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Some Interesting Military Data

Sometimes you get the impression that Banzai attacks arose more from a feeling of desperation, in that they couldn't figure out a devious strategy to win that encounter.

As regards to Midway, one thesis is that the Japanese should have gone for broke, and committed their treasured battleships for the bombardment, to force the Americans to commit their air groups, since, as we know, it was a close run thing.
 
Yamato was nicknamed Hotel Yamato, because it hardly left it's moorings, was used for important meetings, and thereby had a reputation for a great mess.

Considering later fuel shortages crippled operations, and the buggers sucked fuel at an astounding rate, trading battleships for American carriers would be worthwhile, though you needn't risk your latest ones for that mission.
 
Yamato was nicknamed Hotel Yamato, because it hardly left it's moorings, was used for important meetings, and thereby had a reputation for a great mess.

Considering later fuel shortages crippled operations, and the buggers sucked fuel at an astounding rate, trading battleships for American carriers would be worthwhile, though you needn't risk your latest ones for that mission.

I would disagree with the statement that the Yamato hardly ever left it moorings. As for fuel, in its final sortie, the Yamato was using soy bean oil for bunker fuel.
 
While Edward Creasy did make a valuable contribution to military history with his 15 Decisive Battles, he was not exactly a good prophet. He wrote the following sentence to begin his introduction to his book in 1851.

It is an honourable characteristic of the Spirit of this Age, that projects of violence and warfare are regarded among civilized states with gradually increasing aversion.

In 1853, the Crimean War started, followed by various French adventures including the attempt to set up an empire in Mexico, along with the assault of Britain and France on China in 1860, the American Civil War, and then Prussia getting into the act, starting with the Danish War in 1864.

He also wrote the following comment in his discussion of the Athenian attack on Syracuse in 415 BC.

The effect of the presence of a Spartan officer on the troops of the other Greeks, seems to have been like the effect of the presence of an English officer upon native Indian troops.

The Great Indian Mutiny erupted in 1857.
 
Surprisingly, the Japanese liked to overthink and overcomplicate their plans.

I've read in various history books that they liked to pop up various units here and there to distract their enemies.

Early part of the war it worked, but the breaking of JN-25 code worked against them and we knew what was a faked attack and what was the main thrust.

But the fake message 'Midway is low on potable water due to desalination plant failure' and then repeated by a Japanese intercept station in a code the US had broken, gave the exact location of the next big attack.

Then the USN knew the attack on the Aleutians was a diversion and Midway was the one they had to deal with.
 
American Heroes Channel, AHC, has a show where they interview survivors of Taffy 3. I don't remember exactly when it shows, I think around 4th of July and November 11 for Veterans' Day.
 
AHC is showing the Taffy 3 documentary today. Some of the survivors are interviewed.

Thanks for the info, Jim, but I do not have cable.

I will be posting something about the Battle of the Bismarck Sea later. And then next week, the Tokyo Fire Raid on March 9-10.
 
Thanks for the info, Jim, but I do not have cable.

I will be posting something about the Battle of the Bismarck Sea later. And then next week, the Tokyo Fire Raid on March 9-10.

I've read about the Bismarck Sea battles, but I don't have much on the Fire Raids on Japan. So if you have extra info on that, much appreciated.
 
I've read about the Bismarck Sea battles, but I don't have much on the Fire Raids on Japan. So if you have extra info on that, much appreciated.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfPwR00HXM0

You can read up a lot more from the USSBS, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Strategic_Bombing_Survey

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm

http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm

A fuller set with detailed breakout reports not in the summary are online at the Hathi Trust.

http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Searc... Strategic Bombing Survey."&type=author&inst=

Among other things the USSBS estimates that if the original primary target in Germany had come under full attack, the electrical system, the war would have been shortened by a year. They don't say that directly, but that's what it means.
 
The air force didn't talk up the electrical system bit much, because it begs the question, why wasn't it a primary target- which it was identified as such in 1942, then got delisted.

Somebody higher up wanted Germany AND Russia to bleed each other a little more?

Neither the Air Force nor the Navy had an institutional reason to talk much about the extreme effectiveness of the air-dropped naval mine on Japan either. Not an option in 42, but by 44 we didn't really need to be risking subs on mercantile warfare for the home islands.
 
Probably would have saved a lot of time and money getting Wernher von Braun and his colleagues to work on guidance and range; perhaps training Kamikaze chimpanzees.

Whether or not the amount of resources spent on the long range bombing branch was ever justified, before, during and after the Great Patriotic War, it always was considered a strategic weapon, and perhaps over used and overfunded.
 
The air force didn't talk up the electrical system bit much, because it begs the question, why wasn't it a primary target- which it was identified as such in 1942, then got delisted.

Somebody higher up wanted Germany AND Russia to bleed each other a little more?

Neither the Air Force nor the Navy had an institutional reason to talk much about the extreme effectiveness of the air-dropped naval mine on Japan either. Not an option in 42, but by 44 we didn't really need to be risking subs on mercantile warfare for the home islands.

I would rather not get into an extended discussion of World War 2 targeting priorities, or the cost-benefit ratio of mine use to submarines, as that is not the purpose of this thread.
 
Probably would have saved a lot of time and money getting Wernher von Braun and his colleagues to work on guidance and range; perhaps training Kamikaze chimpanzees.

Whether or not the amount of resources spent on the long range bombing branch was ever justified, before, during and after the Great Patriotic War, it always was considered a strategic weapon, and perhaps over used and overfunded.

No question it helped Allied forces get on the continent as they were switched to isolating the battlefield from resupply/reinforcements and of course Operation Cobra.

And arguably forced the Luftwaffe into battle over their own skies instead of forward over either front, materially contributed to it's destruction with a brutal attrition, at a horrific cost.

What didn't work was terror bombing, or piling so many men into aircraft that were supposedly self-escorting, when that did not work out to be the case.

Something more like the Mosquito, counting on speed, would probably have been better even with a higher loss rate over heavy AA protected targets because of less losses from enemy fighters unable to catch up or intercept very often and less crew to lose overall.

Cheaper too as all those men and guns required that much more fuel, engines and plane to carry it all.
 
I would rather not get into an extended discussion of World War 2 targeting priorities, or the cost-benefit ratio of mine use to submarines, as that is not the purpose of this thread.

Fair enough, although to be honest some of these topics' connection to Traveller seem a bit tenuous.

Should be plenty of material for Marn to chew on for years just in that one post.
 
Fair enough, although to be honest some of these topics' connection to Traveller seem a bit tenuous.

Should be plenty of material for Marn to chew on for years just in that one post.

I assume that if any of the moderators felt that I was ranging too far afield, they would very rapidly tell me so.

The intent of the thread is to supply the forum with a wide range of military data covering as wide a range of history and weaponry as possible. Once I have a bit more time, I intend to post material on DriveThru for download in PDF for of such things as WW1 and later air squadron organization, the manpower and organization of a US Zeppelin squadron, the effective burst radius of various artillery and mortar ammunition, and the required thickness of material for protection against various weapons, among other subjects.
 
I assume that if any of the moderators felt that I was ranging too far afield, they would very rapidly tell me so.

The intent of the thread is to supply the forum with a wide range of military data covering as wide a range of history and weaponry as possible. Once I have a bit more time, I intend to post material on DriveThru for download in PDF for of such things as WW1 and later air squadron organization, the manpower and organization of a US Zeppelin squadron, the effective burst radius of various artillery and mortar ammunition, and the required thickness of material for protection against various weapons, among other subjects.

As long as it's not being complained about and people are getting useful data...
 
As long as it's not being complained about and people are getting useful data...

For my part I have no complaints, quite enjoyable and often meandering information can spark new perspectives on play and world building.

I'm just not clear where his line is drawn for the thread's content.
 
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