Sorry, the holidays scrambled my "list of posts to do"!
Originally posted by Tobias: Yeah, similar to how it was proven by him that the initial US response to the U-Boat threat under Admiral King was on the whole sound and reasonable, eh? Actually preeminent historians like Michael Gannon tend to disagree.
Tobias,
Gannon's disagreements with Blair are a matter of degree and not kind. Blair's comments have also been misinterpretated by people with an emotional attachment to certain historical 'stories'. Both Gannon and Blair agree that King could have done nothing to prevent the 'Happy Time' off the US east coast in early '42. Gannon and Blair disagree over just how much harder King could have pushed for the changes he knew were necessary before and during that period.
King was a complete SOB and an Anglophobe to boot. Both of those traits, in particular his anglophobia, have colored the post-war picture of King.
Early 1942 found King without the number of ASW tools he said were required, without the types of ASW tools he said were required, and without the centralised control of ASW he said was required. But the failures wwere his fault. Sure.
- Congress ignored the USN's prewar escort tonnage recommendations and focussed building on 'sexy' larger warships instead. The tonnage the USN wanted was only authorized AFTER early 1942. He didn't have the tonnage he wanted and it's his fault?
- Congress, and Roosevelt, ignored the USN's ASW committee's recommendations concerning what type of escorts to build. That committee, chaired by King, wanted a navalized version of the USCG's cutter design. They only got it AFTER early 1942. He didn't have the ships he wanted and it's his fault?
- The USN wanted control of all ASW aircraft assets rightly pointing out that USAAF was only interested in strategic bombing. Congress and Roosevelt denied that request and, again, the USN only gained control AFTER early 1942. King was denied control of those air assets by his political superiors and it is his fault?
- The usual complaint people bring up against King has to do with the lack of coastal blackouts. Being in the civil sector, the declarations and enforcements of coastal blackouts were beyond his control. What was he to do? Send out parties of sailors with orders to shoot out the lights? King's fault again apparently.
- Another complaint, and one usually voiced by Anglocentric writers, claims that King 'hoarded' his best ASW assets or dispatched them to the Pacific. Blair's work with TROMS refutes that. King's 'spare' destroyers spent a great deal of time escorting capital ships and vital 'emergency' convoys or performing other politically mandated tasks. He did what he was ordered to do by his political superiors and it's his fault?
Didn't have the number of ships, didn't have the tpye of ships, didn't control the aircraft, couldn't control the civilians, was ordered to provide escorts for all sorts of other missions, so it was all King's fault? Sure it was.
Were his decisions sound? No, no decisions made in those circumstance could have been sound. Were they reasonable? Yes, he did the best he could do with what was given to him. I also happen to agree with Gannon that King could have pushed harder for change to happen faster. King didn't have the escorts to protect coastal convoys, either in numbers or range, and he had to work through USAAF for air cover for any convoys. An undefended convoy, the only kind there would have been, would have only concentrated targets for the U-boats. Instead, King was forced by the situation to choose the lesser of two evils; vessels would move in daylight between harbors of refuge along patrolled courses. It sucked but he didn't have any choice. Concentrating targets in undefended convoys would have been worse.
It's interesting to note that when King did have the escort number, types, and control he insisted were necessary no losses occurred at all; i.e. the various military and 'fast gas' convoys.
He never served as an officer, nor in any position that would allow him to actually be involved in command functions.
He served as an officer responsible for the technical assessment of enemy equipment and he repeated the USN's technical assessment of the XXIs they examined. What other qualifications should he have had and what else should he have said? He presented the assessment of the XXIs in the context of post-war claims that they would have own the war. He wasn't examining the design's post-war successes.
No, he simply spouted off his biased opinion and made several false assertions over alleged failures in their constructions, which it took me about 30 minutes to shoot down (at the time I had access to archives documenting the decade-long service of XXIs.)
Decade-long service? You're comparing apples and oranges again.
Blair examined
war time boats and not those built afterwards. He also stepped foot on them, something your study of blueprints cannot match. There's a great difference between blueprints and reality, especially given wartime construction problems. The XXIs were the basis of many if the advances in post-war submarine design, but that wasn't what Blair was writing about. The XXIs constructed in '44 and '45 didn't meet the capabilities of which the design was capable. Coastal Command sank over twenty of them after all. Blair examined the 1945 reality and presented that in his book, not the successful post-war reality or your blueprint reality.
It's interesting to note that of the navies that recieved wartime XXIs as reparations, only two, France and the USSR, actually operated them. France needed any ship she could lay her hands on and domestically designed Soviet subs were simply godawful. The two powers with good submarines already, the US and UK, examined their XXIs, borrowed many ideas for future construction and then scuttled them.
Actually, the Germans, when it was feasible, *did* concentrate on high-value targets (Tankers, usually.) However, unlike the Americans, who were going up against a non-convoying enemy whose every move they were informed about, they couldn't be choosers most of the time.
Telling commanders to sink tankers first and sending them where they could sink tankers are two very different things. Donitz may have ordered the former but he never did the latter. A sustained effort around Trinidad Tobago would have reaped large rewards, but the boats and their milchcows continued chasing less important tonnage elsewhere.
As for codes, Gannon points out that the Germans broke Allied convoy codes on a regular basis. Donitz knew sailing dates, ETAs, and convoy compositions. What he didn't get was real time radio intercepts from convoys at sea thanks to a radio discipline his own forces conspicuously lacked.
Then don't go about how the only effect of the U-Boats was tying up defenses. It was tying up strategic industries (until 1943.)
I wrote that strategic warfare ties up assets and production.
Just a few notes on your flawed comparison:
My flawed comparison? Score a laugh point.
Those numbers and the analysis derived from them are straight out of Michael Gannon's
Black May. You know, Michael Gannon? The fellow you say is better than Clay Blair? Gannon chose those two months to illustrate the drop in numbers despite the fact that the new French Atlantic bases allowed U-boats to stay on station longer. They had more boats, more boats at sea, and more boats at sea in the convoy lanes but they were somehow sinking less tonnage per boat per day than a year earlier. Go figure. Maybe,
as Gannon claims, the defenses were better and the Allies really had won by '41?
That the U-Boat war was strategically lost by ~May 1943 is undisputed.
Gannon's contention in
Black May - You know, Michal Gannon? The fellow you say is better than Clay Blair? - is that ~May of 1943 is when the Germans finally realized they had lost. Gannon says the Allies believed they'd won or at least contained the threat by 1941. He even points out that the 1943 date can't be found in Allied documents prior to 1956.
But they were not merely tying up military resources needed to combat them but strategic resources needed to rebuild what they destroyed.
I wrote that commerce raiding is a type of strategic warfare and it diverts an enemy's assets and production. As for strategic production, what other kind of production would strategic warfare effect?
Which is why merchant ship losses in 1942 were twice that of 1941? Ain't buying it.
Again, that isn't my contention. It's made by Michael Gannon - You know, Michal Gannon? The fellow you say is better than Clay Blair? - in his book
Black May. Take it up with him.
I would advise you to widen your horizon somewhat beyond Blair's (IMHO biased and lacking, if massive) work. Maybe works by Gannon, or Terraine's "Business in Great Waters".
Read Blair again and pay attention to what he actually says, not what you think he says. As for widening my reading horizons, may I suggest that you re-read those portions of the post above in which I point out that the numbers and analysis that got your knickers in such a knot come from one of the very authors you recommended? It seems that my horizons have been wide all along.
Have fun,
Bill