Some Interesting Military Data

[LarryBReese]

I would like to note that, for the most part, the USSBS is one of the very best sources on the second world war available anywhere and it seems, for some reason, to be grossly overlooked for the most. The analysis, and the access to the core original documentation, is absolutely first rate. I have several sections I keep handy for reference work.

LR

* Anyone interested to explore this topic more deeply can find a 488 page USSBS report here -

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/

[1] Select "Government Reports" under the "Primary Documents" section.

[2] Select the document entitled "U. S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan".

[3] Scroll down the Table of Contents to Section JM200K and select reference X-38(N2) Japanese Fuels and Lubricants - Article 2, "Naval Research on Aviation Gasoline".

 

[HG_B]

I would like to note that, for the most part, the USSBS is one of the very best sources on the second world war available anywhere and it seems, for some reason, to be grossly overlooked for the most. The analysis, and the access to the core original documentation, is absolutely first rate. I have several sections I keep handy for reference work.

LR

And to this day it is STILL a mystery why they didn't highlight the deficiency of Allied bombing command for failing to go after electrical power generation in a systematic way as doing so would have made dispersal of military plants (to hide from bombing) almost useless...

 

[Timerover51]

I would like to note that, for the most part, the USSBS is one of the very best sources on the second world war available anywhere and it seems, for some reason, to be grossly overlooked for the most. The analysis, and the access to the core original documentation, is absolutely first rate. I have several sections I keep handy for reference work.

LR

Some of the reports have been posted online, but the really good material is in the background documents used to prepare the reports. I think that it is possible to order all of them on microfilm from the National Archives.

One of the other Japanese Reports covers the use of alcohol as aircraft fuel, which would be quite useful today for non-jet using aircraft.

 

[JimMarn]

Interesting info on av gas.

Regular car gas in about 1952 cost 25 cents in Texas. My parents and I went up to New England, northeast US, about 1957. Car gas was around 45-55 cents in Texas and went up as we drove up the east Coast. I don't remember what it was up by the big cities of New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia.

 

[BlackBat242]

Dayum... by 1972 gas was still below 40 cents per gallon (34-37 in most places) in Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, and western Kansas.

Then 1973/74 hit, and OPEC cut the flow of Arab oil to the US...

 

[Timerover51]

Hmm, probably should clarify something. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, which covered both Europe and the Pacific, and the Naval Technical Mission to Japan (there was also one to Germany which material is unfortunately NOT online), are two totally separate reports. The USSBS was done by civilian experts along with AAF officers, specifically looking at the effects of aerial bombing in the War, while the Naval Technical Mission was looking at the technologies developed and used by Germany and Japan, along with Japanese naval operations. The USSBS tends to be a bit biased towards the assumption that strategic bombing won the war.

However, the collection of the Strategic Bombing Survey in the Interrogations of Japanese Officials is an extremely useful historical document, and at times made the AAF quite unhappy, as it demolished a lot of claims by the AAF during the Pacific War.

 

[Timerover51]

I have been continually amazed at the response on some subjects with I have posted about. I will keep posting, but I am wondering if there is any area that someone would especially like to see information about. Anyone on the forum have an interest or question that I have not said anything about? If I do not have anything, I will say so, and then start digging to see what I can find.

 

[JimMarn]

One history channel documentary I found interesting was the claim that the Japanese air force had large numbers of aircraft in caves on the Home Islands.

Other sources said they were low on aircraft and the big worry on an invasion into Japan by Allied ground forces would be armed civilian attacks, not aircraft.

So which is it ? Hidden aircraft that would have smashed any invasion attempt, or low number of aircraft and only ground forces of military and civilians, would have met the Allied invasion forces ?

I have seen videos of the training films of Japanese women training with bamboo spears.

 

[Timerover51]

One history channel documentary I found interesting was the claim that the Japanese air force had large numbers of aircraft in caves on the Home Islands.

Other sources said they were low on aircraft and the big worry on an invasion into Japan by Allied ground forces would be armed civilian attacks, not aircraft.

So which is it ? Hidden aircraft that would have smashed any invasion attempt, or low number of aircraft and only ground forces of military and civilians, would have met the Allied invasion forces ?

I have seen videos of the training films of Japanese women training with bamboo spears.

Actually, it was both. They had about 4,000 aircraft stockpiled, some in caves, for defense against the invasion of Kyushu that they anticipated. They did have the correct landing beaches determined, based on an analysis of previous US landing. They had also finally figured out that the ships to attack in an invasion were not the aircraft carriers or the battleships, but the transports.

As for the civilian training, that was going on too. i have read some of the reports of fighter sweeps over Kyushu in the summer of 1945 after airfields were in use on Okinawa. It was effectively a "free fire" zone for the US fighters, as they were hitting anything that was moving on the roads or fields. Through newsreel footage, the Japanese civilians were well aware of what the Japanese Army had been doing in China, and they expected the Americans to behave the same way.

 

[HG_B]

One history channel documentary I found interesting was the claim that the Japanese air force had large numbers of aircraft in caves on the Home Islands.

They could have had a million planes. They lacked fuel to fly them. When they sent their last super BB to do battle they only had enough fuel for a one way trip...

 

[Carlobrand]

They could have had a million planes. They lacked fuel to fly them. When they sent their last super BB to do battle they only had enough fuel for a one way trip...

I'd understood their plan was to reserve what fuel remained at that point to use those planes as kamikazes, the course of the war being pretty clear by the time Yamato was sent out.

 

[HG_B]

I'd understood their plan was to reserve what fuel remained at that point to use those planes as kamikazes, the course of the war being pretty clear by the time Yamato was sent out.

They didn't have the fuel for that by that point. Their supply lines were cut faster than they anticipated and most fuel being stored was destroyed. You may read post war USA reports on exactly what remained by the time of surrender.

 

[JimMarn]

Actually, it was both. They had about 4,000 aircraft stockpiled, some in caves, for defense against the invasion of Kyushu that they anticipated. They did have the correct landing beaches determined, based on an analysis of previous US landing. They had also finally figured out that the ships to attack in an invasion were not the aircraft carriers or the battleships, but the transports.

As for the civilian training, that was going on too. i have read some of the reports of fighter sweeps over Kyushu in the summer of 1945 after airfields were in use on Okinawa. It was effectively a "free fire" zone for the US fighters, as they were hitting anything that was moving on the roads or fields. Through newsreel footage, the Japanese civilians were well aware of what the Japanese Army had been doing in China, and they expected the Americans to behave the same way.

Ah, I thought the info about Nanking, et al, had been kept from the Japanese people.

The documentary showed a small aircraft carrier with several gyro copter type aircraft on it. One had almost sunk one U.S. submarine, and had likely sunk others. I remember, but could be mistaken, they could hover over subs in shallow water and drop bombs/depth charges right on them. Increasing the chances of a US sub being sunk.

 

[JimMarn]

They could have had a million planes. They lacked fuel to fly them. When they sent their last super BB to do battle they only had enough fuel for a one way trip...

I knew about the Yamato.

But aircraft don't use the same type fuel as ships.

 

[HG_B]

I knew about the Yamato.

But aircraft don't use the same type fuel as ships.

They were low on ALL petrol products. They lost ALL oil imports basically. Then their oil storage reserves were destroyed. The oil the ships used came from the same oil that the planes fuel was refined from. (You DO know that you get more ship fuel oil out of a barrel of oil than you do Avgas when refined, right?) They even lacked enough fuel to train pilots. Same thing happened to Germany towards the end of the war.

 

[Timerover51]

I'd understood their plan was to reserve what fuel remained at that point to use those planes as kamikazes, the course of the war being pretty clear by the time Yamato was sent out.

Actually, the Yamato was fueled with 8,000 tons of soybean oil to use as fuel for its last sortie. See the following website:

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm

And go to report number X-38(N)-6: Japanese Fuels and Lubricants-Article 6, Research on Diesel and Boiler Fuels at the First Naval Depot, Ofuna, 141 pages.

If you check out report number X-39(N)-3, you will see the extent that Japan was using alcohol as an aviation fuel.

The whole U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan is absolutely loaded with useful information. And it is all there for download. I have a lot of it in hard copy and a complete set on microfilm for WW2 research.

They were reserving what fuel that they had left for what they viewed as the decisive battle for Kyushu. Japan did have a small amount of domestic oil production, and were getting some shale oil production from Manchuria. The discussion in the NavTechJap on Japanese fuel research is quite fascinating, and I am surprised some of it is not being made use of now, particularly the use of alcohol as aviation fuel for reciprocating engine aircraft.

 

[HG_B]

and I am surprised some of it is not being made use of now, particularly the use of alcohol as aviation fuel for reciprocating engine aircraft.

That is because it is inferior in performance and oil is cheap and very plentiful.

 

[Silverhawk]

They didn't have the fuel for that by that point. Their supply lines were cut faster than they anticipated and most fuel being stored was destroyed. You may read post war USA reports on exactly what remained by the time of surrender.

By the end of the war, it is true that Japan faced a serious shortage of all petroleum based products. It was the reason to take control of the Dutch East Indies. That source being cutoff faster than anticipated is a point that is argued over.

One should be aware that the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy did not necessarily agree on policy. The Imperial Navy was very wary of starting a war with the United States. Yamamoto himself had studied at Harvard and was a naval attache in Washington. He and a number of other officers were of the opinion that if the war was not successfully concluded in six months of the start of hostilities that there was little chance of winning.

Unfortunately to get ships like Yamato, they cut deals with the Imperial Army and the Army called those favors in.

Gee I just realized that the undergrad class in the History of China and Japan just came in handy

 

[HG_B]

One should be aware that the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy did not necessarily agree on policy. The Imperial Navy was very wary of starting a war with the United States. Yamamoto himself had studied at Harvard and was a naval attache in Washington. He and a number of other officers were of the opinion that if the war was not successfully concluded in six months of the start of hostilities that there was little chance of winning.

You should read through the captured Abwehr files that contain data from German intel officers stationed in Japan on the run up to the war...

 

[Timerover51]

By the end of the war, it is true that Japan faced a serious shortage of all petroleum based products. It was the reason to take control of the Dutch East Indies. That source being cutoff faster than anticipated is a point that is argued over.

One should be aware that the Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy did not necessarily agree on policy. The Imperial Navy was very wary of starting a war with the United States. Yamamoto himself had studied at Harvard and was a naval attache in Washington. He and a number of other officers were of the opinion that if the war was not successfully concluded in six months of the start of hostilities that there was little chance of winning.

Unfortunately to get ships like Yamato, they cut deals with the Imperial Army and the Army called those favors in.

Gee I just realized that the undergrad class in the History of China and Japan just came in handy

Actually, if you go through the record of the Japanese Pre-war policy conferences, which appears on the book, Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, from Stanford University Press, the Japanese Navy wanted the Japanese Army to agree to attack the USSR, as did Hirohito. However, after being badly, and I do mean BADLY, mauled by the Soviet Army at Nomonhan in northwestern Manchuria, the Japanese Army had no desire whatsoever to tangle with the Soviets without massive equipment upgrading. The only way to get those resources was to head South. We role-played the Japanese decision-making process in our summer World War 2 class, and the students thought that the leaders were out of their minds. The only student who could follow the thought process was a Korean student.

I would strongly encourage anyone interested in government decision-making by a government which does not share the same World View as Europe, or has a bit of a strange one, to read the book mentioned on Japan, and also the Ciano Diaries, by Count Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law and also his Foreign Minister. They are extremely interesting.