40 Years Ago Today...
- Thread starter saundby
- Start date
LiamKerrington
SOC-12
Hello there,
I'd love to eye-witness this - well on the TV that is.
Considering what all the different nations are up to at the moment, I guess it is pretty unlikely that there will be a mission to moon with humans aboard.
But then again, many things happen pretty quickly. The ESA is very interested in the south-pole-region of the moon; the Chinese probably have something jumping out of the box just as quickly and surprising as their short-term space-station in this year. As for the NASA or the USA I am not sure, though ...
40 years. That is a long time ... My childhood and youth was dominated by the STS ... Would be nice to enjoy news about another man or woman placing his/ her feet on the soil of the moon.
All the best!
Liam
I'd love to eye-witness this - well on the TV that is.
Considering what all the different nations are up to at the moment, I guess it is pretty unlikely that there will be a mission to moon with humans aboard.
But then again, many things happen pretty quickly. The ESA is very interested in the south-pole-region of the moon; the Chinese probably have something jumping out of the box just as quickly and surprising as their short-term space-station in this year. As for the NASA or the USA I am not sure, though ...
40 years. That is a long time ... My childhood and youth was dominated by the STS ... Would be nice to enjoy news about another man or woman placing his/ her feet on the soil of the moon.
All the best!
Liam
Timerover51
SOC-14 5K
I watched Neil Armstrong's first step on the Moon. I very much doubt that I will see another man walk on the Moon before I die. Given the existing financial climate, I doubt if any country or organization is going to be willing to spend any money to get there, and the same goes for an expedition to Mars.
saundby
SOC-14 1K
Current U.S. NASA Timeline:
2014: Orion EFT-1, Engineering test of the Orion vehicle launched by a Delta-IVH to do two high altitude orbits and a high speed re-entry test. Date paced by Delta IVH.
2016: Presidential Election.
2017 (Sept): Orion/SLS EM-1. Debut flight of the SLS. Will take the uncrewed Orion to lunar orbit for systems testing then return to Earth.
2020: Presidential Election.
2021: Orion/SLS EM-2. First crewed flight of Orion, taking 4 astronauts to lunar orbit for 4 days then returning to Earth.
2022(Aug): Orion/SLS: undefined mission, vague concepts of an asteroid mission or the first flight to an Exploration Gateway (cislunar space station) have been bandied about. A lunar mission would require the development and flight test of a lunar lander. If that happens, this would probably be the "dress rehearsal", not the landing.
2023(Aug-Sept): Orion/SLS: undefined mission. Possible asteroid visit, use of the Exploration Gateway for a lunar orbit mission, or a landing if directions change that way.
2024: SLS-5: first "cargo" SLS version, currently posited to be a Mars sample return mission.
2024: Presidential Election.
So--the next U.S. President could have a crew in lunar orbit on their first term, and a crew on the surface of Moon in their second term.
China:
2013: Lunar Rover
2017: Lunar sample Return
2020: Regularly crewed space station.
Purely conjectural, presently denied by PRC leadership though reported at times:
2025-2030: First crew on lunar surface.
2030-2035: regularly crewed lunar base.
Europe and/or Russia:
Would require new launch vehicle, perhaps a new version of the Ariane 5 with the crew lofted by a Soyuz. Present ESA plans seem to be a smaller Ariane 6 rather than a new Ariane 5.
Would require a transfer stage and lander.
Pure conjecture:
2018: Test of new LV and transfer stage.
2020: Test of new lunar lander.
2022: Dress rehearsal.
2023: Landing.
All very unlikely with current plans and finances.
Commercial:
2015: Human-rated Atlas V.
2017: Human-rated Falcon Heavy (maybe).
2017: Commercial Crew vehicle to LEO.
Conjectural:
2020: Beyond-LEO capable Commercial Crew vehicle.
2022: Commercial transfer stage/lander test.
2023: Commercial crewed landing.
So, to answer my own question, it looks like a lunar landing would fall just outside the 50 year boundary, even with good tailwinds, no gremlins, and political/economic carte blanche. The U.S. or a joint US/European effort is the most likely to get there first, if the political stars align. Otherwise, it's a race between China and Commercial.
2014: Orion EFT-1, Engineering test of the Orion vehicle launched by a Delta-IVH to do two high altitude orbits and a high speed re-entry test. Date paced by Delta IVH.
2016: Presidential Election.
2017 (Sept): Orion/SLS EM-1. Debut flight of the SLS. Will take the uncrewed Orion to lunar orbit for systems testing then return to Earth.
2020: Presidential Election.
2021: Orion/SLS EM-2. First crewed flight of Orion, taking 4 astronauts to lunar orbit for 4 days then returning to Earth.
2022(Aug): Orion/SLS: undefined mission, vague concepts of an asteroid mission or the first flight to an Exploration Gateway (cislunar space station) have been bandied about. A lunar mission would require the development and flight test of a lunar lander. If that happens, this would probably be the "dress rehearsal", not the landing.
2023(Aug-Sept): Orion/SLS: undefined mission. Possible asteroid visit, use of the Exploration Gateway for a lunar orbit mission, or a landing if directions change that way.
2024: SLS-5: first "cargo" SLS version, currently posited to be a Mars sample return mission.
2024: Presidential Election.
So--the next U.S. President could have a crew in lunar orbit on their first term, and a crew on the surface of Moon in their second term.
China:
2013: Lunar Rover
2017: Lunar sample Return
2020: Regularly crewed space station.
Purely conjectural, presently denied by PRC leadership though reported at times:
2025-2030: First crew on lunar surface.
2030-2035: regularly crewed lunar base.
Europe and/or Russia:
Would require new launch vehicle, perhaps a new version of the Ariane 5 with the crew lofted by a Soyuz. Present ESA plans seem to be a smaller Ariane 6 rather than a new Ariane 5.
Would require a transfer stage and lander.
Pure conjecture:
2018: Test of new LV and transfer stage.
2020: Test of new lunar lander.
2022: Dress rehearsal.
2023: Landing.
All very unlikely with current plans and finances.
Commercial:
2015: Human-rated Atlas V.
2017: Human-rated Falcon Heavy (maybe).
2017: Commercial Crew vehicle to LEO.
Conjectural:
2020: Beyond-LEO capable Commercial Crew vehicle.
2022: Commercial transfer stage/lander test.
2023: Commercial crewed landing.
So, to answer my own question, it looks like a lunar landing would fall just outside the 50 year boundary, even with good tailwinds, no gremlins, and political/economic carte blanche. The U.S. or a joint US/European effort is the most likely to get there first, if the political stars align. Otherwise, it's a race between China and Commercial.
The Apollo program took ~ 8 years to put a man on the moon... (albeit with some estimated > $100 billion of today's dollars).
Golden Spike isn't looking to crowd sourcing for funding so much as for marketing (engaging a public that in turn defines an advertising demographic)... given today's hi-tech billionaire club - and a team of proven folks - its not inconceivable that the free market makes the moon within a decade particularly if it becomes significantly vanity funded (i.e., some multi-billionaire(s) decide to kick in and desire a quicker timeline).
Golden Spike isn't looking to crowd sourcing for funding so much as for marketing (engaging a public that in turn defines an advertising demographic)... given today's hi-tech billionaire club - and a team of proven folks - its not inconceivable that the free market makes the moon within a decade particularly if it becomes significantly vanity funded (i.e., some multi-billionaire(s) decide to kick in and desire a quicker timeline).
Just for perspective, the current US Federal budget is $2-3 trillion per year, so even $12.5 billion per year (like Apollo) for a space program is easily affordable, and a permanent moon base could be done for a lot less (today) than the Apollo program cost - about $1 billion per year over 10 years IIRC. A man on Mars is comparable in cost to the Apollo program.
Another metric for these costs, reducing the number of US aircraft carrier groups from 10 to 9 will fund a program to place a man in a lunar outpost within 10 years and support the outpost for another 10 years (at $1 billion per year).
Americans spend about $1 billion per year on Ice and another $1 billion per year on socks.
We have the money, we lack the vision, leadership and the will.
Baron
SOC-12
Too true. I, too, watched Armstrong step on the moon. The bright future we all saw gradually slid into nothingness. I'm trying to raise my daughter with that yearning for discovery in her eye, and a well-balanced education in science. But I won't live to see her great adventure.
We went to a local planetarium for the Apollo 17 anniversary. The host continuously referenced my daughter, as in," When *she* lands at a lunar outpost," and "When *she* walks on the moon..." I can only hope.
LiamKerrington
SOC-12
Hello everyone,
@saundby: Thank you for providing this timelime and comparison 'sheet'.
Virgin and Red Bull ... As soon as things may become real, they could get into it - especially considering what they have done/ supported/ achieved in the most recent past.
Actually this was on of my first thoughts when I learned about the "Stratos"-mission with Felix Baumgartner funded by Red Bull ...
All the best!
Liam
@saundby: Thank you for providing this timelime and comparison 'sheet'.
Virgin and Red Bull ... As soon as things may become real, they could get into it - especially considering what they have done/ supported/ achieved in the most recent past.
Actually this was on of my first thoughts when I learned about the "Stratos"-mission with Felix Baumgartner funded by Red Bull ...
All the best!
Liam
Timerover51
SOC-14 5K
The US Debt has increased by over $1 Trillion a year since 2009. We do not have the money.
$1 billion program in a $2,000 billion budget (subtracting the extra $1 trillion budget deficit) = 0.0005 = 0.05% = 1/20 of a percent
$3.33 per year for every man, woman and child in the United States ... my 3 person household is willing to pay $10 per year for hope in the future.
$3.33 per year for every man, woman and child in the United States ... my 3 person household is willing to pay $10 per year for hope in the future.
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saundby
SOC-14 1K
I don't want to spur a political discussion, but I'm going to bring in some budget figures hoping that we can use them for comparison's sake when discussing the economics of lunar exploration.
NASA 2013 Budget Request comes in at about US$17.7B.
$830M is for commercial space.
More NASA Budget Background
If sequestration occurs, it will cut about $1.7B out of that budget.
Also, though Congress regularly approves NASA's budget request, they seldom actually appropriate (raise & turn over) the dollars they approve in the budget. Not judging, just sayin'. That's been the pattern for the last 4 years.
Not supported in this budget is the Exploration Gateway I mentioned above. Administrator Bolden has put a lot of himself into supporting it. But his boss isn't behind it now. It's not in this budget, even in the penny-pinching form proposed that literally builds it out of an odd assortment of leftover components from tests and backup hardware. That's why SLS-3 and SLS-4 have no defined mission at present.
For cost comparison between complex technical development programs, (but not for the sake of comparing relative merit, please), the 2013 proposed allocation for F-35 is $9.2B for 29 aircraft. The total program cost is estimated at $382B. Note that cuts in aircraft delivery numbers will result in the sunk costs being spread over fewer aircraft, so a lot of legerdemain can be expected about the aircraft's costs.
Elon Musk's estimate for developing a crewed Dragon (DragonRider) and Falcon 9 for service to LEO is $800M to $1B. This is above the costs for the present Dragon/Falcon 9 in service. Per flight cost would be about $140M once developed. That's for an ISS crew transfer.
Development of the current uncrewed Falcon 9 cost about $300M. I don't know what costs were included and excluded from this number, but I expect it omits launch facilities and ground support costs. I don't have a number for the current Dragon capsule.
Upshot? I don't know, except that costs can be very wonky and it's almost impossible to get good apples-to-apples comparisons. Lots of costs can be shunted out of a program, or otherwise have a blind eye turned toward them, likewise costs can also be accumulated to bury a program by pretending that it bears the full cost of everything it impinges on.
I've worked on 4 different heavy lift programs over the past 30 years that got to the point of building and integrating flight hardware before they were shut down. I'd guess the direct costs lost on those programs to be something like $40-90B (I know that one of them was over $20B when it was chopped off a few months from the first launch.) The taxpayers that paid for them were pretty well unaware of them, and unaware of the many year's investment laid aside. Basically, not trying to say anything political but trying to make the point that, often, the money does get spent, but in a way that results in no tangible benefit at the end. Which is really too bad, but the public that foots the bills seldom knows, which is why I think this happens.
I'm glad of one thing about the controversy over SLS: it's relatively well known for a launch vehicle development program. That'll make it harder to kill without a full airing of the case pro and con.
NASA 2013 Budget Request comes in at about US$17.7B.
$830M is for commercial space.
More NASA Budget Background
If sequestration occurs, it will cut about $1.7B out of that budget.
Also, though Congress regularly approves NASA's budget request, they seldom actually appropriate (raise & turn over) the dollars they approve in the budget. Not judging, just sayin'. That's been the pattern for the last 4 years.
Not supported in this budget is the Exploration Gateway I mentioned above. Administrator Bolden has put a lot of himself into supporting it. But his boss isn't behind it now. It's not in this budget, even in the penny-pinching form proposed that literally builds it out of an odd assortment of leftover components from tests and backup hardware. That's why SLS-3 and SLS-4 have no defined mission at present.
For cost comparison between complex technical development programs, (but not for the sake of comparing relative merit, please), the 2013 proposed allocation for F-35 is $9.2B for 29 aircraft. The total program cost is estimated at $382B. Note that cuts in aircraft delivery numbers will result in the sunk costs being spread over fewer aircraft, so a lot of legerdemain can be expected about the aircraft's costs.
Elon Musk's estimate for developing a crewed Dragon (DragonRider) and Falcon 9 for service to LEO is $800M to $1B. This is above the costs for the present Dragon/Falcon 9 in service. Per flight cost would be about $140M once developed. That's for an ISS crew transfer.
Development of the current uncrewed Falcon 9 cost about $300M. I don't know what costs were included and excluded from this number, but I expect it omits launch facilities and ground support costs. I don't have a number for the current Dragon capsule.
Upshot? I don't know, except that costs can be very wonky and it's almost impossible to get good apples-to-apples comparisons. Lots of costs can be shunted out of a program, or otherwise have a blind eye turned toward them, likewise costs can also be accumulated to bury a program by pretending that it bears the full cost of everything it impinges on.
I've worked on 4 different heavy lift programs over the past 30 years that got to the point of building and integrating flight hardware before they were shut down. I'd guess the direct costs lost on those programs to be something like $40-90B (I know that one of them was over $20B when it was chopped off a few months from the first launch.) The taxpayers that paid for them were pretty well unaware of them, and unaware of the many year's investment laid aside. Basically, not trying to say anything political but trying to make the point that, often, the money does get spent, but in a way that results in no tangible benefit at the end. Which is really too bad, but the public that foots the bills seldom knows, which is why I think this happens.
I'm glad of one thing about the controversy over SLS: it's relatively well known for a launch vehicle development program. That'll make it harder to kill without a full airing of the case pro and con.
For this discussion only, an exception to the "No Politics" rule is granted. Mostly on the grounds that the subject is of direct interest to a majority of board users, and on the caveat that it must be kept relevant, and is primarily factual, rather than opinion, in nature.
Fundamentally, NASA budgets ARE political topics. Hence, the exception.
Fundamentally, NASA budgets ARE political topics. Hence, the exception.
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Perhaps your memory is better than mine ...
IIRC the Direct (Shuttle Derived Heavy Lift Rocket) and its Boeing counterpart claimed (industry experts outside of NASA) that they could move forward for just over $1 billion per year - including roughly a 10-20 year plan to return to the moon for long visits.
I vaguely remember the Atlas/Delta based flexible path forward was within spitting distance of that price (a little more or a little less depending on whose figures you use).
So for NASA figures we have $4 billion per year to
1. dismantle the Shuttle Program
2. maintain the ISS
3. build the new STS rocket and capsule
and a lot of wiggle room to shift 'costs' between programs.
Is that correct?
I still believe that what we lack is a steady vision forward, to continue towards a goal until that goal is achieved, and then to build upon that success in a spiral development towards the next, higher, goal. We seem to have the money, we just keep moving the goalposts and filling the dumpster with 'last years progress'.
... and it makes me sad and want to go play Classic Era Traveller
- big Imperium Traveller - not some broken down post-virus Traveller Universe (which reminds me too much of NASA ... we once went to the Moon/Stars and will be able to return again ... someday 
).
Just a quick fact clarification ... the Federal Deficit (what we spend minus what we earn) is about $1 trillion per year ... the Federal Debt (total amount we owe in Treasury notes) is over $58 trillion [just under $700,000 per US family].
This strengthens your point and, yeah, it sucks ...
... but space isn't the black hole* that is gobbling all of our children's money.
I've said enough on this rabbit trail,
Arthur
*[Hey, I made a pun.]
saundby
SOC-14 1K
SLS is pretty much DIRECT after a NASA make-over. It tries to deliver a Congressionally-mandated lift capacity. Initially it comes short of that, using existing hardware and suppliers with evolutionary development through the early flights toward a stable, relatively inexpensive configuration that meets the mandate.
That was quoted for a more limited mission capability. For Lunar/BEO missions that were being discussed at the time, the costs of the additional launches to conduct the same mission were higher, by about 50-100% depending on how realistic the numbers were.
The costs savings were claimed in development costs of a new LV, particularly one requiring a J-2X and potential cost growth of an RS-25E and five-segment solids.
However, my experience with man-rated systems is that the costs of modifying an existing design aren't as low as ULA &c. were making out. Not necessarily prohibitive, but not cheap, either.
Yeah, pretty much. Some of the technology budget goes into new LV development, and a fair bit of the $4B is stuff you'd not expect. E.g., NASA display of Atlantis--not the full ticket but much of it, stripping of the OPFs and some of the refit costs to prepare them for new users, crawler-transporter updates and so on.
I agree 100%. Too many politicians perceive the micturation marks of other politicians on capable programs. So they can them, then launch new programs with their own scent on them. Unfortunately this is common practice in aerospace and defense, at least in the U.S. Often it results in programs being declared too expensive when paid for to a substantial degree, when a declared cheaper program will likely result in more dollars spent before yielding any useful. And usually with less ability claimed.
But then, the chances of these programs completing are low, too. At any rate, it has been a reality of my professional life for over 30 years now.
... and it makes me sad and want to go play Classic Era Traveller
I'm with you. But, I keep hoping. We have the technology, and, I feel, the money. But the biggest piece I see missing now compared to 50 years ago is the ability to effectively organize our efforts.
Leadership is just one part of that. Capable NASA Administrators placed by Presidents from both major parties have been unable to control problems within NASA that drive up costs, cause delays, and generally create conditions that cause programs to fail. And that's without even considering the effects of Congress.
I remember a quote by Tom Peters to the effect that "any organization with more than 5 members is a hopeless bureaucracy".
Perhaps we need to turn the manned space program over to the "skunkworks"
[Of course, post Kelly Johnson, it may also be a "hopeless bureaucracy" at this point.]
Strictly my opinion, but much of the success of "Direct" is a result of it being a small group of "monomaniacs with a mission" ... the classic recipe for most successful innovation.
Perhaps we need to turn the manned space program over to the "skunkworks"
[Of course, post Kelly Johnson, it may also be a "hopeless bureaucracy" at this point.]
Strictly my opinion, but much of the success of "Direct" is a result of it being a small group of "monomaniacs with a mission" ... the classic recipe for most successful innovation.
Maitrejeanthierry
SOC-7
Damn right you are, sir !!! We all could do with a slight dose of optimism.
saundby
SOC-14 1K
DIRECT certainly had an impact--SLS is a result of it. Within NASA, there's a sense that the 105mT variants can do all the BEO work we need. As a point of comparison, a Saturn V's lift capacity is 120mT.
But one comment on the small team--DIRECT was an architecture-building exercise to create an alternative to the Constellation program launch vehicles. Architecture-building is the easiest part of the whole process of creating a space exploration system, if you have the basic information and if you follow some basic rules (which NASA regularly violates, viz. X-33.)
They built architectures for only one part of the system, the launch vehicle. And they had a specific target--improving on the costs and IOC dates of Constellation's two launch vehicles (Ares-I and Ares-V) with their own architecture.
The DIRECT folks themselves were very specific about what they were doing and trying to achieve, BTW. They did not oversell themselves or what they were doing. See the press release where the team declares victory as well as other posts by user "kraisee" on the nasaspaceflight.com forums.
The 130mT variant of SLS, if it ever occurs, is not likely to materialize till about 15 years from now, and likely closer to 20 years.
Part of the deal here is that we don't have a specific mission to build to. Mars is too far off right now, and the interim targets have all been deprecated. Those include the Moon and an asteroid mission. The more ambitious asteroid missions would definitely benefit from a 130mT launch vehicle, as would any Mars missions.
There are a number of mission possibilities being built into the current CONOPS (Concepts of Operations) which are guiding the development of Orion and SLS. Without clear guidance on a mission, the CONOPS is providing the feedback mechanism to the design where capabilities form mission profiles which then feed back into design and development work that creates the capabilities. Using a CONOPS to take the place of an actual mission means that the work is more diffuse than if we had a specific mission.
So the present plan is to build the equipment that can be fit to any of a number of missions. Growing capabilities to refuel in space, operate space stations, use solar electric propulsion, and take advantage of libration points for low energy transfers is influencing present designs. All of these result in a reduction in the required size of an Earth to orbit launch vehicle.
Some feel that they eliminate the need to develop a heavy lift vehicle at all, that our current medium lift vehicles are up to the task. My own opinion, at present, is that we still need a heavy lift vehicle to keep costs under control by reducing the total number of launches to accomplish the missions under consideration at present, and to limit overall mission complexity and risk on the more difficult missions like lunar sorties, asteroid surveys, and Mars flybys.
This is because of the need for balancing consumables with flight time for crewed flights to BEO destinations, and the overall mass of an Orion with service module.
There's also another factor that I think militates for larger launchers--we're getting the ability to use a single launch for multiple payloads down to a routine now, and this capability can be used as a means of reducing the risk of the primary mission. In essence, we can launch with excess capacity for the primary mission. If the primary mission doesn't need that capacity, there's a secondary payload along that can take advantage of that capacity while sharing the costs of the launch.
This used to be something that added enough complexity and risk to a launch that it was only done when LV availability and costs demanded it. But current technology has adjusted the numbers enough to where it is becoming an advantage. One example is the SpaceX business plan. The Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy LV economics depend on the buses that allow pretty well seamless integration of multiple payloads on a single vehicle.
It's a small jump from having large LVs out-compete small ones by cost-sharing among multiple payloads, or having secondary payloads reduce costs to a larger primary payload, to using secondary payloads as as a risk reduction measure for a crew. If the LV performs to plan, the secondary payloads get a cheap ride. If not, their missions are compromised, but the primary payload has the excess capacity it needs to stay on track. The secondary payloads provide the dollars to buy that extra capacity.
From where I'm sitting, I'm seeing a near future where HLVs are the dominant commercial launch vehicle, and mediums are reduced to bespoke systems built for governmental use, with smalls being very common in the low end and light weight commercial arena.
SLS is a bespoke large system, which is why I wonder whether we'll see growth to 130mT. Rather, I think that when the time for that decision comes in about a decade or a bit more, there will be commercial systems that will either supplant the SLS or reduce costs by contributing the necessary components to increase payload capacity.
The commercial availability of HLVs will make crewed BEO missions much more cost effective, and therefore more politically palatable (and reduce the time to results short enough for office-holders to benefit politically from providing the funding.)
Right now we're living in a difficult inflection point in technology. The new stuff isn't quite flying yet, and many organizations haven't changed their thinking based on present and near future technology.
I think the next three years will change a lot of that.
So hold on to your hope.
But one comment on the small team--DIRECT was an architecture-building exercise to create an alternative to the Constellation program launch vehicles. Architecture-building is the easiest part of the whole process of creating a space exploration system, if you have the basic information and if you follow some basic rules (which NASA regularly violates, viz. X-33.)
They built architectures for only one part of the system, the launch vehicle. And they had a specific target--improving on the costs and IOC dates of Constellation's two launch vehicles (Ares-I and Ares-V) with their own architecture.
The DIRECT folks themselves were very specific about what they were doing and trying to achieve, BTW. They did not oversell themselves or what they were doing. See the press release where the team declares victory as well as other posts by user "kraisee" on the nasaspaceflight.com forums.
The 130mT variant of SLS, if it ever occurs, is not likely to materialize till about 15 years from now, and likely closer to 20 years.
Part of the deal here is that we don't have a specific mission to build to. Mars is too far off right now, and the interim targets have all been deprecated. Those include the Moon and an asteroid mission. The more ambitious asteroid missions would definitely benefit from a 130mT launch vehicle, as would any Mars missions.
There are a number of mission possibilities being built into the current CONOPS (Concepts of Operations) which are guiding the development of Orion and SLS. Without clear guidance on a mission, the CONOPS is providing the feedback mechanism to the design where capabilities form mission profiles which then feed back into design and development work that creates the capabilities. Using a CONOPS to take the place of an actual mission means that the work is more diffuse than if we had a specific mission.
So the present plan is to build the equipment that can be fit to any of a number of missions. Growing capabilities to refuel in space, operate space stations, use solar electric propulsion, and take advantage of libration points for low energy transfers is influencing present designs. All of these result in a reduction in the required size of an Earth to orbit launch vehicle.
Some feel that they eliminate the need to develop a heavy lift vehicle at all, that our current medium lift vehicles are up to the task. My own opinion, at present, is that we still need a heavy lift vehicle to keep costs under control by reducing the total number of launches to accomplish the missions under consideration at present, and to limit overall mission complexity and risk on the more difficult missions like lunar sorties, asteroid surveys, and Mars flybys.
This is because of the need for balancing consumables with flight time for crewed flights to BEO destinations, and the overall mass of an Orion with service module.
There's also another factor that I think militates for larger launchers--we're getting the ability to use a single launch for multiple payloads down to a routine now, and this capability can be used as a means of reducing the risk of the primary mission. In essence, we can launch with excess capacity for the primary mission. If the primary mission doesn't need that capacity, there's a secondary payload along that can take advantage of that capacity while sharing the costs of the launch.
This used to be something that added enough complexity and risk to a launch that it was only done when LV availability and costs demanded it. But current technology has adjusted the numbers enough to where it is becoming an advantage. One example is the SpaceX business plan. The Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy LV economics depend on the buses that allow pretty well seamless integration of multiple payloads on a single vehicle.
It's a small jump from having large LVs out-compete small ones by cost-sharing among multiple payloads, or having secondary payloads reduce costs to a larger primary payload, to using secondary payloads as as a risk reduction measure for a crew. If the LV performs to plan, the secondary payloads get a cheap ride. If not, their missions are compromised, but the primary payload has the excess capacity it needs to stay on track. The secondary payloads provide the dollars to buy that extra capacity.
From where I'm sitting, I'm seeing a near future where HLVs are the dominant commercial launch vehicle, and mediums are reduced to bespoke systems built for governmental use, with smalls being very common in the low end and light weight commercial arena.
SLS is a bespoke large system, which is why I wonder whether we'll see growth to 130mT. Rather, I think that when the time for that decision comes in about a decade or a bit more, there will be commercial systems that will either supplant the SLS or reduce costs by contributing the necessary components to increase payload capacity.
The commercial availability of HLVs will make crewed BEO missions much more cost effective, and therefore more politically palatable (and reduce the time to results short enough for office-holders to benefit politically from providing the funding.)
Right now we're living in a difficult inflection point in technology. The new stuff isn't quite flying yet, and many organizations haven't changed their thinking based on present and near future technology.
I think the next three years will change a lot of that.
So hold on to your hope.
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