Some Interesting Military Data

[Timerover51]

I will not be posting much more here, but I did come across the following in the logistics portion of the following report. The report can be found at the Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library.

COMINCH P-0012
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
CAPTURE OF IWO JIMA
16 FEBRUARY TO 16 MARCH 1945
17 July 1945.

Casualties among corpsmen were very high, especially among front line units. In moving about to care for the wounded, they were subject to intense enemy fire and frequently were shot down alongside the man they were caring for. For this operation, each division was assigned approximately 5 percent additional corpsmen before the operation; however, the losses among corpsmen in one Marine Division (4th Mar. Div.) were approximately 38 percent and a little less in the others so that there was need for additional replacements and medical companies were levied on to furnish these. In one division this was carried to such an extent that by D-plus-Eight- Day, one medical company had been reduced to three Medical Officers and a few Marines and was completely inoperative as an organization. This is contrary to established doctrine and greatly hinders the care of the wounded. The hospital sections of the medical companies must not be disrupted to furnish replacements for front line units or there will be no one to care for the wounded after they are evacuated from the front lines.

Emphasis added. I have a good friend who was a Marine corpsman in Vietnam, where the casualties among corpsman were similar.

Four LST's were outfitted for use as casualty evacuation ships and a large medical staff placed on board.

On D-day from 0900 to 1530 there had been 1,230 casualties evacuated through these LST's. This was slightly more than three casualties per minute. After a few days and nights of this the medical officers and corpsmen were exhausted.

Again, emphasis added.

 

[aramis]

I have noticed a few times over the years that folks think Custer was a General when he was in the cavalry fighting the Native Americans. I think its confusion over the breveted ranks used in the 1800s.

Few Americans understand the whole idea of Commissioned officers as it exists now, and fewer still as it existed then. Let alone the esoterica associated with same, such as brevet promotions, commissioned and warranted officers, and the regimental system and officer promotions therein... Nor the difference between Regular Army, State Units, State Commissions, and reserve units... (noting also that the modern RA/NG/Reserves system is a 20th century artifact. See the 1903 Dick act, the 1908 Military Establishment Act, and the 1916 National Defense Act.)

 

[Timerover51]

The Commander in Chief, US Navy report on Iwo Jima is also available in html format at HyperWar. It makes for interesting reading.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Iwo/Cominch/index.html

 

[JimMarn]

The Commander in Chief, US Navy report on Iwo Jima is also available in html format at HyperWar. It makes for interesting reading.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Iwo/Cominch/index.html

LVM ? Hmm... A ship type new to me. I glanced through it, looks like a good read. Thanks !

 

[Timerover51]

As Lt.-Col. George Armstrong Custer was mentioned earlier, the following might be of interest to some on the forum. It is a report on the Court-Martial of Custer in 1867. The following quote is from the Introduction.

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer--Brevet Major General--United States Army, was Court-martialed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during September and October, 1867. Though not unknown to Custer historians, this little-chronicled event in the life of the well-known American soldier and Indian fighter is seldom accorded more than an obscure comment in the many books and articles about the man.

The full report can be downloaded here from the Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, and is a public document and therefore copyright-free.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/1948/rec/245

Note, this is not the fictional account of a court-martial following the Battle of the Little Big Horn which appeared in 1978. I will not make any comments on that film or book, which I have both seen and read. I will state that I do not and never will have a copy in my military history library, which does include some fiction.

Enjoy reading about the actual court-martial. No spoiler as to the outcome.

 

[BlackBat242]

Here is a shorter version of the lead-up, court-martial, and aftermath:
http://law.jrank.org/pages/2594/George-Armstrong-Custer-Court-Martial-1867.html
http://law.jrank.org/pages/2592/George-Armstrong-Custer-Court-Martial-1867-Court-Martial.html
http://law.jrank.org/pages/2593/George-Armstrong-Custer-Court-Martial-1867-Aftermath.html

 

[Timerover51]

For all those not old enough to remember those days. October of 1962 in particular.

https://archive.org/details/tenforsurvivalsu00unitrich

Ten for survival : survive nuclear attack by United States. Office of Civil Defense 1961

 

[Timerover51]

The U. S. Civil War saw the first major use of railways as a means of supplying armies in the field. The following comment comes from a study of the supply of Gen. Sherman's march to Atlanta, Georgia in 1864. Note, this is not his March to the Sea, which took place in November of 1864, where his forces lived off of the land by foraging. The comment applies to the repair and maintenance of the Western and Atlantic Railroad between Chattanooga, Tennessee, his forward supply base, and Atlanta, Georgia. This was basically a single-track 5 foot gauge railway, and was partially owned by the State of Georgia.

The most important single structure was Chattahoochie bridge, 780 feet long and 92 feet high, which was completed by the construction corps in four and a half days.

Emphasis added.

The study is as follows: Supply of Sherman's army during the Atlanta Campaign, published by the Army Service School Press in 1911, and can be downloaded here.

http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll11/id/527/rec/7

The reason for the study is given as follows.

It was begun at the instance of Lieutenant Colonel John F. Morrison, General Staff, Senior Instructor, Department of Military Art, Army Service schools, and has been used in connection with the Staff College course in "Supply".

 

[Condottiere]

According to a documentary, one point four kilogrammes per man per day, which was why Manassas Junction was so strategic, being the crossing point for two different railroads.

 

[JimMarn]

For all those not old enough to remember those days. October of 1962 in particular.

https://archive.org/details/tenforsurvivalsu00unitrich

Ten for survival : survive nuclear attack by United States. Office of Civil Defense 1961

I remember that event. My dad was in the US Army at the time and was suddenly told to pack his duffle bag, report to base, and standby to be shipped to Florida on short notice.

 

[AnotherDilbert]

The U. S. Civil War saw the first major use of railways as a means of supplying armies in the field.

Railways were instrumental already in the Crimean War.

"In 1854 during the Crimean War Peto, Betts and Brassey constructed the Grand Crimean Central Railway between Balaklava and Sevastopol to transport supplies to the troops at the front line."

 

[Timerover51]

Railways were instrumental already in the Crimean War.

"In 1854 during the Crimean War Peto, Betts and Brassey constructed the Grand Crimean Central Railway between Balaklava and Sevastopol to transport supplies to the troops at the front line."

Moving supplies a few miles between the port of Balaklava and the siege lines of Sevastopol is a bit easier than Sherman operating against Atlanta with his forward supply base at Chattanooga which in turn was supplied by Nashville, Tennessee.

"The Chattanooga & Atlanta, or Western & Atlantic Railroad, extends from Chattanooga to Atlanta, one hundred and thirty-eight miles, with a branch from Kingston to Rome seventeen miles long. . The reconstruction and maintenance of this line was, in many respects, the most difficult of any military railroad operations during the war. By it the Confederate army; under General Johnston, made its retreat from Buzzard's Roost to Atlanta, and in falling back from one strong position to another, it did such damage to the road as was supposed would delay or prevent Sherman's pursuit; but in this it was unsuccessful. However great the damage done, it was so speedily repaired that General Sherman soon ceased to fear any delay from this cause, and made his advance movements with perfect confidence; that the railroad in his rear would be "all right."

Emphasis Added. The source for the above quote is the same as the previous one.

The siege lines around Sevastopol were supplied by horse-drawn wagon and pack animals prior to any railway. Sherman could not have possibly been supplied in that manner. Nor could he live off of the land as he could in his March to the Sea from Atlanta to the coast. Similarly, the cutting of the South Side Railroad by Sheridan, following the victory at Five Forks in early April of 1865 forced Gen. Lee to evacuate both Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia, as they could no longer be supplied.

 

[Whipsnade]

Moving supplies a few miles between the port of Balaklava and the siege lines of Sevastopol is a bit easier than Sherman operating against Atlanta with his forward supply base at Chattanooga which in turn was supplied by Nashville, Tennessee.

How about the Franco-Austrian War/Second War of Italian Independence in 1859 instead?

The French moved five corps, something like 180,000 men, half her standing army, from France across the maritime Alps into northern Italy. It took about two weeks from Austria's declaration of war in late April and the Second Empire's subsequent mobilization to a point where enough troops were in Lombardy for Napoleon III to travel there and take command.

France then kept her own troops and those of her Sardinian ally supplied through the signing of an armistice in July.

 

[AnotherDilbert]

Moving supplies a few miles between the port of Balaklava and the siege lines of Sevastopol is a bit easier than Sherman operating against Atlanta with his forward supply base at Chattanooga which in turn was supplied by Nashville, Tennessee.
...
The siege lines around Sevastopol were supplied by horse-drawn wagon and pack animals prior to any railway. Sherman could not have possibly been supplied in that manner. Nor could he live off of the land as he could in his March to the Sea from Atlanta to the coast. Similarly, the cutting of the South Side Railroad by Sheridan, following the victory at Five Forks in early April of 1865 forced Gen. Lee to evacuate both Petersburg and Richmond, Virginia, as they could no longer be supplied.

The "Grand Crimean Central Railway" supplied a much larger force, up to 175000 men. The railway was necessary to support that many man, or any heavy artillery, around Sevastopol. The earlier animal-powered supply effort failed to adequately supply a smaller force. The railway was a prerequisite for a successful siege. I would call that a major use, YMMV of course.

I'm sure someone can find earlier use, perhaps more limited.

 

[Timerover51]

The "Grand Crimean Central Railway" supplied a much larger force, up to 175000 men. The railway was necessary to support that many man, or any heavy artillery, around Sevastopol. The earlier animal-powered supply effort failed to adequately supply a smaller force. The railway was a prerequisite for a successful siege. I would call that a major use, YMMV of course.

I'm sure someone can find earlier use, perhaps more limited.

The following is the size of Sherman's army in terms of men and animals, not counting the troops guarding his lines of communications. Also, the terrain between Chattanooga and Atlanta is primarily mountainous, and at the time, very sparsely developed.

I assumed the strength of the army to move from Chattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and the number of animals to be
fed, both for cavalry and draught, at thirty five thousand; then allowing for occasional wrecks of trains, which were very common, and for the interruption of the road itself by guerillas and regular raids, we estimated it would require one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each; to reach Chattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply.

That equates into 1300 tons of cargo daily to supply his army. And all of that had to be brought forward by train from Nashville. Chattanooga is 151 miles from Nashville, and most of that is mountainous. I have driven from Nashville to Chattanooga to Atlanta several times along the route followed by Sherman, and it is not flat country at all.

I do not think that the British had to worry about their Crimean railway being wrecked by the local populace.

Edit Note: I would rather not get into an extended discussion of the competency or lack thereof of the British and French commanders and supply systems, especially the British, during the Sevastopol siege.

 

[Condottiere]

The figures below show annual running costs for Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships.

The average annual costs of operating only include those which are directly attributable to the Ship’s Unit Identity Numbers e.g. Personnel Costs, Fuel, Port Visits, Travel & Subsistence etc.

The average annual costs of operating do not include:▮

a. Maritime Domain Maintenance Costs

b. Central Allowances- Appointing Drafting and Leave (allowances), Continuity of Education Allowance etc

c. Overheads for common services

d. Support costs for Naval Bases

e. Support costs from other MoD Top Level Budget areas

f. Central costs i.e. IT and Communications

g. Aircraft costs

h. Training and force generation costs

Costs shown are in £ million, per annum, for individual ships or individual ships in the class.

LPD Albion Class 23.975
T45 Daring Class 14.764
RFA Auxiliary Oiler and Replenishment Ship (Fort Victoria) 14.325
LPH Ocean Class 12.345
RFA Solid Support Ship (Fort Austin) 11.776
T23 Duke Class 11.735
RFA Tanker (Wave Class) 9.183
RFA Primary Casualty Receiving Ship, and Aviation Training (Argus) 8.877
RFA Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary (Bay Class) 8.170
Antarctic Patrol Ship (Protector) 7.413
RFA Small Tanker (Black Rover) 7.227
RFA Forward Repair Ship (Diligence) 6.558
RFA Spt Tanker Leaf Class (Orangeleaf) 5.677
ECHO Class 5.460
OCEAN SURVEY Ship (Scott) 4.541
RIVER Class 3.449
SANDOWN Class 3.020
HUNT Class 2.762
GLEANER Coastal Survey Ship 0.555

 

[AnotherDilbert]

The figures below show annual running costs for Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships.

T45 Daring Class 14.764

As far as I understand this mean only very direct shipboard costs.

I can find a questionable number of £660m as the cost to build a Type 45. £15m is only about 2% of the build cost, surprisingly little?

But at a guess this includes rather small amounts of live ammunition fired?

 

[Condottiere]

I'll assume that direct expenses, crew salaries, fuel, and maintenance costs, nothing like actual parts replacement, emergency personnel leave, and ammunition depreciation, or actual depreciation, presumably over twenty years.

 

[Timerover51]

The figures below show annual running costs for Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships.

The average annual costs of operating only include those which are directly attributable to the Ship’s Unit Identity Numbers e.g. Personnel Costs, Fuel, Port Visits, Travel & Subsistence etc.

The average annual costs of operating do not include:▮

a. Maritime Domain Maintenance Costs

b. Central Allowances- Appointing Drafting and Leave (allowances), Continuity of Education Allowance etc

c. Overheads for common services

d. Support costs for Naval Bases

e. Support costs from other MoD Top Level Budget areas

f. Central costs i.e. IT and Communications

g. Aircraft costs

h. Training and force generation costs

Costs shown are in £ million, per annum, for individual ships or individual ships in the class.

LPD Albion Class 23.975
T45 Daring Class 14.764
RFA Auxiliary Oiler and Replenishment Ship (Fort Victoria) 14.325
LPH Ocean Class 12.345
RFA Solid Support Ship (Fort Austin) 11.776
T23 Duke Class 11.735
RFA Tanker (Wave Class) 9.183
RFA Primary Casualty Receiving Ship, and Aviation Training (Argus) 8.877
RFA Landing Ship Dock Auxiliary (Bay Class) 8.170
Antarctic Patrol Ship (Protector) 7.413
RFA Small Tanker (Black Rover) 7.227
RFA Forward Repair Ship (Diligence) 6.558
RFA Spt Tanker Leaf Class (Orangeleaf) 5.677
ECHO Class 5.460
OCEAN SURVEY Ship (Scott) 4.541
RIVER Class 3.449
SANDOWN Class 3.020
HUNT Class 2.762
GLEANER Coastal Survey Ship 0.555

Nice post of interesting data. Thanks.

 

[Timerover51]

I am not sure how many Game Master might use things like booby traps and land mines on their players, but here is an interesting variation on the theme by some Japanese.

SOCK BOOBY TRAP
A U. S. Army captain returned from Saipan has told of a clever booby trap used by the Japanese to take advantage of souvenir- hunting soldiers. Some of the Japs on Saipan apparently carried their personal possessions around in a sock, and American soldiers overrunning a Jap bivouac area became accustomed to picking up these socks and shaking out the souvenirs. However, on some occasions—instead of chop sticks, a Jap flag, and ten-yen notes—a sock would contain a U. S. hand grenade with the safety pin pulled.

The source is INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN VOL. Ill NO. 10 JUNE 1945, page 38.