• Welcome to the new COTI server. We've moved the Citizens to a new server. Please let us know in the COTI Website issue forum if you find any problems.
  • We, the systems administration staff, apologize for this unexpected outage of the boards. We have resolved the root cause of the problem and there should be no further disruptions.

Some Interesting Military Data

I came across the following in the description of the Japanese process for producing thin plates of high-hardness, face-hardened steel armor. The process is covered in the US Naval Technical Mission to Japan, Report O-36-2, Japanese Light Armor, Article 2. This can be found at the fischer-tropsch.org website cited earlier.

After carburizing , the plates were normalized at 850°C, held for one hour in a car-type furnace at 850ºC, quenched by hand in whale oil, and drawn for two hours in rape seed oil at 180ºC. The desired hardness was greater than 550 BHN for the face and greater than 400 BHN for the reverse side. The carburizing compound used was of powdered charcoal, 70%, and barium carbonate (BaCO3), 30%.

Quenching is the process of rapidly cooling the front of a plate of armor with either water or oil to secure a very high degree of hardness in the plate. The use of Whale Oil to do this is a new one on me, as I had not noticed that earlier. The ballistic tests required for the plates to pass proof are also given, which would be of interest to those wanting to know more about armor protection and penetration. It should be noted that very high-hardness plates, if attacked by a projectile with considerable excess energy for penetration can shatter with a catastrophic failure rather than simply being penetrated.
 
Ah, I thought the info about Nanking, et al, had been kept from the Japanese people.

There's constant attempts by historical revisionists in Japan to hide what happened. While the event took place over about 6 weeks and involved enough soldiers for knowledge of it to be unable to be suppressed during the war, time and war culpability apologists have been chipping away at the truth constantly.

...the Japanese Navy wanted the Japanese Army to agree to attack the USSR, as did Hirohito. However, after being badly, and I do mean BADLY, mauled by the Soviet Army at Nomonhan in northwestern Manchuria, the Japanese Army had no desire whatsoever to tangle with the Soviets without massive equipment upgrading.

Yeah, the Japanese got quite a bit of a thumping at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Notably, the Soviet commander who headed up their forces in the engagement was none other than Georgy Zhukov!
 
Yeah, the Japanese got quite a bit of a thumping at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Notably, the Soviet commander who headed up their forces in the engagement was none other than Georgy Zhukov!

Yep. that's why, as soon as the German's informed Stalin that the Japs were going to attack South rather than into Eastern USSR he moved Georgy to the West to command.
 
There's constant attempts by historical revisionists in Japan to hide what happened. While the event took place over about 6 weeks and involved enough soldiers for knowledge of it to be unable to be suppressed during the war, time and war culpability apologists have been chipping away at the truth constantly.

The photos and film in the US National Archives that covers the Rape of Nanking is pretty much all derived from Japanese sources, or from duplicates made by Chinese films labs of photos taken by the Japanese, who then had them developed in China. Note, one of the heroes of Nanking when it came to sheltering China civilians was the GERMAN consul, and Germany had a military mission training some of Chiang Kai-Shek's forces.

Yeah, the Japanese got quite a bit of a thumping at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol. Notably, the Soviet commander who headed up their forces in the engagement was none other than Georgy Zhukov!

For those who want to find out more about this, I would recommend the following link.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/ca...omonhanJapanese-SovietTacticalCombat_1939.pdf
 
The following item comes from The US. Air Service in World War I, Volume 2, edited by Maurer Maurer, and published by the US Air Force Office of Air Force History.

(g) The next question of difficulty is that of sheltering the airplanes. During certain parts of the year, with luck, our airplanes should last roughly three months when kept in the open; but during the other portions of the year, as, for example, the rainy season, experience in Mexico shows that airplanes last only about two weeks; while French advices received about two weeks ago show that airplanes kept in the Toul region in the open, in the fall, or in other bad seasons, last only about 8 days. It becomes at once apparent, therefore, that every attempt must be made to shelter the airplanes; otherwise the replacement of airplanes due to lack of shelter becomes an enormous problem

It should be noted that the life expectancy reported is NOT combat life expectancy, but how long the aircraft will remain operational if exposed to the elements, from a maximum of 3 months to a maximum of 8 days, depending on the area and climate. When you add this to the assumed short combat life, maintaining a large number of World War One aircraft in combat squadrons becomes a massive effort.
 
Probably got a lot to do with the materials used in their construction; wood, cloth and canvas do not stand up to the elements as well as bonded superdense.
 
Just adding my two cents a bit belatedly here. There will always be room for the good 'ol bayonet and other mêlée weapons. Pretty much if people have ammunition they are going to shoot, but there are some times when you might not want to do that. Like when you could puncture the hull, blow out a pressurized dome, shoot up some critical electronics on the bridge, in the jumpdrive room, in the med lab etc. whatever. Plus, with all those high-tech full-auto weapons. Sooner or later somewhere someone is going to run out of ammo. So shoot them if you can. If you can't then you had better hope that you aree lucky enough to get close enough to use cold steel!
 
Just adding my two cents a bit belatedly here. There will always be room for the good 'ol bayonet and other mêlée weapons. Pretty much if people have ammunition they are going to shoot, but there are some times when you might not want to do that. Like when you could puncture the hull, blow out a pressurized dome, shoot up some critical electronics on the bridge, in the jumpdrive room, in the med lab etc. whatever. Plus, with all those high-tech full-auto weapons. Sooner or later somewhere someone is going to run out of ammo. So shoot them if you can. If you can't then you had better hope that you aree lucky enough to get close enough to use cold steel!

Shadowfax, I fully agree with you. The more reading I do of personal accounts of World War 2, the more anecdotal evidence I find for the use of bayonets in combat, either at night, in jungle, or when out of ammunition or no time to reload.
 
Bayonets

I think charges are a psychological weapon and whoever has the highest morale wins. So the reason you rarely get a bayonet *fight* is if the chargers have lower morale the charge fails before it gets to that point and if the chargers have higher morale the defenders run away before it gets to that point.

So the only time an actual bayonet fight will result from a bayonet charge will be when both sides have exactly equal morale - which as a function of probability must happen sometimes but mostly not - or where the defender is trapped and can't get away or doesn't know which way to run (darkness, smoke etc).

I think that covers most of the examples given in the earlier posts.

I've been told that in the British army there is or used to be a tradition that you sharpened your bayonet before a battle. I don't know if that is true or was true or not but on the surface it would seem like a really pointless thing to do in the modern world however when you realise it's all psychological then the act of sharpening your bayonet before a battle makes perfect sense even if the chance of using it is close to zero. So I think modern armies - or at least the ones I want to win - should keep bayonets and sharpen them before a battle as a ritual even if they don't train with them.
 
In 1982, in the Falklands, British forces conducted a bayonet charge against dug-in Argentine forces at Mt. Tumbledown (for which Major Kiszely was awarded the Military Cross).

In 1995, during the Siege of Sarajevo, French Marine infantrymen from the 3rd RIMA carried out a bayonet charge against the Serbian forces to regain the Vrbanja bridge.

In 2004 in Iraq at the Battle of Danny Boy, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders bayonet-charged mortar positions filled with over 100 Mahdi Army members. The ensuing hand-to-hand fighting resulted in an estimate of over 40 insurgents killed and 35 bodies collected (many floated down the river) and nine prisoners. Sergeant Brian Wood, of the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment, was awarded the Military Cross for his part in the battle.
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-famous-bayonet-charge-of-modern-conflict-2012-10

I have read un-sourced accounts of at least two instances in Iraq where US Marines used bayonets to go after Feyadeen fighters in thick >6' tall grassy areas.

In September 2012, Lance Corporal Sean Jones of The Princess of Wales's Regiment was awarded the Military Cross for his role in a bayonet charge which took place in October 2011.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9571522/Soldier-who-led-Afghanistan-bayonet-charge-into-hail-of-bullets-honoured.html

There have been scores of instances in both Iraq and Afghanistan where individuals used bayonets - such as this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8252974.stm


I found this article interesting: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202123.html
 
Bayonets

I think charges are a psychological weapon and whoever has the highest morale wins. So the reason you rarely get a bayonet *fight* is if the chargers have lower morale the charge fails before it gets to that point and if the chargers have higher morale the defenders run away before it gets to that point.

So the only time an actual bayonet fight will result from a bayonet charge will be when both sides have exactly equal morale - which as a function of probability must happen sometimes but mostly not - or where the defender is trapped and can't get away or doesn't know which way to run (darkness, smoke etc).

I think that covers most of the examples given in the earlier posts.

I've been told that in the British army there is or used to be a tradition that you sharpened your bayonet before a battle. I don't know if that is true or was true or not but on the surface it would seem like a really pointless thing to do in the modern world however when you realise it's all psychological then the act of sharpening your bayonet before a battle makes perfect sense even if the chance of using it is close to zero. So I think modern armies - or at least the ones I want to win - should keep bayonets and sharpen them before a battle as a ritual even if they don't train with them.

About the longest period of sustained hand to hand combat I know of occurred at the Bloody Angle during the US Civil War at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse in 1864. The Union and Confederate forces went at it for about 20 hours, separated by a log barricade. I have been there, and there is an eerie feeling about the area. There were quite a few kids there that day, it was a Sunday, and they were sticking really close to Mom and Dad.
 
In 1982, in the Falklands, British forces conducted a bayonet charge against dug-in Argentine forces at Mt. Tumbledown (for which Major Kiszely was awarded the Military Cross).

In 1995, during the Siege of Sarajevo, French Marine infantrymen from the 3rd RIMA carried out a bayonet charge against the Serbian forces to regain the Vrbanja bridge.

In 2004 in Iraq at the Battle of Danny Boy, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders bayonet-charged mortar positions filled with over 100 Mahdi Army members. The ensuing hand-to-hand fighting resulted in an estimate of over 40 insurgents killed and 35 bodies collected (many floated down the river) and nine prisoners. Sergeant Brian Wood, of the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment, was awarded the Military Cross for his part in the battle.
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-famous-bayonet-charge-of-modern-conflict-2012-10

I have read un-sourced accounts of at least two instances in Iraq where US Marines used bayonets to go after Feyadeen fighters in thick >6' tall grassy areas.

In September 2012, Lance Corporal Sean Jones of The Princess of Wales's Regiment was awarded the Military Cross for his role in a bayonet charge which took place in October 2011.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9571522/Soldier-who-led-Afghanistan-bayonet-charge-into-hail-of-bullets-honoured.html

There have been scores of instances in both Iraq and Afghanistan where individuals used bayonets - such as this:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8252974.stm


I found this article interesting: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/12/AR2009061202123.html

I know about the charge during the Falklands War, but thanks, BlackBat, for the information on the rest.
 
I'm not saying it doesn't happen. I was detailing a model for why it only happens rarely - relatively speaking - but when it does happen i.e. when both sides have equally high morale (or the lower morale defender can't escape for some reason) - it is exceptionally bloody.

edit: "rarely" in this context doesn't mean "hardly ever" it means how many bayonet charges are there compared to the number of firefights without bayonet charges. I doubt there were more than one in a thousand firefights in Iraq that involved a bayonet charge - although it wouldn't be surprising if the percentage in the Falklands was higher as the Falklands involved a high proportion of the most hardcore British infantry regiments (who'd probably vote to go back to bayonet fighting if they had a choice).
 
About the longest period of sustained hand to hand combat I know of occurred at the Bloody Angle during the US Civil War at the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse in 1864. The Union and Confederate forces went at it for about 20 hours, separated by a log barricade. I have been there, and there is an eerie feeling about the area. There were quite a few kids there that day, it was a Sunday, and they were sticking really close to Mom and Dad.

I can believe it.
 
Last edited:
Some Bad Military Predictions

A couple of not so great military predictions.

From the entry for April 12th, 1861 in A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, by John Beauchamp Jones, copyright 1866, available for download at Project Gutenberg. This is actually a very useful source of information on the Confederate Government and views of the Confederate citizens. Jones, as Clerk of the Confederate War Department, was essentially the administrative head of the Department, and reported directly to the Confederate Secretary of War.

Gov. Wise, smiling, rose again and walked to a corner of the room where I had noticed a bright musket with a sword-bayonet attached. He took it up and criticised the sword as inferior to the knife. Our men would require long drilling to become expert with the former, like the French Zouaves; but they instinctively knew how to wield the bowie-knife. The conversation turning upon the probable deficiency of a supply of improved arms in the South, if a great war should ensue, the governor said, with one of his inevitable expressions of feeling, that it was not the improved arm, but the improved man, which would win the day. Let brave men advance with flint locks and old-fashioned bayonets, on the popinjays of the Northern cities—advance on, and on, under the fire, reckless of the slain, and he would answer for it with his life, that the Yankees would break and run.

Governor Wise was the Governor of Virginia in 1861.

The following quote is from Ian Hamilton's Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1, the entry for March 14th, 1915.

Lord K. thereupon made the remark that if we could get one submarine into the Marmora the defences of the Dardanelles would collapse. "Supposing," he said, "one submarine pops up opposite the town of Gallipoli and waves a Union Jack three times, the whole Turkish garrison on the Peninsula will take to their heels and make a bee line for Bulair."

The Lord K. mentioned is Lord Kitchener, then the British Secretary of State for War.
 
The Lord K. mentioned is Lord Kitchener, then the British Secretary of State for War.

He had no idea what he was up against. Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) was leading the Turkish forces at Gallipoli. He rallied them with the order:

"Men, I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time that it takes us to die, other forces and commanders can come and take our place."

Simon Hibbs
 
He had no idea what he was up against. Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk) was leading the Turkish forces at Gallipoli. He rallied them with the order:

"Men, I am not ordering you to attack. I am ordering you to die. In the time that it takes us to die, other forces and commanders can come and take our place."

Simon Hibbs

I agree that Kitchener had no idea of what he was encountering, but the commander of the area of the Dardanelles was actually the German General Liman von Sanders, while Mustafa Kemal initially the commander of the Turkish 19th Division that opposed the Anzac landing. That is not to say that Hamilton did not make some major mistakes as well, one of them being failure to actually exercise command on the day of the landings.
 
A couple of not so great military predictions.

The following quote is from Ian Hamilton's Gallipoli Diary, Vol. 1, the entry for March 14th, 1915.

Quote:
Lord K. thereupon made the remark that if we could get one submarine into the Marmora the defences of the Dardanelles would collapse. "Supposing," he said, "one submarine pops up opposite the town of Gallipoli and waves a Union Jack three times, the whole Turkish garrison on the Peninsula will take to their heels and make a bee line for Bulair."

The Lord K. mentioned is Lord Kitchener, then the British Secretary of State for War.

The Royal Navy submarine B11 was operating (and sinking ships, including the Ottoman battleship Messudieh) in the Dardanelles starting in December 1914.

By 26 April 1915 the Royal Australian Navy submarine AE2 was in the Sea of Marmora, attacking Ottoman ships - but not sinking any.

On 29 April 1915 she met the RN sub E14, which had just entered the Sea - the morning of 30 April 1915 HMAS AE2 was sunk with no loss of life.

http://www.navy.gov.au/hmas-ae2

Between 2-4 British subs were active in the Sea of Marmora at any given time throughout 1915, and afterwards - but despite sinking quite a number of Ottoman vessels (and even surfacing and sinking a ship in Constantinople/Istanbul harbour), there presence never worried the Ottoman authorities excessively.

The Ottomans overestimated the number of subs (they thought there were an average of 11 at any time), but they had no lasting effect on the Ottomans - neither operationally nor in regards to morale.
 
Back
Top