Timerover51
SOC-14 5K
I recall an account by a WW-II army captain of his experience during the war. One of the notable parts relevant to this issue was that at one point he'd been in the field and on rations for so long that his stomach could no longer tolerate regular food. He ended up in an infirmary eating pureed something-or-other for several days while he recovered. I also recall that the preference was to find some way to deliver prepared meals to the troops, with the rations intended to provide an alternative when combat circumstances made that impossible. Do you have any information on the maximum recommended time the soldiers could or were supposed to be eating field rations?
The following quote from the Quartermaster history gives the basis on which the C ration was designed. One reason for the continual work at improving the ration was that in some areas, especially the Southwest Pacific Area on New Guinea, the troop were eating C rations for far longer than anticipated. My emphasis added in the quotes.
The C ration had not been designed for continuous consumption over long periods of time. It was not to be issued for more than 72 hours and, within this limit, its three meat components were satisfactory. In actual theater operations, however, the ration was frequently used for long periods. Instances were reported of soldiers being fed the C ration for as long as 90 days.
The much improved "C-4" ration for the Korean War, with a much greater variety in the menus, was rated as acceptable for between 10 and 21 days.
Early in July an officer investigating the exceptionally bad ration supply of the 34th Infantry Regiment bivouacked at Hollandia [New Guinea] concluded that "technically all units are getting ample food" but that "actually they are not, as the ration issued has been mainly “C' ration and after several days the troops can not eat it."
In one shipment of 600,000 C rations to Biak two-thirds of the meat components consisted of corned beef hash
The two above quotes are from the QMC in the War Against Japan.
Even getting a proper balance of the "B" ration, which was the standard ration for large-scale messing in the field was not easy, as can be seen from the following quote in the QMC in the War Against Germany. This incident occurred in North Africa, but similar happening were not unusual in the Southwest Pacific Area in WW2.
The first daily train from Eastern Base Section to Bédja carried 250 tons of supplies. Within this tonnage McNamara had ordered balanced B rations for 50,000 men. When the freight train arrived, it had sixteen carloads of peanut butter, a car full of crackers, a case of grapefruit, and a sack of flour. McNamara used the incident to impress on Eastern Base Section the necessity to balance rations.
While I have not tracked down that report, if it still exists, in the Archives, I strongly suspect that the individuals in charge of loading that train got very thoroughly toasted.