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Fleets and Logistical Tails

I was asking, for example, if you have 1 million tons of battle group, how many tons would be supply ship(s)?

From the standpoint of determining logistical support required, that does not have a lot of meaning to a logistics officer. That 1 million tons could be 2 ships or 200, or a thousand. How long a period are the ships going to need support prior to returning to a main base? Are transports included, and if so, how many men are carried on them? Are they using drop capsules that will need to be replaced? How many missiles launchers are in the force, and do they all use the same type of missile? How many sandcssters are being used? With a large number of ships, spare parts are going to be needed. The more ships, the more spare parts, and the greater the need for dedicated repair ships.
 
I was asking, for example, if you have 1 million tons of battle group, how many tons would be supply ship(s)?

I've heard several rules of thumb from various naval officers.

The "support tonnage" rule - half the ship's displacement in support ship's cargo tons - split between colliers, supply ships, and other tenders. (Which would provide, roughly, 2/3 the overall hull displacement tonnage.) They don't specify the range/duration in that... So, working it back...

The "50 pounds per man per month plus fuel" rule is in referenced in several navy manuals...

Note that the Jersey, at 58,000 tons-displacement (roughly), carried 2.5 M gal, or roughly 8000 long tons of fuel. And burned 21.6K gallons per hour at full burn... 115 hours of maximum steam, and almost a year (347 days) at minimum idle... (one plate of one boiler). So the resupply oilers needed depends on where she is, where she's going and how fast she's going there. (And she made 65kts peak speed at full emergency flank...)

Normal cruise is 33 kts, and probably about 400 hours (half a month); she was usually a harbour-queen...

Add the 40-55 tons of food (depending upon era, roughly 2400, 1950, or 1600 crew)...

So, for cruising patrol, 16000 cargo tons of oiler, another 50 tons of food, but that has to be fuel supplied in lots...

the standard oiler of the era was 55700 barrels - about 7500 tons - of fuel oil, and was 14,500 displacement... you'd need at least 2 per month. 29,000 tons displacement of oilers alone. Plus another resupply ship for food, monthly. (IIRC, she had hold spaces sufficient for 60 days food.)

The oilers needed would be roughly half to two-thirds the displacement per month, depending upon activity.

So, that works with the rule of thumb above as a monthly, especially when you add needed ship's spares and ammunition for non-combat routine uses (including limited training fire)... And heavy combat, yeah, at least double that fuel use, and go to several thousand tons of ammo a month.

http://www.ussnewjersey.com/hist_sts.htm
http://www.ussnewjersey.com/vol6-03.pdf
 
In Mongoose, you can devote a certain percentage of the volume to spare parts for extended maintenance, or you can offload that, instead of spending time at a starport level facility, I forget at the moment the formula.

I decided that the Solomani Navy modularized their engineering, which meant they could easily pop in or out these modules in case of malfunctions that can't easily be rectified or are battle damaged, so they would have tenders carrying those as spares.
 
In other words, and truly, YMMV!

Sounds like an exercise for someone who would care about the logistics, and is outside the scope of Traveller.

All I care about is: will I get my milk and chocolate bars?!? :D
 
Note that the Jersey, at 58,000 tons-displacement (roughly), carried 2.5 M gal, or roughly 8000 long tons of fuel. And burned 21.6K gallons per hour at full burn... 115 hours of maximum steam, and almost a year (347 days) at minimum idle... (one plate of one boiler). So the resupply oilers needed depends on where she is, where she's going and how fast she's going there
.
She also had the capability of refueling escorting destroyers, and did so on a periodic basis.

(And she made 65kts peak speed at full emergency flank...)

Her designed top speed was 33 knots, I have no idea where you got that 65 knots figure. Consult Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. You might also want to look at Norman Friedman's U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History for additional information on the development of the Iowa-Class Design. The previous two classes, the North Carolina and the South Dakota where designed for 27 knots top speed. The Iowa-class ships, along with the Littorio-class battleships of the Italian Navy were the fastest battleships built.

Normal cruise is 33 kts, and probably about 400 hours (half a month); she was usually a harbour-queen...

Her designed cruising speed was 20 knots, see the Friedman book. Her top speed was intended to match the fleet carriers, which could do around 33 knots on trials. After a period of service, those speeds typically dropped by a couple of knots. As for "harbor queen", she served as the flagship of Admiral William Halsey when he was commanding the Third Fleet. I would suggest you check the Dictionary of American Fighting Ships for her service record.

Add the 40-55 tons of food (depending upon era, roughly 2400, 1950, or 1600 crew)...

So, for cruising patrol, 16000 cargo tons of oiler, another 50 tons of food, but that has to be fuel supplied in lots...

The ship did carry 1080 rounds of 16 Inch ammunition, a mix of 1900 pound High-Capacity rounds and 2,700 pounds Armor-Piercing Rounds. I believe there was also 400 rounds per gun for its twenty 5 inch guns, as well as large quantities of 40mm and 20mm ammunition.

the standard oiler of the era was 55700 barrels - about 7500 tons - of fuel oil, and was 14,500 displacement... you'd need at least 2 per month. 29,000 tons displacement of oilers alone. Plus another resupply ship for food, monthly. (IIRC, she had hold spaces sufficient for 60 days food.)

See the following for the data on the Cimarron-class of US Navy oilers during World War 2. They carried 146,000 barrels of fuel oil.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cimarron-class_oiler_(1939)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy_oiler

The following quotes comes from the book Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, which can be found here on the Internet. That is the Service Force supporting the Iwo Jima Invasion.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/BBBO-23.html

Rear Admiral D.B. Beary's Logistic Support Group was organized in
2 task groups, each of 3 sections: Train, screen, and escort. Group A was designated 50.8.10, its flagship the Detroit, Captain D. Curry, Jr. The train, under Captain F.S. Gibson, included 15 oilers, 4 fleet tugs, and 1 escort carrier. Commander H.H. Love commanded the screen 50.8.14, of 2 destroyers and 12 destroyer escorts, while Commander H.D. Riley was in command of the escort carrier, consisting of 1 escort carrier and 2 destroyers. Task Group B, 50.8.16, under Captain H.F. MacComsey, included Captain V. Bailey's train of 12 oilers, 3 escort carriers, 2 ammunition ships, 1 general supply vessel, all with the designation 50.8.17. Screen, 50.8.22, under Captain J.R. Pahl, had 5 destroyers, 6 destroyer escorts, and 4 destroyer transports. Carrier Escort 50.8.23, Captain F.T. Ward, Jr., commanding, numbered 1 escort carrier and 2 destroyers. Besides these there were the 6 oilers in reserve at Saipan, or as it later worked out, at Ulithi. Task Force 58 sailed from Ulithi on 10 February to give Tokyo a mauling preliminary to the Iwo landings. This was the first air strike against Tokyo Bay by the carriers since the raid Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle had flown off the carrier Hornet in April 1942. Task Group A rendezvoused with the Fast Carrier Force 13 February about 10 a.m. and finished the refueling job about noon next day. The Bougainville transferred replacement planes and pilots to the force, was rushed back to Guam for a new load, and was back on the 19th with replacements for the losses in the Tokyo raid.

Knowing that Iwo would be strenuously defended, preparations for a large expenditure of bombardment ammunition were made, which was wise. The ammunition ships Shasta and Wrangell, with the auxiliary ammunition ship Lakewood Victory, were sent to the objective 2 days after D-day for resupply of our bombardment vessels. In addition to this, Turner had loaded his Task Force 51 vessels with all they could carry of every conceivable use, including 4,800rounds of 8-inch high capacity in 8 transports; 2,800 rounds in 14 LST's; 32,000 rounds of 4.2 mortar (20 percent of which was smoke) in 10 LST's; and 180 depth charges in 2 transports. Sixteen LCM's carried by the landing ship (dock) Bellegrove were loaded with ammunition at Saipan, taken from 8 of the LST's there. Besides all this, 18 LCM's carried by the Ashland each carried 500 rounds of 5-inch .38 caliber antiaircraft, not obtained from the LST's.

Between D-minus-1 day to the end at about D-plus-35 day, the ammunition actually expended totaled 14,650 tons; 2,400 rounds of 16-inch, weighing 2,280 tons; 5,700 rounds of 14-inch, 3,640 tons; 1,400 rounds of 12-inch, 520 tons; 8-inch high capacity, 11,700 rounds, 2,020 tons; 8,400 rounds of 6-inch high capacity, 440 tons; 152,000 rounds 5-inch high capacity, 4,160 tons; 17,700 rounds 5-inch star, 300 tons; 12,000 rounds 5-inch, 270 tons; 10,000rounds 4-inch, 145tons; and 70,000 rounds 4.2 mortar, 875 tons.

Fuel and other issues were no less amazing--4,100,000 barrels of black oil, 595,000 barrels of Diesel oil, 33,775,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 6,703,000 gallons of motor gas; approximately 28,000 tons of all types of ammunition; 38 tons of clothing; more than 10,000 tons of fleet freight; more than 7,000 tons of ship supplies of rope, canvas, fenders, cleaning gear, hardware; approximately 1,000 tons of candy; toilet articles; stationery; ship's service canteen items; and approximately 14,500 tons of fresh, frozen, and dry provisions.

The weight for the larger guns does not include the weight of the propellant, and you also have to include the weight of the cartridge casings for the smaller guns, from 6 inch on down.

And of course, all of the material had to be delivered to Eniwetok Atoll, which was the staging base for the invasion by other ships, and had to be distributed once it arrived at both Eniwetok and Iwo Jima.
 
The following also comes from Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil, and gives an idea as to the size of the Service Force for the Pacific Fleet. Remember, all of these ships were dependent for their supplies on ships coming from the United States, so this only represents the direct supply force, not all of the ships in the supply pipeline. These would likely triple the number of supply ships needed, as those supply ships would be operating at slower speeds, and in convoys.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/BBBO/BBBO-2.html

A new Squadron Four, entirely different from its predecessor, was commissioned in October 1943 and sent to Funafuti in the Ellice Islands to furnish logistic support to the fleet. In February of 1944, Squadron Ten of a similar nature went to Majuro in the Marshalls, soon absorbed the Service Force until the end of the war. Just a year later--February 1945--Service Force had been assigned 1,432 vessels of all types, with 404 of them still to report; and by the end of July 1945, a few weeks before hostilities ended, it had no less than 2,930 ships, including those of Service Force Seventh Fleet, over which administrative control had been established in June.

By squadrons this astonishing total of ships was as follows: Squadron Two, 1,081 ships; Six (new), 107; Eight, 727; Ten, 609; Twelve, 39; Service Force Seventh Fleet, 367. There were 305 planes in the Utility Wing. The total of personnel was 30,369 officers and 425,945 enlisted men, or approximately one-sixth of the entire naval service at the peak of the war. Squadron Twelve, nicknamed "Harbor stretcher," had been commissioned in March 1944 for the primary purpose of increasing depths in channels and harbors where major fleet units would anchor, or where coral reefs and shallow water created serious navigational hazards., By far the largest operation Twelve undertook was at Guam.

For US Army Planning purposes, for the Pacific, a planning factor of 65 pounds per man per month was used, which did to an extent, include the aviation fuel and ordnance expended in support of the Army. Supply for the Army Air Force was more based on the number and types of planes being supported.

Edit Note: The 1959 edition of FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual-Organization, Technical,and Logistical Data, Part I -Unclassified Data, on page 305 gives 67.4 pound per man per day for the Army in the Pacific Theater, and on page 307 gives 81.14 pounds per man per day for the Army in Polar Regions. This would be Alaska, Greenland, and Iceland for the most part.

This manual can be downloaded from the Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library under Obsolete Field Manuals. That data it is based on was the operational experience of the US Army during World War 2, and to a lesser degree on the Korean War. It does use the Pentomic Army Division for its basis of planning, which must be taken into account.

See here for the download.

http://cdm16040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p4013coll9/id/523/rec/206

It should also be noted that I served in the US Army in Alaska as a supply officer, and was trained as such at Fort Lee, Virginia at the US Army Quartermaster School. I have also read the US Army official history of Quartermaster supply to the European and Pacific Theaters, as well as the more detailed studies on the Logistic support of the operations in Europe prior to and following D-Day. This is in addition to studies on the subject done at the National Archives in Washington, D. C. I have some small knowledge of the subject of logistics.
 
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FIrst of all, remember I'm an amateur, and as such more concerned on tactics than logistics, so take any comment here with a big grain of salt.

Fuel and other issues were no less amazing--4,100,000 barrels of black oil, 595,000 barrels of Diesel oil, 33,775,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, and 6,703,000 gallons of motor gas; approximately 28,000 tons of all types of ammunition; 38 tons of clothing; more than 10,000 tons of fleet freight; more than 7,000 tons of ship supplies of rope, canvas, fenders, cleaning gear, hardware; approximately 1,000 tons of candy; toilet articles; stationery; ship's service canteen items; and approximately 14,500 tons of fresh, frozen, and dry provisions.
The weight for the larger guns does not include the weight of the propellant, and you also have to include the weight of the cartridge casings for the smaller guns, from 6 inch on down.

For what I see here (the use of different units makes comparing not easy), the lion's share of supply needs is fuel an ammunition, the rest of it being "only" about 22000 tons out of over 850000 tons (unless I messed with units, off course), so meaning about 2.5% of the total supplies needed.

See that a mainly energy weapons ship will need little (if any) ammunition, and fuel can be skimmed (by slowing opperations a little). So, I guess that a fleet armed mainly with energy weapons will need only about 2.5-5% of the supply figures TimeRover so kindly provides us, even less if recycling an recovering of waste is highly efficient (something that can be expected).

In a BT/BR fleet, I also guess most of those needs (incluiding repairs, limited maintenance, etc) can be performed by the tenders themselves, that act as mobile bases, at least for their BRs and escorts (the amintenance of the Tenders themselves becoming another matter)...

As I said before, if we assume part of those supplies can be obtained from captured territory (and that needs mostly compatibility), the supply train can be quite smaller than we are used in current times.

And that's for forces on offensive, as those in defensive can rely in their bases/depots for ressupply...

And now ducking my head to receive the answers :devil:.
 
"Whatever is most useful for an engaging Traveller-themed grand strategy wargame."
 
It's one reason everyone tried to take the nuclear option, than discovered there were rather obvious additional costs to that as well, and then you need to maintain a certain critical mass to keep nuclear propulsion optional, once you decided that it wouldn't be worth it for most generic warships.

You can imagine if jump dives and hyperspace transitions can be powered by fission reactors, all the militaries would switch to that rather than fusion plants.
 
It's one reason everyone tried to take the nuclear option, than discovered there were rather obvious additional costs to that as well, and then you need to maintain a certain critical mass to keep nuclear propulsion optional, once you decided that it wouldn't be worth it for most generic warships.

You can imagine if jump dives and hyperspace transitions can be powered by fission reactors, all the militaries would switch to that rather than fusion plants.

Well, I do, but I make it have unique advantages and drawbacks, so it is a choice.

Besides, I want leaky irradiated ships out there in the Cloud.

Yes, you can go see if that Rumor is true about the treasure on the lost fleet payship from 80 years ago that you just detected, but its going to require a top flight hazrad suit.

Oh didn't pay big bucks for one of those? Perhaps a disposable robot then.

None of those either? Well, some tough decisions, it's drifting ever closer to the common fuel lanes and someone is going to salvage it....
 
the 'Lost Fleet' Series by Jack Campbell covers this well .... a rather large fleet is stuck way behind enemy lines .... with limited jump capabilities [there are 'jump gates' and you can only reach certain systems from the one you are sitting in]

they scavenge a lot and have 3 'factory ships' to makes spares and bullets
 
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