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Some Interesting Military Data

The following statement by General George Patton, Jr., who I assume needs no more introduction appears in a report filed by U. S. Army Ground Forces observers to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Ground Forces on 18 February 1943. The statement is made regarding the landings in North Africa in November of 1942.



Gen. Patton was the commander of the Western Task Force which landed in French Morocco, with the objective of taking the port of Casablanca.
You have neglected to mention that the US forces were fighting the French, and that they put up a very stiff opposition to the invasion.
 
You have neglected to mention that the US forces were fighting the French, and that they put up a very stiff opposition to the invasion.

I guess that I am hoping that the members of this forum would have some idea of that, but perhaps I should not be so optimistic.

The French did some good fighting in French Morocco, and you might want to read about the attempts to crash the harbors of Oran and Algiers. Oran in particular turned out very badly.

Ruthless resistance had completely frustrated the daring venture. Of the 17 officers and 376 enlisted men of the 6th Armored Infantry, 9 officers and 180 enlisted men were killed or presumed dead while 5 officers and 152 enlisted men were wounded. Only 3 officers and 44 enlisted men landed unhurt. U.S. Navy casualties were 5 killed and 7 wounded; Royal Navy losses, 113 killed and 86 wounded. All survivors were held first as civil, then military, prisoners while the battle for Oran proceeded, its ultimate outcome almost unaffected by this bloody episode.

The above quote comes from Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, one of the volumes of the Official U. S. Army History of World War 2, page 204. The volume can be downloaded for free from the Center for Military History website and viewed at HyperWar, http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/

It is in the public domain.
 
Yes and no - while some Vichy officials did support the Fascist cause, many were ambivalent - Marshall Petain, who headed the Vichy government, simply wanted to preserve French nationality in some form, rather than see France absorbed wholly into Germany.

Remember that the Vichy government was created to be in control of the large portion of France that was NOT occupied by the German or Italian Armies between the surrender of France and the invasion of North Africa (and remained in existence afterwards mainly to be an interface between the occupying Axis forces and the French colonies & people). Vichy was officially "neutral" - most of the French Navy simply stayed in port after the fall of the pre-war French government - only leaving port to defend against ANY nation that tried to gain control of the area they were in. The French Army & Air Force, likewise did not conduct active combat operations on behalf of the Axis until after the German occupation of the Vichy-controlled part of France.


Many Vichy officials, like Admiral Darlan, head of the French Navy before the war and Minister of Marine (Secretary of the Navy) under Vichy, took office in that "captive government" for the purpose of minimizing German control and damage - Darlan specifically accepted with the hidden purpose of making sure the Germans & Italians never gained control of the French fleet, and after accepting the job he sent out orders for all ships to be scuttled if the Germans/Italians ever tried to seize them for use.

After the Allied landings in North Africa, Germany did occupy the rest of France, and tried to seize the French fleet - and Darlan succeeded in having most of the ships scuttled - only a few small ships were put into Axis service, most after being salvaged/repaired after being only partly scuttled.


As for the Allied landings - the resistance, while sharp in places, didn't last very long due to much preparatory work in which local military and political leaders were convinced to "put up a show for a bit, then surrender" (so as to not incur reprisals by Germany against their families, etc back in France for giving up too soon).

Like most military operations, this didn't work quite as planned, with some local commanders not getting the message, and thus fighting until forced to surrender, and others being relieved by more belligerent officers who didn't go along with the plan. Thus the resistance was greater, and lasted longer, than had been "expected".

That is the source of Patton's statement - the Vichy forces did NOT fight whole-heartedly, nor for very long - and the American forces were not at that time ready for an all-out fight against a well-armed modern force with good morale. The fighting in North Africa, first against Vichy forces, then (after a break to re-group, re-organize, and re-supply) against Rommel's forces taught the Americans a lot about what did and did not work in their doctrine, tactics, and strategy - and there was a lot that needed to be changed, including a good part of the training our troops received before leaving the US.
 
I would rather this not turn into a discussion of Vichy France. For those who wish to gain more information, I would suggest the Army history mentioned as a starting point, and with the volume on the French Fleet in World War 2. Churchill's history is also worth looking at. Eisenhower did catch a lot of grief for dealing with Darlan.
 
Indeed - I'll just make this one additional Traveller-related statement.

Vichy France is an excellent example of a "Captive Government", and studying it, with all of its conflicting motivations and factions, will greatly enhance the development of Traveller "Captive Government" scenarios.
 
Indeed - I'll just make this one additional Traveller-related statement.

Vichy France is an excellent example of a "Captive Government", and studying it, with all of its conflicting motivations and factions, will greatly enhance the development of Traveller "Captive Government" scenarios.

You do have a good point there. A study of what all went on with respect to Vichy, the French Navy, and French North Africa would be useful. I have my suspicions that Darlan was not just "incidentally" in French North Africa at the time of Operation Torch.
 
According to The Murder of Admiral Darlan by Peter Tompkins (1965), it was no coincidence.

As early as June 1941 (a year after the formation of the Vichy government), he told Admiral Leahy (then US Ambassador to France, later the United States' first de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (official title "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief"), "If the United States is capable of landing at Marseilles 5000,000 men, 3,000 tanks, and 3,000 planes, I, Darlan, will be ready to march with you".

In the run-up to Torch, he was contacted by various agents, to the point where, on 13 October 1942, he called one in the liaison between the US and the Vichy French about the invasion "I know what you are up to, and the contacts you have. I would like you to inform those who have sent you that I am disposed to be the man you seek" - the US had been looking for a Vichy official to formally request US intervention in North Africa to legitimize the landings.

Formal negotiations were then opened - Churchill saying "Kiss Darlan's stern if you have to, but get the French Navy".

After Darlan returned to Vichy from a quick visit to Algiers October 22-30, he burned a great number of papers, both secret government ones and personal ones. Having sent one of his assistants to meet with Robert D. Murphy, former US Embassy official in Vichy & Algiers, in Algiers on 3 November 1942, he then flew back to Algiers on the 5th "because his son Alain (who was in a hospital in Algiers) had 'become gravely ill' - Alain was 'greatly recovered' by the 6th.

The person who had told Darlan about his son's condition was Admiral Raymond Fenard - former head of the Vichy French Naval Mission to the US, then resident in Algiers - Fenard had been informed by US agents of the locations and date of the landings!
:smirk:
 
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The following quote comes from a 1942 publication, The Soldier and his Food.

Today's soldier eats at the finest Army mess in the world. His individual ration costs Uncle Sam 48 cents a day, or $175.20 a year, an all-time high in Army budgeting. In World War I, the daily cost of feeding a soldier was 26 cents. . . .

The average healthy, hungry soldier eats about 5.5 pounds of food a day. This ration contains about 4,500 calories, which is an estimated 1,500 to 3,000 more than many a well-fed civilian adult receives.

Another source, from the US Army Quartermaster history site gives the cost of the World War One ration at between 28.01 cents in 1916 to 48.20 cents in 1918. Those were the daily cost of food for one soldier. The calorie count is a bit high, later data shows about 4100 calories, but the publication is correct is saying that the US military was the best-fed force in World War 2.

The current food costs for one military member, for all military services was $10.35 in 2015, and about $10.50 in 2016.

Edit Note: One Dollar in 1942 was worth $14.79 in terms of 2016 Dollars, so that 48 cents in 1942 would be worth $7.10 in 2016 Dollars. One Dollars in 1916 was worth $22.11 in terms of 2016 Dollars, so that 26 cents figure would equal $5.75 cents on 2016 Dollars.
 
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According to The Murder of Admiral Darlan by Peter Tompkins (1965), it was no coincidence.

As early as June 1941 (a year after the formation of the Vichy government), he told Admiral Leahy (then US Ambassador to France, later the United States' first de facto Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (official title "Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief"), "If the United States is capable of landing at Marseilles 5000,000 men, 3,000 tanks, and 3,000 planes, I, Darlan, will be ready to march with you".

In the run-up to Torch, he was contacted by various agents, to the point where, on 13 October 1942, he called one in the liaison between the US and the Vichy French about the invasion "I know what you are up to, and the contacts you have. I would like you to inform those who have sent you that I am disposed to be the man you seek" - the US had been looking for a Vichy official to formally request US intervention in North Africa to legitimize the landings.

Formal negotiations were then opened - Churchill saying "Kiss Darlan's stern if you have to, but get the French Navy".

After Darlan returned to Vichy from a quick visit to Algiers October 22-30, he burned a great number of papers, both secret government ones and personal ones. Having sent one of his assistants to meet with Robert D. Murphy, former US Embassy official in Vichy & Algiers, in Algiers on 3 November 1942, he then flew back to Algiers on the 5th "because his son Alain (who was in a hospital in Algiers) had 'become gravely ill' - Alain was 'greatly recovered' by the 6th.

The person who had told Darlan about his son's condition was Admiral Raymond Fenard - former head of the Vichy French Naval Mission to the US, then resident in Algiers - Fenard had been informed by US agents of the locations and date of the landings!
:smirk:

Thanks for the info, BlackBat. I will need to take a look at that book.
 
Calorie intake. I've been looking at hiking long distance, over 100 miles, and then 'settle down'. The thru hikers I've talked to have mentioned the calorie requirements to hike the Appalachian Trail in 6 months is abut 6,000 to 8,000 calories per day. The AT has lots of up and downs, sometimes covering several thousand feet rises in less than 2 miles.

The Pacific Crest Trail, while taking similar calorie intake, has fewer what they call 'pointless ups and downs' or PUDs.

So unless the Scouts checking a planet have grav cars, they will need lots of food to explore on.
 
He tells the audience that it costs $17,500 to outfit one American soldier. Stock footage of the early days of the Iraq invasion play across the screen as price tags flutter off the equipment.
 
He tells the audience that it costs $17,500 to outfit one American soldier. Stock footage of the early days of the Iraq invasion play across the screen as price tags flutter off the equipment.

And what is so surprising about that? Put the cost of outfitting a Napoleonic Cuirassier into proportion of France's Gross National Product of the time, and get ready for a shock. Or maybe consider the cost of training someone to fly an F-22 or even an F-4 Phantom, or a B-52.
 
He tells the audience that it costs $17,500 to outfit one American soldier. Stock footage of the early days of the Iraq invasion play across the screen as price tags flutter off the equipment.

That's nothing to the training costs. Why do they now use rifle simulators for some of the shooting training? Because the ammo savings pay for the machines in under a year.

I've heard cost estimates of $100,000.00 to $1.5M for various US servicemen in various specialties. (Navy Nuke Program BTN and MMN is at or above that $1.5M... oops - BTN got rolled into MMN...)
 
He tells the audience that it costs $17,500 to outfit one American soldier. Stock footage of the early days of the Iraq invasion play across the screen as price tags flutter off the equipment.

And what is so surprising about that? Put the cost of outfitting a Napoleonic Cuirassier into proportion of France's Gross National Product of the time, and get ready for a shock. Or maybe consider the cost of training someone to fly an F-22 or even an F-4 Phantom, or a B-52.

The cost of outfitting one Roman soldier was probably greater in today's money.

That's nothing to the training costs. Why do they now use rifle simulators for some of the shooting training? Because the ammo savings pay for the machines in under a year.

I've heard cost estimates of $100,000.00 to $1.5M for various US servicemen in various specialties. (Navy Nuke Program BTN and MMN is at or above that $1.5M... oops - BTN got rolled into MMN...)

This is why there is so much work being done in most modern navies to reduce crew sizes aboard ship - even to the point of developing multi-million/billion-dollar automated damage-control equipment.

Expenses related to personnel* are the single biggest line-item in the operating cost of warships (much higher than fuel, or even refits) - if the ship serves for 40 years or so the personnel costs alone can even exceed the initial build cost of the ship!

The Royal navy, for example, has 3-4 personnel ashore for every one aboard a ship - and about one third of those positions are to support the personnel aboard, not to support the ship itself or perform other duties (and there are lots of civilian personnel-support employees as well) - reducing the shipboard personnel also reduces the personnel-support staff (both military and civilian).




* pay (including dependent pay), housing, food, medical care, initial training, specialist training, on-going training (new equipment), re-training (changing specialties), administrative, retirement pay, post service medical care (veterans' medical care), veterans' educational benefits... etc.
 
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