medal of Honor. The supply of Audie Murphys is unfortunately quite limited.

As for the US Army Air Force, as all pilots had to be officers, and you did have a fairly high casualty rate, promotions did tend to be rapid.