A different paradigm for naval warfare (and maybe even piracy?)

[Tobias]

Originally posted by Bill Cameron:
Gannon's disagreements with Blair are a matter of degree and not kind.

Not really.
Whether or not one thinks that King (or other US authorities) could have prevented serious losses is not so much of importance as what they actually did do. Which can be accurately summed up by "nothing too smart". No convoying, extremely poor organisation, bright navigation lights on, nice predictable schedules for ASW patrols - these are obvious failures, and nothing else.
Sure, not all of this was King's fault. Other US authorities were also to blame. But King did, on the whole, not even seem to realize that something was going wrong.

Didn't have the number of ships, didn't have the tpye of ships, didn't control the aircraft, couldn't control the civilians, was ordered to provide escorts for all sorts of other missions, so it was all King's fault?

Did he make an all-out effort to correct any of the mistakes that allegedly weren't his? No?

Concentrating targets in undefended convoys would have been worse.

Very unlikely. Nor is it true that there were *no* escorts available.
But all of this is somewhat beside of what I wrote, (contrasting with what you put in my mouth) namely "the American response under Admiral King". Sure, he was not the only one to make gross mistakes. Sure, these mistakes have to be seen in the context of overall war preparedness of the US at the time. But nevertheless, there were severe blunders on the US side, however explainable.

He served as an officer responsible for the technical assessment of enemy equipment and he repeated the USN's technical assessment of the XXIs they examined.

When? As far as I know, he was an NCO (supply IIRC) aboard USS Guardfish.

What other qualifications should he have had and what else should he have said?

I dunno, maybe study the actual operational history of XXIs? In lieu of having technical expertise himself, a critical consultation of experts?

Decade-long service? You're comparing apples and oranges again.

Sigh. No I'm not.

The XXIs constructed in '44 and '45 didn't meet the capabilities of which the design was capable.

Google Roland Morillot, Wilhelm Bauer, B-27, etc. etc.
Type XXI boats. Designed and constructed during WW2. Serving for decades in various navies. Whose actual performance (not "blueprints", again with the putting words in my mouth) is on records.

Coastal Command sank over twenty of them after all.

All of which were destroyed surfaced (btw, "over twenty" collides with all other literature I have) while in harbor or making it out of shallow waters. Or by mines.

I wrote that strategic warfare ties up assets and production.

You wrote that the main effect of the U-Boat war was to tie up defenses. Yes or no?
If yes, it is total nonsense - until a certain point which can be conveniently set in early- to mid 1943.

Gannon's contention in Black May - You know, Michal Gannon? The fellow you say is better than Clay Blair? - is that ~May of 1943 is when the Germans finally realized they had lost.

You totally failed to realize what the point was.
I will try to rephrase it in simple words.
Until early to mid 1943 U-Boats were an effective strategic weapon insofar as they destroyed more (generally, much more) strategic resources than their construction and operation consumed. After that, they were not, thus they had failed to be an effective strategic weapon in this regard. But they still could be considered effective by tying up enemy military resources (though it is debatable if they were still an effective strategic weapon in that sense.)
This does not assert that the U-Boats before "could have won the war" for Hitler - nothing could have done that post-1941.

Again, that isn't my contention.

No, but your (flawed) interpretation.

Instead of going on and on regarding this off-topic subject, let me quote an opinion of Blair's work, namely that of Gary E. Weir from the US Navy Historical Center, reviewing the first part of Blair's work for the Journal of Military History:
History is not the near-exhaustive gathering of facts into a narrative. Blair's work exhibits no historical methodology, a frequent absence of necessary depth, a tenous grasp of the latest in German, British and American naval historiography, and dated analysis. Because "Hitler's U-Boat War" offers only a handicapped chronicle of the U-Boat war from 1939 to 1942, the critical subject still cries out for a comprehensive, scholarly history.

Regards,

Tobias

 

[atpollard]

Originally posted by Tobias:
This does not assert that the U-Boats before "could have won the war" for Hitler - nothing could have done that post-1941.

Two small points:

1. To all participants in the discussion on WW2 submarines, thank you for your disagreement. This is much better than the recent TML discussions on “cannon” and “monkeys beating their chest” and words unsuitable for a family audience.

2. A German jet powered bomber or missile delivering an atomic bomb to London and New York might have won the war for Hitler. I think that both of those were still “possible” in early 1942. God just liked US more.

I yield to your greater knowledge and passion on this subject.

Arthur

 

[mbrinkhues]

You have not seen us when we start the "Great tank discussion" in all it's incarnations:

M4 vs M26
T34 against everything
Panther vs Tiger
German vs Wester Allied tanks
German vs Sowjet tanks
....

Compared to that, the "great submarine discussion" is harmless

 

[Liam Devlin]

An aside gentlemen lest we steer clear past the paradigm of gentleman's war, striking colors, piracy and when to surrender to whom...

we are out deep system off topic here, revisiting the WW2.

In the context of the arguments towards the thread, and submarine warfare vis-a vis piracy there is room enough.

Re-fighting the naval war of the Atlantic, isn't the topic.

back to it, please gentlemen, or take up separate threads for where I see this splintering off.

thank you,