Some Interesting Military Data

[Condottiere]

Soryu was 2884 Y per ton
Hiryu was 2559 Y per ton
Shokaku was 3300 Y per ton
Taiho was 3695 Y per ton

Yamato was 3571 Y per ton

Wartime inflation probably affects Unryu at 5417 Y per ton.

The Yamato's were built when there was a sharp escalation of Japanese ship building costs probably because of the volume of work going through and all ships were delayed by some months.
Note that costs for carriers don't include airgroup and you should factor in 4 lifecycles of airgroup over the 20 year life of the carrier + spares.

Large warships are more economical, Kagero's were 5,050 Y per ton and the big subs were 6,450 Y per ton. On cost reasons, super battleships make sense.
I'm interested in your sources for those numbers.

These are the figures that I believe came from the Diet request for the 2nd circle programme.

Aircraft carrier (Hiryu/Soryu)
2
10,050
4,000
Cruiser (Tone/Chikuma)*
2
8,450
3,700
Destroyer*
14
1,380
4,900
SS, cruiser type*
2
1,950
5,300
SS, large fleet type*
2
1,400
5,600
Total
22


Oil tanker
2
12,000
1,500
Seaplane Tender (A)
2
10,400
2,000
Seaplane Tender (B)
1
9,000
2,000
Torpedo boat
16
600
5,000
Sub. chaser, large
1
300
5,100
Sub. chaser, small
3
150
5,800

But then of course some of those tonnages aren't exactly correct, which skews the numbers.

 

[Timerover51]

I came across the following comment in a discussion of the problems of making artillery ammunition written in 1919. Bold highlights are from me.

It may be interesting to note in this connection that calculations show that, neglecting the retardation of the air, it would require a muzzle velocity of only about seven miles per second to make a projectile leave the earth entirely and never return, while with a velocity of about five miles per second, only five times that reached in the German gun, the projectile would revolve around the earth as a satellite. Obviously, velocities somewhat short of these values would be sufficient to reach from any one point of the earth's surface to any other point, if the resistance of the air could be neglected. To actually accomplish the result it would be necessary only to give a sufficient added velocity to the projectile so that it might have the velocity mentioned by the time it had risen above the earth's atmosphere. Whether it will ever be possible to design a gun capable of giving such a velocity to a projectile is a problem for the future.

While guns probably cannot be built to do this, the rocket engine has demonstrated that it can reach the required velocities.

 

[aramis]

I came across the following comment in a discussion of the problems of making artillery ammunition written in 1919. Bold highlights are from me.



While guns probably cannot be built to do this, the rocket engine has demonstrated that it can reach the required velocities.

Guns have been designed that theoretically could... the test runs show the technique works... Using multiple breeches into common barrel timed to inject more hot gas at multiple places along the barrel length as the projectile passes in order to keep increasing the barrel pressures.

 

[Timerover51]

Guns have been designed that theoretically could... the test runs show the technique works... Using multiple breeches into common barrel timed to inject more hot gas at multiple places along the barrel length as the projectile passes in order to keep increasing the barrel pressures.

Actually, given that we are on the Traveller forum, this would also be highly dependent on the planet. Making a gun to fire projectiles at greater than escape velocity for a planet such as the Moon, and probably Mars, would be much easier than one from Earth.

 

[Enoki]

I came across the following comment in a discussion of the problems of making artillery ammunition written in 1919. Bold highlights are from me.

While guns probably cannot be built to do this, the rocket engine has demonstrated that it can reach the required velocities.

A gun can be built to do it, but it won't be something small or mobile. Project HARP in the 60's is an example of this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_HARP

The project was based on a flight range of the Seawell Airport in Barbados, from which shells were fired eastward toward the Atlantic Ocean using an old U.S. Navy 16-inch (410 mm), 50 caliber gun (20 m); it was later extended to 100 caliber (40 m). In 1966 the project installed its third and final 16-inch gun at a new test site in Yuma, Arizona. On November 18, 1966 the Yuma gun fired a 400 lb (180 kg) Martlet 2 projectile at 7,000 ft/s (2,100 m/s) sending it briefly into space and setting an altitude record of 180 km (590,000 ft; 110 mi); that world record still stands as of 2013.

So, it is possible to use a gun to fire something into orbit. It could be made with extant technology. The problem would be having anything delicate survive the firing.
Of course, the other issue with payload is that it's restricted to a certain size and weight and must be in a very stout "shell" to survive firing.
With the gun, the problem will be it's going to wear out PDQ. That means frequent liner changes.

 

[aramis]

Actually, given that we are on the Traveller forum, this would also be highly dependent on the planet. Making a gun to fire projectiles at greater than escape velocity for a planet such as the Moon, and probably Mars, would be much easier than one from Earth.

The LRO orbits at 1600 m/s (and a mean 50 km MLS )... the M16 hits 947 m/s

The .220 Swift hits 1200 m/s in atmosphere.

The Rheinmetal 120mm can push 1750 m/s (with the right round) ...

At 200 km MLS, you can shoot yourself in the back with a .220 Swift (assuming you can aim that accurately).

 

[Timerover51]

I was going through a British Cavalry manual from 1912 and came across the following comments. The book is Our Cavalry, by Major-General M. F. Rimington, and can be located at Project Gutenberg.

If any particular personal weapon is carried habitually, that weapon should be adopted; but failing that, there must be a long apprenticeship to lance or sword. Perhaps the point to which most attention should be given is that the man must be taught to have implicit confidence in his weapon; this can be attained best with the lance or with the pointing sword. A man appreciates the fact that with either of these weapons the point goes through easily; whilst with the cutting sword only the most expert can make any impression on, say, a leg of mutton covered with a sack and a leather strap or two.

In the German cavalry, stress is laid on teaching the trooper that the sight of the lance is sure to make the enemy turn and fly. In our own cavalry greater attention is now paid to practising the man in riding at a gallop at a rebounding dummy, offering resistance equal to the weight of a man. Without such practice the men sprain their wrists and lose their grip of the sword, and do not understand how simple it is to run a man through.

There are some other interesting bits of information in the book, such as that the cost of horses for the British forces in the Boer War represented one-tenth the cost of the war. Then there is this comment.

The real lessons learnt from war are extremely difficult to impress on the taxpayer, who, in modern Great Britain, only reads of them in the newspaper, and who at best does not wish to pay for one more cavalry soldier than is absolutely necessary.

The cavalry leader must recognize that the arm is expensive, therefore it cannot afford to be inactive; it is the hardest arm to replace, therefore it must be used to the full.

In all ages cavalry have been expensive, and one may well wonder if the frugal mind of the taxpayer balances them against who can say what pictures of dead and wounded, indemnity, pillage, lost trade, and damaged prestige, or whether he looks at one side of the balance-sheet only, and forgets that from which they may save him.

Emphasis added.

 

[Condottiere]

I've been informed that if you're continuously shelled for sixty days, there's a ninety eight percent chance you'll go nuts.

Combat performance peaks after eighty days in the field and then just goes downhill from there; and you'll have had enough after four hundred days, or at least your unit will, if turnover hadn't been significant.

 

[Timerover51]

I've been informed that if you're continuously shelled for sixty days, there's a ninety eight percent chance you'll go nuts.

Hmm, I would be interested in where that came from. There are not that many places that have been continuously shelled for 60 days, Verdun in World War One and Sevastopol in World War 2 being two I can immediately think of. I do not recall any reports of massive occurrences of insanity in either case. Corregidor was shelled pretty much continuously for about 30 days in April and May of 1942. The main problem with the troops there was knowing that there was no possible relief in sight. The Anzio Beachhead may qualify as well for being shelled for more than 60 days. The Night Blitz on London went on for well more than 60 days.

Combat performance peaks after eighty days in the field and then just goes downhill from there; and you'll have had enough after four hundred days, or at least your unit will, if turnover hadn't been significant.

That sounds sort of right, but only as an average.

 

[Timerover51]

Having read Tacitus, in translation, not in the Latin, during college, I have been looking for a downloadable version of his works. Finding one, courtesy of Project Gutenberg, I thought that this would be in interesting tidbit to post. Shortly after Tiberius became Emperor, a major revolt of the legions broke out in Pannonia, an area covering from Western Hungary south and southeast into Slovenia and Serbia. The following event is recorded by Tacitus as occurring.

As it was, they expulsed the Camp-Marshal and Tribunes; and as they fled, plundered their baggage: they likewise put to death Lucilius the Centurion, whom they had sarcastically named "Fetch Me Another" [approximate translation of the Latin in the original], because when upon the back of a soldier he had broken one wand, he was wont to call for another, and then a third.

I have read fairly often about this centurion as an example of Roman Discipline, without the users mentioning his fate.

 

[Enoki]

Vegetius The Military Institutions of the Romans is more widely available on that subject. You might try that one.

 

[Enoki]

I've been informed that if you're continuously shelled for sixty days, there's a ninety eight percent chance you'll go nuts.

Combat performance peaks after eighty days in the field and then just goes downhill from there; and you'll have had enough after four hundred days, or at least your unit will, if turnover hadn't been significant.

Read this one. It's a tour de force on morale and combat. The authors followed 100 US Army infantry companies from their entry into combat to VE day. It's obscure, but absolutely conclusive.

http://www.worldcat.org/title/varia...to-ground-combat-in-world-war-ii/oclc/2783869

 

[Timerover51]

Vegetius The Military Institutions of the Romans is more widely available on that subject. You might try that one.

I have had that one in hard copy for about 30 years or so. The problem with Vegetius is that he was writing circa 400 AD, and trying to describe how things used to be in the Roman Army. Sorting out what he thinks should be done and what was actually the case can be a problem at times.

You might want to check Oman's view of Vegetius in his shorter version of The Art of War in the Middle Ages A.D. 378-1515, available on Project Gutenberg. There are some longer and more detailed editions on archives.org.

 

[JimMarn]

I found a book recently, I've been trying to find out more info on my relative who fought on Corregidor in 1941 and 1942.

The book is titled 'Crisis in the Pacific' sub-titled: 'The Battles for the Phillipine Islands by the Men Who Fought Them'. Also about the return.

paperback, 599 pages with names of people interviewed, their unit, and some have info about what they did during this time, and an index. Its about 3 inches by 6 inches. Don't have a ruler handy.

Sheds new light on several events, like why did the AA guns have such a hard time... turns out only 1 in 6 rounds fired or exploded when it hit a target. This was the 200th Coastal Artillery unit. The unit I'm trying to find out more detail about.

Most of the fighters and civilians were kept in the dark about the extense of what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Many kept up hope that relief was on the way, mostly, until Bataan surrendered.

( I did have most of a post typed in here, but a power fluctuation happened and I got disconnected. Is there a way to recover such posts ?)

 

[Blue Ghost]

My uncle was in the Bataan march. He didn't much like "Bridge on the River Kwai".

But, my real reason for posting; one of the last bayonet charges;

https://youtu.be/S9H7XplkI54

 

[Timerover51]

My uncle was in the Bataan march. He didn't much like "Bridge on the River Kwai".

But, my real reason for posting; one of the last bayonet charges;

https://youtu.be/S9H7XplkI54

I can imagine that he was not impressed by the "Bridge Over the River Kwai". The Australian Official History has some very good coverage of what the actual conditions were during the building of the Burma-Thailand Railway. I do not think that you could make a commercial movie showing the actual conditions, as they were pretty awful.

Volume IV of the Australian Army Official History covers the treatment by the Japanese of the Australian prisoners. Chapter 24 covers the Burma-Thailand Railway.

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/RCDIG1070128/

 

[Blue Ghost]

Well, he was army. I can't remember if he was commissioned or an NCO, but he had lots of explicatives for the film. Lots. His one non-salty comment was "We never had it that good." He did everything but bash in the TV (an old wood cabinet Zenith).

Dick Cavetti did an episode on the Bataan march in his "Remember When" HBO series back in the 80s, and another survivor also dismissed any attempt by Hollywood. If you were thought to be weak then you got bayonetted or a samurai sword across your neck. And that's just the tip of the ice berg.

To keep it "Traveller" oriented, one wonders if the Vargr or K'Kree have such practices. Possibly some Aslan clans.

 

[JimMarn]

I can imagine that he was not impressed by the "Bridge Over the River Kwai". The Australian Official History has some very good coverage of what the actual conditions were during the building of the Burma-Thailand Railway. I do not think that you could make a commercial movie showing the actual conditions, as they were pretty awful.

Volume IV of the Australian Army Official History covers the treatment by the Japanese of the Australian prisoners. Chapter 24 covers the Burma-Thailand Railway.

https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/RCDIG1070128/

Some years ago the History channel did a comparison of the movie and the survivors. It was an iron bridge, not wood, for starters. And they were absolutely certain their commanding officer would never go out and pull up the demolition wire.

 

[Timerover51]

The following quote is the initial remarks of a French officer to an Englishman interested in joining the French Foreign Legion. Not exactly an enthusiastic greeting. Note, the man did join and served for 5 years. The comment comes from a book he wrote about his experiences in 1907, after leaving the Legion.

"Sacré bleu! The Legion—why, you don't know what it is. Well, I will tell you—hard work—hard knocks—hard discipline, and no thanks. And how does it end? Your throat cut by some thieving Arab if you have luck; if not, wounded, and then his women make sausage meat of you. In Tonquin the same sort of thing—only worse, with fever and sunstroke into the bargain. A bad business! yes, a bad business!" Then his voice took quite a paternal tone, and he continued: "You look like a gentleman—you are one, I'm sure. Mind you, I don't mean to say there are not others over there—there are many—poor fellows! Your family, too!—think of them—such a sudden decision. Sapristi! and all for some trifling bêtise, sans doute. A petticoat, I'll swear—don't deny it—I have been young also—a faithless sweetheart—Pish! There[Pg 11] are a thousand others who would be delighted to console you. No! No! A good dinner, the Moulin Rouge, and to-morrow you will be cured, sacré bleu!" He laughed, and added: "Try that; and if to-morrow you still feel the cravings for a military career, well, come and see me."

The book is A Soldier of the Legion: An Englishman's Adventures Under the French Flag in Algeria and Tonquin. It can be found on Project Gutenberg. It may be of use to those creating mercenary units for players to join.

Tonquin is what was called French Indo-China, and is now Vietnam.

 

[Enoki]

I've been informed that if you're continuously shelled for sixty days, there's a ninety eight percent chance you'll go nuts.

Combat performance peaks after eighty days in the field and then just goes downhill from there; and you'll have had enough after four hundred days, or at least your unit will, if turnover hadn't been significant.

Actually, if you use the source I quoted above, the rate works out to about this:

Morale starts at somewhere between 6 and 10 for each individual. That is, their tolerance for combat and such.

For each 2 week period spent continuously in combat their tolerance to it goes down by 1. This means that somewhere between 90 and 140 days in combat and you're finished. You've had all you can take and you become a mental casualty.
If the combat is particularly intense and / or in poor conditions the rate of decline increases by 2 or 3 times. At worst, under continuous shelling, in miserable conditions like cold, wet, and such, troops start falling apart in as little a couple of weeks.

Pulling troops out of combat for a rest before returning them to the line helps but doesn't ever fully mitigate the effects of combat. Eventually everybody breaks. The Gilbert - Bebee study put that point at 128 days maximum, but noted that (at least in WW 2) troops never got to that point. They were wounded, killed, or became psychological casualties well before they reached that point.