Some Interesting Military Data

[JimMarn]

All right, I will give it a shot. I will warn you that included in my collection are military cookbooks (chortles insanely with glee).

When I was a Boy Scout, troop sponsered by a US Army base, I got to eat 20 year old C Rations from the Korean War. They were uh edible.

 

[Timerover51]

When I was a Boy Scout, troop sponsered by a US Army base, I got to eat 20 year old C Rations from the Korean War. They were uh edible.

The ones we got when I was in ROTC were not quite that old, nor were the ones we had in Alaska. I know that the Quartermaster school maintained a stockpile of the older rations to check on eatability as the years went on. I was a Quartermaster officer, among other things.

With respect to putting together recipes, I was actually thinking of figuring out ones that could be made here, based on the various intelligent species.

 

[Timerover51]

Again, going back to the original idea of the thread, the following data is from the Vietnam era, so a bit closer in time compared to some of the earlier posts. The data comes from the study The war against trucks : aerial interdiction in southern Laos, 1968-1972, by Bernard Nalty, written for and published by the Air Force History and Museums Program, and as a government publication is public domain material. The complete study may be downloaded at the following website.

http://www.afhso.af.mil/index.asp

GUIDED BOMB ACCURACY 1970
Because of the limitations that these other kinds of munitions revealed, only the guided bomb rivaled the howitzer shell fired from a Pave Aegis gunship as a one shot killer of trucks. The Air Force used two kinds of guided bombs in southern Laos, one of them laser-directed and the other electro-optical. The laser-guided weapon contained a mechanism that homed on the reflection caused when a laser beam focused on an object. When an F–4, for instance, released this bomb within a specific cone, or “basket,” the sensing device automatically manipulated the weapon’s controls to bring the bomb squarely onto target. The other type, the electro-optically guided bomb, depended on contrasts in reflected light, as a self-contained television camera enabled the guidance mechanism to lock onto the target, provided that object had a clearly defined “edge,” like a factory building or tunnel.

In aerial interdiction of traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the electro-optical weapon had few targets suitable for its pinpoint accuracy. Out of thirty-five launches during a combat evaluation, twenty-nine of the bombs guided properly, and twenty scored direct hits on such targets as ferry landings, bridges, roads, and caves. The twenty-nine bombs that locked onto their targets missed by an average distance of just six and one-half feet at ranges between eleven thousand and twenty-four thousand feet, but these results depended on daylight. At night, when so many interdiction targets appeared, electro-optical guidance became blind and useless. During 1970, a television guidance kit, when added to a two thousand pound bomb costing $685, increased the price by $17,000, compared to $4,200 to fit laser guidance onto the same kind of bomb. Cost presented an irrefutable argument against using the electro-optical bomb on any target that a laser-guided weapon could destroy. Indeed, by the summer of 1972, Task Force Alpha characterized electro-optical guidance as too costly for the kind of targets found in southern Laos.

Unlike the electro-optically guided bomb, which came in just a two thousand pound size, laser guidance mechanisms could at the outset fit either the seven hundred fifty pound or two thousand pound bomb. Combat evaluation of both laser weapons took place in the summer of 1968, during Operation Turnpike, and they entered the Southeast Asia arsenal immediately afterward. Of the two sizes, the two thousand pound bomb appeared better suited for aerial interdiction. Besides containing more explosive, it demonstrated greater accuracy because the control surfaces were located near the nose instead of at the tail, an arrangement that caused the larger weapon to respond more quickly to movements of these fins. Success with the first laser-guided weapons resulted in the development of a three thousand pound bomb that made its debut in October 1969. During 1970, the seven hundred fifty pound model gave way to a five hundred pound version; because of the accuracy of laser guidance, the slight reduction in weight had little effect on destructive power, and the smaller size enabled an aircraft to carry additional bombs.

The two thousand pound laser-guided bomb gained a reputation as a relentless truck killer in southern Laos after technicians installed a laser target designator in the Blindbat C–130 that normally dispensed flares over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. A night observation scope mounted coaxially with the laser enabled the operator in the flareship to keep the beam trained on target and to determine whether the fighter-bomber releasing the weapon had scored a hit, but he could not, unfortunately, assess the damage from a near miss. Four of the first eight trucks illuminated in this fashion vanished in a cloud of flame when the two thousand pound bomb struck home. The average circular error for the two thousand pound and seven hundred fifty pound types declined from thirty feet during the August 1968 evaluation to seventeen feet a year later. The three thousand pound bomb achieved an average error of twenty-three feet, compared to the hoped-for thirty feet. This exceptional accuracy depended to some degree on the absence of antiaircraft fire during most of the early missions, which permitted the laser operator to make a leisurely search for vehicles, keep the beam precisely focused, and coach the bomb-carrying F-4s onto the target.

The howitzer referred to was the 105mm howitzer mounted on some of the AC-130 gunships, and fired standard 105mm howitzer ammunition. Based on very thorough Korean War testing of various types of aerial ordnance against trucks, in open terrain an instantaneous-fuzed bomb detonating within 75 feet of a truck would do serious damage to the vehicle, and if it was carrying fuel, likely destroy it by fire. For complete destruction, a direct hit from a bomb, or the truck within the crater radius of a 2,000 pound bomb would be required. Other tests of the 20mm and 40mm weapons used indicated that the 20mm round was not fully stable at lower altitudes and tended to tumble, resulting in large numbers of dud rounds, while the 40mm round needed to hit either the cab or the engine compartment to ensure destruction. A .50 caliber Gatling gun would have been more effective than the 20mm carried, as the .50 caliber ammunition is very effective against un-armored vehicles.

 

[Timerover51]

I posted some information in the MIG-15 in the Adventurers sub-forum under the Attack Squadron: Roswell Aids thread.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

Just as a FYI, a fabulous book on the interdiction war in Laos is The Ravens, by Christopher Robbins. It's all about the Forward Air Controllers there.

 

[Timerover51]

Not all medals are won fighting against a human enemy. The following comes from COMBAT SUPPORT IN KOREA by John G. Westover, published by the Center of Military History, US Army. I was a supply officer and the book does make for interesting reading. It can be downloaded from the Center of Military History website.

On 18 October 1950 the entire company was engaged in a sustained cargo haul from ship to a rail transfer point. As the operation continued, wear and tear began to tell on the vehicles. In one period of twenty-four hours, three DUKWs sank as a result of rusted-out hulls. Cpl. Elmo Anderson was awarded the Soldier’s Medal for saving the life of a South Korean laborer when the DUKW in which they were riding sank. Using old, rebuilt vehicles, battling a 30-foot, 5-1/2-knot tide, and making extremely long water hauls, the company achieved a splendid mark in tonnage hauled.

By the way, the DUKW is one of my favorite vehicles. If you are ever in the area of the Wisconsin Dells, a ride on one of them is highly recommended. It would be interesting to put them into Traveller, as they are a fair off-the-road vehicle too, with a 5,000 pound payload.

 

[Timerover51]

I might have been a quartermaster officer, but I am also a military historian as well as a student of logistics, so the following blistering account of supply service failure is also a valuable lesson. This is taken from Combat Support in Korea, a publication of the Center of Military History, US Army.

Edit Note: My apologies for not defining the Class of Supply mentioned. Class I is rations, Class II is personal clothing and equipment as well as organizational equipment like tents and field kitchens, Class III is POL (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants), Class IV is construction material and at that time also personal use items and QM sales material (think soap, tooth brushes and tooth paste, paper, etc.), and Class V is ammunition.

Major James W. Spellman, Executive Officer to the Quartermaster, 24th Infantry Division. (Condensed from a statement written on 15 November 1950.)

From the first day they spent in Korea, members of the 24th Division’s quartermaster section have had mixed feelings about quartermaster support. We remember with pride the difficult being done immediately, and the impossible taking a little longer. Then we shudder as we recall how often we failed in those hectic days of defeat, victory, and stalemate. We don’t like to remember how many times we have had to turn down requests. “How about the mantle for my Coleman lantern?” “How about a generator for my field range?” “How about. . .” stencil paper, GI soap, trousers, tent poles, paper clips, underwear, cigarettes?

We seldom had to make excuses for lack of rations or gasoline. But yeast, baking powder, shoestrings, toilet paper, and forks were not available. It has been weeks since many of the small but very important items have been received. Shoes are tied with scraps of cord and kitchens are using toilet soap received from home by mail. I do not doubt that hundreds of soldiers are writing home for items of quartermaster issue because they are not available, or because they come more quickly by mail. After all, our requisitions are often still unfilled after a month of waiting.

From the tragic days in Taejon we have sensed a passive indifference to our requirements for individual and unit equipment. In the heat of summer we begged for even salvaged fatigue jackets and trousers to be shipped from Japan to cover our semi-naked soldiers, for salt tablets, and for mess kits to replace those lost by our troops as they withdrew over the mountains, carrying only their rifles.

It was understandable that supply confusion should exist at first. But I do not understand why the supply authorities should resist our legitimate requests with criticisms that we were using too much. How were we using too much? What known yardstick of modern U.S. logistics could be applied to this long series of defeats and withdrawals?

From the first telephone request—ignored—for minimum clothing and equipment, through the present requirement of six copies of every requisition, we have felt the antagonistic, unsympathetic reaction on the part of Eighth Army’s minor quartermaster personnel. They have minutely questioned every item of even emergency requirements, and deliberately delayed supplies while they checked and rechecked requests against noncombat-type statistical status reports. There has been an almost comical questioning of requirements, delving into the microscopic details of why a company, outnumbered 30 to 1, did not evacuate kitchen equipment under small-arms fire. A directive stated that when damaged equipment was not submitted for exchange, a formal certificate must be submitted giving all details of loss.

So long as Pusan remained within truck distance, it was possible to bypass approving authorities and go directly to the mountains of supplies in the port. Often we obtained supplies in Pusan that were impossible to get through the red-tape maze of proper channels. Personnel in charge of warehouse operations frequently begged us to take supplies so they could make room for those being unloaded from ships.
After we crossed the Naktong River, efforts of the army quartermaster to supply class II and class IV items to the 24th Di vision were conspicuous by their absence. It is true that great efforts were made to supply class I and class III items, but it only made the indifference to II and IV more apparent. Even now, if a unit is willing to send its trucks 230 miles to Ascom City, or 400 miles to Pusan, supplies can be obtained. But the price in broken springs and deadlined trucks is prohibitive.

As the drive passed Kaesong, Pyongyang, and points north, frantically worded requests to Pusan awaited the opening of a shaky rail system for delivery. On 10 November, the 24th Division had just completed a forty-mile withdrawal of its forward elements. The quartermaster section, then at Sukchon, received a placid notification of a boxcar of class II and class IV supplies—complete with car, engine and train numbers, and hour of departure from Pusan on 9 November—destined for “24th Division, Waegwan.” Our rear echelons had cleared Waegwan nearly two months earlier.

A long time would be required to list the major deficiencies in our supply line. In the prosecution of a war the lack of a generator for a field range is not vital. But the result of poor meals is lowered morale—which is vital. When repeated supply failures occur, when indifference is shown, troops often become discouraged and indifferent. Supply failures at this level cost men their lives.

I should point out that units of the 24th Division were the first ones committed to Korea, and the commitment was somewhat piecemeal in fashion. The division was badly chewed up during the retreat to Pusan, having its division commander, Major General William Dean, captured at Taejon. This was also written just prior to the retreat from North Korea following the Chinese intervention, when the supplies lines were stretched to the fullest. I am looking at the history of logistics for the Korean War, but I would say that part of the problem that the Eighth Army had in fulling supply requests was that they either did not have some of the items in the early phases of the war, and then they did not know where they were in the fall. The units in Japan were equipped for occupying Japan, not for going to war, and they were therefore short-handed both in terms of equipment and personnel.

It is also headaches like this which makes me take a very dim view of planetary invasions of high population planets.

For supply classes, a more detailed description from Combat Support in Korea.

Supplies are divided into five classes: class I, articles consumed at approximately uniform rates, such as rations; class II, articles authorized by tables of basic allowances, such as radio sets, tools, and arms; class III, engine fuels and lubricants; class IV, articles not authorized by tables of basic allowances but needed for operations contemplated or in progress, such as barbed wire and construction materials; class V, ammunition, pyrotechnics, antitank mines, and chemicals.

 

[JimMarn]

I have read of other foulups for Supply. Like a British unit being sent to the Middle East, unpack the crates uopon arrival. And found hundreds of snowshoes.

The BEF to Norway did pack snowshoes, but there were no bindings to tie them to their boots with. Or thousands of ski poles, but not enough skis.

 

[Timerover51]

Shifting from supply, I found a downloadable copy of the Terminal Ballistics book for 1945 online, and I can finally post an image of what the effective casualty pattern of a shell burst looks like. Is there a way that I could post that to the Art Gallery and then link it to here?

For those interested, the volumes on Terminal Ballistics are located here:

http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/search/collection/p4013coll8/page/86

under Terminal Ballistics. It does help if you know something about how explosions work and the testing process works.

 

[Timerover51]

An interesting short piece on ground to air firing by infantry, taken from Tactical and Technical Trends, Issue No. 14. The Japanese also routinely had infantry fire at all attacking aircraft, and they also scored on occasion. I love the final comments of the British officer.

4. GERMAN GUN-FIRE AGAINST AIRCRAFT

The Germans apparently do not resort to desultory fire against enemy aircraft but "turn on the tap" by using every weapon capable of pointing skywards, including heavy and light AA guns, machine guns, automatic rifles, rifles, and pistols. These are fired to the limit whenever an attempt is made to attack one of their columns. Bombing a German column has often proved to be a dan▮gerous and costly matter, as was evidenced both in the battles of France and in the fighting in Libya. This information, reported by a British air officer, emphasized in addition the effectiveness of the German 20-mm AA cannon which is distributed throughout all columns.

This air officer suggests that troops should not feel disappointed if, despite their fire, an enemy plane gets away apparently unscathed. Few planes vigorously attacked escape without some damage. Some are seriously shot up. Not only must all serious damage be repaired, parts replaced, and sometimes even entire engines replaced, but every bullet hole must be patched, and a thorough, painstaking check made of the aircraft to discover hidden spots which may have been hit. All this takes time and requires labor, with the result that the aircraft is grounded during the time needed for inspection, repair, and subsequent recheck. All of these points should be remembered. Consequently, the need for an all-out attempt to inflict damage on attacking aircraft with the weapons available should be of paramount importance.

This same British officer, when asked if there was any difficulty in determining the nationality of columns of troops in the desert, said: "No. All
columns of troops in the desert look alike from the air, and both friend and foe shoot at you; but their nationality is immediately apparent. If they are our own, the fire is disturbing, and one fires the identification signal; if they are German, the fire is terrifying, of unbelievable volume and intensity, and leaves no doubt as to the identity of the column"

Note, ground troops still have a tendency to shoot at anything that flies, while the flyboys still have a tendency to hit anything moving on the ground.

 

[McPerth]

I have read of other foulups for Supply. Like a British unit being sent to the Middle East, unpack the crates uopon arrival. And found hundreds of snowshoes.

The BEF to Norway did pack snowshoes, but there were no bindings to tie them to their boots with. Or thousands of ski poles, but not enough skis.

I once read that the Russian calibers in WWII had such strange numbers just to avoid that, after in one show before Stalin the crates had 150 mm gun ammo instead of 150 mm rockets.

After that, the nominal caliber for guns became 152, as the 120 mm gun was nominally called 122 (to avoid confusión with the 120 mm mortar), while true calibers didn't change.

 

[SpaceBadger]

Note, ground troops still have a tendency to shoot at anything that flies, while the flyboys still have a tendency to hit anything moving on the ground.

Yes, this reminds me of a WWII infantry squad-level computer game that I used to play (sorry, blanking out on the name right now, medication sucks). Some players (including me) got very irate on the game forums about how "air support" would show up at random and would sometimes bomb friendly troops rather than enemy, until some historian types posted accounts showing that to be how it often happened.

 

[Garyius2003]

Some players (including me) got very irate on the game forums about how "air support" would show up at random and would sometimes bomb friendly troops rather than enemy, until some historian types posted accounts showing that to be how it often happened.

For many years the US Marines insisted on using a pilot to control close air support from the ground, since he knew what things would look like from above. The Army and Air Force felt enlisted can handle it just fine, just like arty FO work. The enlisted point of view is quickly winning, as it makes much more budget sense to have one O-3 and one O-2, who cost one million dollars each to train, per battalion, instead of one or two O-3s and three or four O-2s.

 

[Dragoner]

I once read that the Russian calibers in WWII had such strange numbers just to avoid that, after in one show before Stalin the crates had 150 mm gun ammo instead of 150 mm rockets.

After that, the nominal caliber for guns became 152, as the 120 mm gun was nominally called 122 (to avoid confusión with the 120 mm mortar), while true calibers didn't change.

The 152 and 122 are Tsarist calibers, iirc*.

*yes dating from 1910 and 1909 respectively.

 

[Enoki]

Yes, this reminds me of a WWII infantry squad-level computer game that I used to play (sorry, blanking out on the name right now, medication sucks). Some players (including me) got very irate on the game forums about how "air support" would show up at random and would sometimes bomb friendly troops rather than enemy, until some historian types posted accounts showing that to be how it often happened.

While air support might attack friendly troops, particularly when they are close to the enemy, air support is not random. Even in WW 1 it was planned out in advance. By WW 2 there were controllers talking to the planes either from a ground vehicle or a light aircraft. The air support wouldn't be just a random plane either. It would be 4 to 12 (a flight to a squadron) that attacked in an organized fashion.

Today is no different. Air support is carefully planned and strikes laid out in advance. Targets are designated and approved by higher command and controllers before the planes attack.

 

[Timerover51]

While air support might attack friendly troops, particularly when they are close to the enemy, air support is not random. Even in WW 1 it was planned out in advance. By WW 2 there were controllers talking to the planes either from a ground vehicle or a light aircraft. The air support wouldn't be just a random plane either. It would be 4 to 12 (a flight to a squadron) that attacked in an organized fashion.

Today is no different. Air support is carefully planned and strikes laid out in advance. Targets are designated and approved by higher command and controllers before the planes attack.

The USAF recognition manuals for the 1991 Gulf War did not have any of the new US Marine Corps vehicles in them, and the pilots were told that any armored vehicle with wheels was enemy, even though the Marines were using the Grizzly wheeled APC at the time. I heard anecdotal reports that the Marines were firing at USAF jets that were attacking them. The US Army would dearly love to have Marine-style close air support, rather than what the USAF deigns to give them.

Aircraft were sent out in both WW2 and Korea on what were called "armed reconnaissance" missions, essentially to attack whatever they saw worth attacking. As a result, there were quite a few "friendly fire" incidents. The list is quite long.

As for the Russian gun calibers, the Russians also use an 82mm mortar, dating from prior to WW2, with it specifically designed so as to be able to use captured 81mm mortar ammunition, with a little less accuracy, while captured 82mm ammunition could not be fired in German 81mm mortars.

 

[Fritz_Brown]

The US Army would dearly love to have Marine-style close air support, rather than what the USAF deigns to give them.

Sort of. They discovered the big problem was they really didn't want to pay for all those pilots and aircraft. So, the Air Force gets the job. (And, the Air Force wants the job - sortof.) And, the Army gets *loads* of air support - sometimes more than it can use. But, even when they're stacked thousands of feet high at the IP, waiting for their turn, the Army insists it isn't enough. It's just the way things work. [I was an Air Liaison Officer (a forward air controller on the ground) for 2 1/2 years in Germany and Bosnia.]

 

[BlackBat242]

Thanks, Aramis, that pretty much is what I needed. Just that most dogs that I have known seem to have problems with highly spiced foods, but will go with the Vargr liking spices but probably not "heat" from Capsaicin.

Every dog I've owned liked salsa picante....

Do they like celery?


I've known some dogs (though not my dingo-derivative Australian Cattle Dog so much) that would eat things that are very bad for them. They may like the salsa, but what's their next trip outside like, compared to others? o:

A roommate in the early 1990s had a rottweiler pup who was chewing the furniture.

He started putting hot tabasco sauce on the furniture, as the vet said this would stop the chewing.

Not only did this not work, the pup began eating the chili peppers he was growing straight from the plants in the garden!

 

[BlackBat242]

Sort of. They discovered the big problem was they really didn't want to pay for all those pilots and aircraft. So, the Air Force gets the job. (And, the Air Force wants the job - sortof.) And, the Army gets *loads* of air support - sometimes more than it can use. But, even when they're stacked thousands of feet high at the IP, waiting for their turn, the Army insists it isn't enough. It's just the way things work. [I was an Air Liaison Officer (a forward air controller on the ground) for 2 1/2 years in Germany and Bosnia.]

No.

The Key West Agreement of 1948 which established the USAF specifically stripped the Army of all aircraft except "liaison, observation, and medical evacuation" aircraft.

The US Army has tried several times to equip with fixed-wing attack aircraft and/or decent tactical cargo aircraft.

In the late 1950s the US Army held trials of a modified A-4 Skyhawk, a Fiat G.91, and the Northrop N156 (which the USAF bought as the F-5A) for purchase by the Army for CAS. When the USAF learned of this they protested to Congress and Congress banned the Army from buying any such aircraft.

In the early years of the Vietnam war the Army bought a number of DHC-4 Caribou STOL cargo aircraft... the USAF threw a fit, claiming that those were "too big for the Army" and infringed on the USAF rights in transport aircraft. The dispute was settled by the Army giving all the Caribou to the Air Force in return for unlimited purchase and use of all types of helicopters.

In the 1990s the USAF was wanting to retire the A-10, and the Army approached Congress asking that they be transferred to the Army instead... the Air Force then reversed position and spent considerable sums of money upgrading the A-10s.

In the early 2000s the Army wanted to replace its C-23 Sherpas (themselves USAF cast-offs, not an Army procurement decision) with a better transport... the USAF immediately invented its own need for the aircraft (which had not existed before the Army asked for the aircraft) and got its nose into the program. Eventually the entire program was turned over to the USAF by DOD & Congress (over the protests of the Army), and the USAF canceled the program in 2012 and is giving the ~20 C-27Js already bought and in service under the program to the US Coast Guard.
I gave a better summary of that fiasco here: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/472216-c27s-coming-8.html#post7751237


And again, no. But since this was after your time I'll excuse you this.

The Army found that operations in Iraq & Afghanistan required lots of quick-response flights with repair parts, helicopter engines, and so on... the kind of thing that can't be scheduled in advance, and which degrades operational capabilities if delivery is delayed.

The Sherpas were not able to keep up with the demand, but when the Army turned to the USAF for support they found significant and consistent USAF resistance to making a C-130 flight with a single engine for a CH-47, etc... the USAF regularly delayed delivery until it had "enough" material destined for that airfield to "justify" a C-130 flight.

In order to keep the front-line units operating properly the Army had to greatly increase the flight hours of its CH-47 fleet to make these supply runs the USAF wouldn't... which wore out the CH-47s at a much faster rate, increasing the repair part needs and shortening the fleet life-span of the CH-47s. That was why the Army, in 2004, began asking Congress for a larger replacement for the C-23s.

 

[BlackBat242]

All right, I will give it a shot. I will warn you that included in my collection are military cookbooks (chortles insanely with glee).

I've got a PDF of the US Navy shipboard cooking manual from 1920.
US Navy Cook-Book 1920
Now you can have it too.*





* Note: NOT my site... the creator, Gene Slover, passed away March 22, 2013. The site will be kept up by a friend of his who had been working with him on the site for the last few years.