Insurgencies in Traveller

[tbeard1999]

The first draft of the first part of an adventure guide for Traveller referees (much of it is a rewrite of comments made in other threads). Comments appreciated.

The small brushfire war that has sputtered off and on for several years on this frontier world has, within the last week, came suddenly alive. New ships are arriving in orbit daily, and Down Franklin Starport, for many months nearly empty, is now choked with a steady flow of marines and army troopers disgorged from busy fleet shuttles.

Yesterday Colonel Eitan Rahbaan, public relations officer for the newly formed Forty-Third (Provisional) Frontier Army explained in a press conference the reason for the sudden build-up and the general plan of action. The continuing protracted nature of the insurgency action on Efate had been a mounting drain on manpower resources, and had begun to sap the morale of indigenous troops. As a result, the decision was made to concentrate maximum effort to end the conflict in the shortest possible time.

Maximum effort is the only way to describe the amazing build-up that has taken place literally overnight. Already official circulars list eleven brigade-sized Imperial formations deployed on-planet, in addition to four brigades that apparently were here previously. Even now, large transports are off-loading the heavy vehicles of the well-equipped and hard-hitting 317st Air-Mechanized Brigade, and rumor has it that the build-up is still not complete.

This reporter admits to being overwhelmed by this truly impressive show of force. One can only wonder how long the stubborn but indifferently equipped insurgents on this world can hold out against the ultra-modern juggernaut Army Vice-Marshal Lord Calavan, commander of the 43rd Provisional Army, is preparing to unleash on it? Days? Hours? (JTAS news releases 1107).

This quote shows that insurgencies have always been a part of the official Traveller universe. Unfortunately, there have been few resources for the Traveller referee to use in designing adventures set in insurgencies. This dearth of useful reference material has, in my experience, resulted in overworked Traveller referees looking to Hollywood depictions of Vietnam as a guide. Unfortunately, these movies are often thinly disguised political screeds that grossly distort the reality of the Vietnam War. In addition, the (real) Vietnam War may not be a very useful guide for what insurgencies would look like in the far future. Also, campaigns may be colored by the absurd religion belief many folks have that insurgencies somehow “cannot be defeated”. This belief is flatly contradicted by history. Some insurgencies have been defeated, and some haven’t.

So this series of articles attempts to provide the Traveller referee with far more useful guidance than Platoon, Apocalypse Now, or self-serving claims by witless 1960s antiwar activists. (That said, the imagery of such films is very useful for Traveller insurgencies set in jungle environments. Just beware of cliches.).

The classic formulation of how an insurgency should develop can be found in Mao’s theory of guerilla warfare in On Guerilla Warfare. While his divisions are somewhat artificial, the pattern is useful for a Traveller referee because it breaks an insurgency into discrete stages:

In Phase 1, the insurgents attack government elements such as police, ministries and the like. This may include vulnerable wealthy citizens who tend to support the government. The insurgents gain the population’s support by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the government and distributing propaganda. Also, the insurgent tactics begin goading the government into repressive countermeasures that will alienate the people. Typical strategies will involve provoking government troops, then exploiting the media to show only the government’s apparently unprovoked violence.

This stage will be characterized by small scale operations—terrorist attacks, raids and atrocities on outlying citizens who support the government (like large ranches in the Outback, if appropriate)—and belated government countermeasures, including attacks on suspected insurgents, attacks on suspected insurgent supporters and the beginnings of a “hearts and minds” campaigns.

Phase 2 begins when the insurgents have developed a considerable cadre of forces and after the government’s hold on the people weakens. In Phase 2, insurgents escalate attacks against the government’s most critical institutions. This includes military forces and critical institutions like courts, public utilities, etc. The goal at this stage is to completely undermine public support for the government and the military. In this stage, some institutions may be completely compromised (universities and media seem particularly vulnerable to being compromised).

As part of this phase, the insurgents will attempt to neutralize “hearts and minds” campaigns (which begin in earnest in Phase 2). This usually involves intimidation and violence against the population, since the insurgents are almost never able to match the government in humanitarian programs.

Referees portraying insurgent operations in Phases 1 and 2 should remember Mao's famous dictum: "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue."

Phase 3 begins when the government can no longer control large areas of the country (and when the insurgents have built up a respectable conventional force). At this point, conventional forces attempt to seize cities, overthrow the government, and take control of the country. The Tet Offensive is a good example of an unsuccessful Phase 3.

Note that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either direction. Also, the phases may not be uniform throughout the country. If the insurgents are defeated in Phase 3, for instance, they may shift to Phase 2 (or even Phase 1 if the defeat was severe enough).

Actual conflicts can be fitted to this template. Vietnam showed this pattern—1-2-3-2-defeat of government. Phase 3 occurred in the Tet Offensive, which was a disastrous military defeat for the Viet Cong. Had the US press not so effectively intervened for the Viet Cong, the Viet Cong would have probably dropped down to Phase 1. The defeat of South Vietnam was a conventional military defeat by an external power, so it falls outside classical Maoist theory in my opinion.

The earlier French experience in Vietnam pretty much went Phase1-2-3 (Dien Bien Phu).

Iraq seems to have shown this pattern—Phase 1-2-1-insurgent defeat.

As an aside, it is important to note that Mao's classical formulation of guerilla war didn't really deal with external military support for the insurgents (other than as a source of supply). This is a major reason that I believe the Vietnam War falls outside classical theory--the North Vietnamese were an external allied force (although they adopted insurgent tactics once they were in-country).

In any case, a Traveller referee can identify which phase the insurgency is in and design adventures accordingly. He can also develop a story arc in which the insurgency develops from phase 1 to phase 3. (As an aside, insurgencies tend to take a long time to make this progression; campaigns will need to compress the time frame or have time pass faster than in typical campaigns).

Effect of Advanced Technology

Insurgencies have existed since the beginning of time, but in my opinion, the general trend is for insurgencies to be less effective as technology— particularly reconnaissance tech—improves. This has compelling implications for the Traveller universe, where technology has advanced (at least) hundreds of years past the early 21st century.

Insurgents are seldom able to stand toe to toe with regular troops without suffering grossly disproportionate casualties. Whether we're talking about Vietnam in 1967, Somalia in 1993 or Iraq in 2007, the insurgents suffer 10-50 casualties for every enemy casualty they suffer. At this loss rate, even the largest insurgencies will lose if they constantly seek standup battles with the government forces. Indeed, a key strategy for the government will be to force standup fights wherever possible.

But despite overwhelming conventional superiority, the government's major challenge is to find the insurgents and hit them. A related challenge is to detect and avoid insurgent ambushes.

Both of these challenges are addressed by better reconnaissance capabilities. And the trend over the last 50 years is clear—reconnaissance capabilities are advancing to a remarkable degree. This inevitably favors the regular forces.

Technological advances in gravitics will provide government forces with far more capable air mobility--grav AFVs are really just helicopters with effectively unlimited endurance and far better armor.

I'm not convinced that improvements in weaponry will overly benefit government forces. The fact is that even at TL8, government forces can pretty much pulverize insurgents, if they can find them.

I doubt that Traveller battledress will make as much of a difference (especially since CT battledress can be fairly easily defeated by gauss rifles, which are the common infantry rifles of that TL). This does raise a key point, however. For an insurgency to be plausible, it must be able to obtain reasonably modern small arms capable of defeating normal battlefield armor.

And things like armed RPVs are highly effective against insurgents, but would be nearly useless against regular troops (who have far more elaborate jamming and antiaircraft assets).

Of course, I doubt that technology alone will end insurgent warfare. But I think that technology disproportionately favors the regular troops over the insurgents.
(continued)

 

[tbeard1999]

(continued)
Effect of Training

Technology can also have another benefit--improving the training of regular forces.

On the battlefield, training can have a far greater impact on the combat performance of regulars vs insurgents than equipment normally does. Consider the casualties in the 1993 battle of Mogadishu—the most reliable estimates are that the Americans (elite rangers and professional soldiers) lost 18 and the Somali irregulars lost 700...a fantastic disparity. Yet one that would be very familiar to Islamist savages in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003-2007.

As armies get more technologically advanced, I think that they will tend to become more professional. In addition, advanced technology allows armies to hone their fighting skills through the use of highly realistic simulation tech. This will generally favor the regulars as it dramatically increases the training level of the regulars.

Vietnam—Not Necessarily Applicable

Because the Vietnam War is a defining event of the Boomer generation, it’s the most covered insurgency in the popular media. However, I do not think that Vietnam represents an accurate model for a Traveller insurgency for the following reasons:

1. Vietnam was actually not an insurgency. Well, to be accurate, it wasn’t just an insurgency. Rather, it was a unique blend of insurgency and large scale conventional operations. Examples of the latter include any number of American operations, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, the Tet Offensive (and siege of Khe Sahn), numerous battalion and brigade sized operations, and of course, the fall of South Vietnam, which was a classic conventional campaign. Compare this to (say) Iraq, where insurgents seldom launch operations of more than a few dozen men.

2. I think that the US falure in Vietnam was due to a perfect storm of circumstances that are unlikely to appear regularly in the future—especially in the Imperium:

a. The insurgents were supplied by the Chinese and Soviets. Their source of supply was immune from US attack. As far as I know, no insurgencies have failed when this was the case. Therefore, I consider this to be the most important metric for determining the success of an insurgency. See the Soviet failure in Afghanistan for supporting evidence and the British success in Malaysia (where the insurgents were effectively isolated from their sources of supply). The Imperium has the ability to completely isolate systems from resupply by unfriendly governments, so they won’t typically face this situation.

b. President Johnson made a cynical and unprecedented decision not to deploy the force necessary to win, and then decided not to withdraw. This guaranteed a strategic stalemate. Johnson’s subsequent humiliation serves as an effective warning for future politicians. And in any case, Johnson’s calculations were motivated by the desire to convince the voters that his social welfare policies were more important than some distant war. An autocratic regime like the Imperium would not need to make such calculations.

c. Predictably, the US people tired of that stalemate and questioned whether the cost was worth the purported benefit. This will, in my opinion, inevitably happen in a democracy. Citizens of autocracies will have far less ability to influence policy like this.

d. The US media managed to convert the Tet Offensive—a decisive Viet Cong defeat (even they thought so) —into a US defeat. They were unable to repeat this feat with Iraq, which leads me to conclude that this was a one-time occurrence (though I predict they’ll keep trying). I think that the degree of media culpability in the US defeat has been overstated (although I think it’s highly probative of the systemic anti-US bias in the US media). However, the media has been highly effective in pushing the false “Vietnam was doomed to fail” meme. The war, like most wars, was winnable. The US simply failed to do what was necessary to do so. The influence of the media is likely to be far less in the Imperium for the simple reason that communication is limited to the speed of travel.

So I’d caution Traveller referees from using Vietnam—especially the ridiculous media version of Vietnam in movies like Platoon, Apocalypse Now, etc., as a model for future insurgencies. Malaysia, Iraq and Afghanistan are far more relevant to what insurgencies would like in the Imperium. And in particular, don’t overrate the ability of the media to lose insurgencies. They’ve really only done it once (and had lots of help).

Many of the minor factors that influenced the US failure in Vietnam are also likely to be inapplicable to a Traveller insurgency:

1. Rules of Engagement. US forces in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan have had limits on their ability to engage the enemy. Nowhere were these rules of engagement more onerous than in Vietnam. But onerous Rules of Engagement are relevant only to governments that actually care about things like collateral damage. Historically, rules of engagement that benefit insurgents have only been seriously used by democratic nations (and of course, only a minority of them). The Imperium is an autocracy, not a democracy. Therefore, many of things that influence wars against Democracies—especially things that turn on public opinion—are far less relevant to the Third Imperium.

2. Insurgent Savagery. Some folks assert that insurgent savagery will be so frightening that the regular forces somehow can’t win. But the historical evidence is that savagery is not a particularly effective tactic most of the time, even when used against democracies. Nazi and Japanese savagery during WWII didn’t scare the Allies into surrendering. Soviet savagery didn’t prevent the formation of NATO and the stationing of significant forces in Western Europe to defend against Soviet aggression. And the Islamists are just the latest in a long line of gibbering, delusional morons who are finding out the Hard Way that the soft Western democracies have teeth. It’s one thing to luridly gibber on about blood, slaughtering infidels, etc. It’s quite another when a professional soldier comes for your scalp. I think that most folks are angered by barbarism and are not generally inclined to appease the savages. The exception seems to be among certain classes of elected leaders. From Neville Chamberlain on, appeasement seems to have a certain attraction. There is little evidence IMHO to indicate that this is a widely shared view among the voters. The fact that appeasement minded politicians go to great lengths to conceal their intentions supports my position. I don’t expect this to change in the future. For that matter, I don’t even expect to be an issue except when the savages are fighting opponents with consensual governance. Neither Germany nor Russia was intimidated by the remarkable savagery of the other during WWII, for instance. An autocratic state like the Imperium would react similarly, I think.

3. Asymmetric Warfare. I really think that all the talk of how effective “asymmetric warfare” is misses a key point. The very limited evidence we have of asymmetric warfare actually working involves democracies. The Imperium is not a democracy. Popular opinion—which is what most asymmetric threats are aimed at—is simply not important in an autocracy. Now, I would agree that weapons of mass destruction (particularly nukes) give insurgents a theoretical capability to inflict carnage WAY out of proportion to their numbers. But in my mind, this simply means that any successful future state will have to become ferocious in their intolerance for insurgents and far more proactive than they are today. Governments that provide the necessary aid and support for insurgents will be punished far more directly and brutally than they have been in the last 30 years.

(Continued)

 

[tbeard1999]

(continued)

4. Media Manipulation. My argument that the media will be relatively ineffective rests on far more than an ability to suppress the media. The absence of immediate media communications, rather than any government suppressive ability, is the main reason I think that the 3I media will be unable to be used by insurgents they way they are in the 20th and 21st centuries. In addition, there’s the basic fact that the 3I, however well intentioned, is an autocratic state. Popular opinion must be far less important in such states than in Western liberal democracies.

Consider the greatest insurgent media victory of the last 100 years—the Tet Offensive. This operation was a military disaster that essentially destroyed the Viet Cong. Yet, US news media reports transmitted during the offensive successfully portrayed the battle to the US people as a US defeat (much to the amazement of the North Vietnamese, who admit that they believed that they had suffered a major defeat).

But would the same result occur if the press had to wait weeks or months to get the story out? I seriously doubt it. The news would be stale by the time it reached a significant percentage of the populace and even if the populace got inflamed, how could it meaningfully hold the Imperium’s leadership accountable?

Also, insurgent media manipulation relies heavily on self-criticism (and self loathing, seems to me) by the population of the invading power. This phenomenon is a very recent development and (so far) is confined to liberal Western democracies. I see no reason to impute this trait to an autocratic society like the 3rd Imperium.

Of course, this does not mean that insurgencies are impossible in the 3rd Imperium. It just means that they probably won’t be fought along the same lines as (say) Vietnam. Referees who want plausible insurgencies will have to create an environment where the Imperium’s superior firepower and technology (particularly in reconnaissance assets) are neutralized to a significant degree.

Myself, I favor settings in which the occupying power is severely restricted in resources. Like France in Vietnam, for some reason they just can’t deploy overwhelming assets. This is the typical setup in my Commonwealth campaign—most brushfire wars are fought by company troops and sepoy auxiliaries, rather than by Commonwealth Marines. (And since the Commonwealth is a democracy, the media does have some influence and can occasionally inflame public sentiment against a particular war).

An interesting model for how the Imperium might fight an insurgency might be the Soviets in Afghanistan. Of course, you have to correct for circumstances. In particular, a key reason the insurgency was successful was that they were armed by the US and the Soviets could not directly interdict or threaten that supply chain. (The same was true of the US in Vietnam—it couldn’t interdict or threaten the Chinese and Soviet supply lines that kept the North Vietnamese armed). Such a condition would be far harder to justify, given the naval superiority of the Imperium. Unlike 20th century Terran insurgencies, there are no overland lines of supply. But the brutality of the Soviet occupation (which was working until the US started supplying advanced weapons to the insurgents) is a very good analog for how an autocracy like the Imperium might deal with an insurgency.

 

[epicenter00]

A couple of observations regarding your thread, tbeard1999 and some concepts that GMs reading this thread might want to consider as well:

• The Media Has An Opinion I've had a rather unique life experience of being raised in a politically conservative area and attending a liberal university. The lesson I've come away with after being bombarded by the smug "we're-certain-we're-right" attitudes in both areas is that the media is bad when it says what you don't want to hear (seriously, the media is either full of "bleeding hearts, liberals, and terrorists" or it's "corporate media controlled by religious fundamentalists and multinational corporations"). One thing GMs should consider is that the media isn't inherently anti-war or pro-war in any regime or any conflict, neither in the present nor in the future. However, they do have an agenda of their own and can be swayed by outside forces (usually money). It's important for GMs to decide if which side the media's stronger voices will favor - there will always be dissenting outlets but which side has more credibility amongst those who matter is important.
  
• Exactly When Do Imperial Forces Commit? I think it's inherently wrong to believe that the 3I is anything like the modern United States (or any other existing Western government) - this is easy to do because that's where most of us live, but it's simply untrue. The stated mandate of the 3I is that it controls the space between worlds while its reasons for intervening on the planets themselves seems a lot more nebulous. I think at various times various writers of Traveller scenarios have regarded the 3I has much more interventionist on planetary affairs than you'd be led to believe by strictly reading source material. Arguments on if such a government could actually work aside, it seems to me that the 3I's government would actually avoid interventions in planetary affairs - one of the tenets of the 3I is that its planetside presence is pretty limited. One of the questions of profit-conscious nobles and indeed the Emperor would be to figure out at what point it's time to send in Imperial forces or aid - and when to pull it out. This dovetails into my next observation:
  
• It's Not A Democracy and Insurgents Aren't Necessarily Stupid True, the 3I is not a democracy. However, saying that the 3I is immune to media warfare because of this I think is in danger of thinking in a different kind of box from the one you're going on about (regarding the danger of Viet Nam being the model for all insurgencies, which I agree with). Insurgencies, just like the government forces, will abandon tactics that don't work (or won't adopt them in the first place) and will develop new tactics that do work. For instance, if the average Imperial Subject (even en masse) has no influence on the Imperium's government - something I doubt from official GDW materials, though the arguement can be made that GDW's writers are showing their own democratic assumptions in assuming the nobles would care what people think - then the insurgents primary goal would be somehow make the intervention unpopular amongst those whose voices do matter, namely nobility and megacorporations (who often are described as being pretty much the same thing in the 3I). How insurgents do this probably varies, but the successful insurgencies all have to do this. One way might be to convince the local nobility that insurgent victory is inevitable unless massive intervention is undertaken (read: expensive) and that would be pointless because even if the insurgents take over, they'll still be willing to provide the things the Imperium is interested in (e.g. "Even if we win we'll still do business with you"). Another way would simply be for the insurgents to threaten whatever the Imperium is interested in (a method most famously used in sci-literature when Paul Mua'dib threatened to destroy the Spice in Arrakis unless the Spacing Guild backed off). Last but not least is to have nobles on your side as well - nobles willing to petition / wheel-and-deal / etc to powerful Imperial factions to bring about a favorable conclusion to the insurgency.

 

[kafka47]

Insurgency on one world can be tolerated for a very long time by the Imperium unless there is something valuable dirtside. Few insurgents can survive the Capital Flu (named after the Moscow flu that many Comintern CP leaders seemed to suffered right after WW2). Failing that they can always buy off the leadership of a Coup d'etait with a few noble titles and lucrantive offers of offworld luxury items imported by a friendly megacorp at a fraction of the cost. In short, there are challenges to Imperial rule but the Imperium often takes a long term view. If there are divisions to exploit, it will exploit them in the name of divide & rule. If there are quellings then they need to be made king. If the insurgents are unreasonable, find - locate and destroy...the Imperium would make present day Chechnia look like a vacation camp. The higher the TL the more difficult this makes it...but the more inscentative such worlds have to be part of the Imperium anyhow. It was only when a dangerous idea eminated from the top Assassination of the Emperor was the Imperium ever in peril.

 

[Garyius2003]

Just for discussion sake...

What about the US in the post-Spanish American War PI? I know some people divide the occupation fight into two halfs, the revolt and the Moro war.

In both, though, the US used the carrot and stick. Work with us, and go to one of the schools that we shipped 500 teachers in to staff, get a farm carved out of the Church holdings, become a government employee yourself. Be on the other side, and we kill you and your family, destroy your village, defile your body with pig blood.

Add TL-13 or 14 grav bots watching and listening while hovering at or 600 meters, and the ability to fly battledress troops and support vehicles in to respond at some high speed within seconds, and being the enemy of the 3I looks a lot harder than being their friend.

 

[tbeard1999]

A couple of observations regarding your thread, tbeard1999 and some concepts that GMs reading this thread might want to consider as well:

• The Media Has An Opinion I've had a rather unique life experience of being raised in a politically conservative area and attending a liberal university.

• 
  
  Given the fact that an overwhelming percentage of university academics self-identify as Democrats and that they contribute to liberal causes in even higher proportions, I doubt that your experience was particularly unique, unfortunately.
  
  

  The lesson I've come away with after being bombarded by the smug "we're-certain-we're-right" attitudes in both areas is that the media is bad when it says what you don't want to hear (seriously, the media is either full of "bleeding hearts, liberals, and terrorists" or it's "corporate media controlled by religious fundamentalists and multinational corporations"). One thing GMs should consider is that the media isn't inherently anti-war or pro-war in any regime or any conflict, neither in the present nor in the future.

  
  I never intended to suggest that the media was inherently anti-war. My comments were in the context of Vietnam, a conflict in which the press clearly favored the insurgents. I only caution that even if the press is pro-insurgency, it cannot necessarily give the insurgents as much assistance as it did in Vietnam. Note their conspicuous failure to lose Iraq.
  
  Now, as an aside, since US journalists overwhelmingly self identify as Democrats and contribute to liberal causes by ratios of 7-1 (Fox News) to 12-1 (NBC/NYT), it seems self-evident to me that the media is strongly biased to the left ideologically. And while it's possible that they can remain objective, I see no reason to assume that they will do so. Of course, this doesn't mean that future media folks will be lefties...
  
  But my point remains, I think -- the media's role in Vietnam is unlikely to be replicated in a Traveller insurgency for numerous reasons, which I listed.
  
  

  It's Not A Democracy and Insurgents Aren't Necessarily Stupid True, the 3I is not a democracy. However, saying that the 3I is immune to media warfare because of this I think is in danger of thinking in a different kind of box from the one you're going on about (regarding the danger of Viet Nam being the model for all insurgencies, which I agree with).

  
  Well, I've done far more than simply assert that the 3I is not a democracy. I've identified the specific reasons why I think that the media's ability to arouse opposition to a war is far less than in 1960s America. If you have any specific disagreements, I'd like to hear them.
  
  Of course, the media's ability to influence the outcome of an insurgency could be just as great, if the government is a planetary government and conditions permit (relatively affluent liberal democracy, legal protections for freedom of the press, bored celebrities wanting to be relevant, etc.) But I just can't see that it would be so in the case of the 3I.
  
  

  Insurgencies, just like the government forces, will abandon tactics that don't work (or won't adopt them in the first place) and will develop new tactics that do work.

  
  Again, I never said that either insurgencies or governments are stupid. It is, however, certainly possible (indeed, probable in my opinion) that one side will be better than the other. It's also possible (again, probable IMHO) that one side will be luckier. Or one side may simply misjudge the situation worse than the other side does. (Something we gamers should always be mindful of is that in the Real World, folks rarely know what the rules of the game are...unlike us gamers.)
  
  My only further comment is for referees to avoid the silly cliche that "insurgencies cannot be beaten". They can, and they have.
  
  If the objective is to have an engaging Traveller campaign, then both sides need to be seen as able to win. Otherwise, there's no real drama.

 

[tbeard1999]

Just for discussion sake...

What about the US in the post-Spanish American War PI? I know some people divide the occupation fight into two halfs, the revolt and the Moro war. In both, though, the US used the carrot and stick. Work with us, and go to one of the schools that we shipped 500 teachers in to staff, get a farm carved out of the Church holdings, become a government employee yourself. Be on the other side, and we kill you and your family, destroy your village, defile your body with pig blood.

I submit that these are classic examples of how a "hearts and minds" campaign might be used by the government in an insurgency. Intimidation would not necessarily be solely a tool of insurgents.

Add TL-13 or 14 grav bots watching and listening while hovering at or 600 meters, and the ability to fly battledress troops and support vehicles in to respond at some high speed within seconds, and being the enemy of the 3I looks a lot harder than being their friend.

I agree. This is why (IMHO) I think that referees who want plausible insurgencies need to think hard about the Imperium's advantages and how they could be nullified.

The easiest is to do what others have suggested and simply avoid committing large Imperial forces. More challenging, but far more interesting IMHO, would be a campaign in which the Imperium did commit major forces, yet still is in danger of losing.

One solution would be to create a planetary environment which somehow nullifies the Imperial advantages. (Dune, one of my favorite novels, did this). Somehow, the environment would have to severely interfere with both aerial and satellite reconnaisance. It would help if the environment somehow interfered with grav vehicles. Now *that* would be interesting. A TL15 army that can't use its grav vehicles would definitely be in an unfamiliar situation...

As an example, here's how it was done in Dune.

1. Imperial reconnaisance advantages were nullified by (a) a climate that was brutal on machinery and that had storms that made flights more perilous than normal; (2) a Spcing Guild that controlled satellite placement and that was bribed by the insurgents to keep prices for satellites prohibitively high.

2. Body shield (the primary military advantage of advanced armies) were nullified by the fact that they attracted sandworms (and the static electricity in dust storms shorted them out).

 

[Garyius2003]

Maybe go the other way, strictly urban?

Weapons and equipment are shipped in in pieces or made in small high tech workshops after hours.

The equipment is smuggled and used all at once in a string of 'big showy' attacks. The terrs move to pre-planned positions outside camera range and assemble weapons, and attack at the same time throwing prismatic smoke to cover their pull out. Weapons are either assembled near powerlines or old fashioned slug throwers are used. Weapons are left where they can be found but booby trapped.

Take a page from the weather underground in America (late 1960s-70s) which only existed because a good chunk of the leadership was from upper class families and escaped police interaction by being too highly placed to be searched and able to set up safe houses in upper class housing areas.

Of course, the number of troops with decent tech is key. No revolt is going to fly, city or not, if the 3I has a bunch of TL-13 or 14 troops such that they can put a fire team with full sensors on every block.

Too many ways to move under cover in urban areas and too much interference means hovering watcher bots don’t work. Responding battledress troops have to air dismount from grav APCs and fly down to the street, where one terr with a FGMP can take out two and maybe run away through basements (or die).

It would take a lot of money, but either the weather underground model or the zhos will provide that. A lot of money will also provide the incentive to smuggle the parts.

A tough part would be hardwired camera/sound sensors----maybe start a youth movement that smashes those wherever they are found? It would take a special kind of dark 3I to kill or imprison an 8 year old for that.

 

[Marchand]

This is a really interesting discussion - one of those that gets me itching to write scenarios.

Three thoughts:

Well, I've done far more than simply assert that the 3I is not a democracy. I've identified the specific reasons why I think that the media's ability to arouse opposition to a war is far less than in 1960s America. If you have any specific disagreements, I'd like to hear them.

1) Authoritarian regimes can actually be more sensitive to popular opinion and prone to populist policies than democracies. Without wanting to offend anyone, I point to Russia of today, or rather 2004. The government tried to reform pensions (never popular in any country). This provoked some small demonstrations. The government didn't dare crack down, though - they reversed those reforms PDQ. They can crack down effectively on the pro-democracy opposition because, like it or lump it, not many people over there really seem to give a damn about rights and freedoms. Not the way they do about their pay / benefits cheques. If people in the Imperium cared about the insurgency for some reason, the government could feel pressured to act.

Although I guess the Imperium could effectively censor newsflow from the theatre... (hmm - adventure idea right there. Can the party get news of an Imperial atrocity back to their do-gooding patrons? Twist: the footage is actually of natives massacring some Imperial settlers, which the patrons, who are a front for an arms-manufacturing megacorp, want to use to whip up war fervour... heh heh heh...)

2) James McPherson's US Civil War history "Battle Cry of Freedom" compares and contrasts the Thirteen Colonies' revolt against Britain with the South's revolt against the US. One of the key factors he identifies in explaining why the US won and the South lost is that the US had effective outside help (France, Spain and the Netherlands - big naval powers at the time - all supported the US I believe). The South got no outside aid, as it failed to achieve recognition of the CSA by Britain or France, despite the best efforts of Southern agents. There is more to it than that, but it's consistent with the view that outside help is key.

3) Again on the evil-twist theme: imagine the party successfully help the brave, noble rebels overthrow the corrupt oligarchy... a few trade runs later, they loop back to the same world. Only to find the new lot are now just as bad as the old.

 

[tbeard1999]

Maybe go the other way, strictly urban?

Weapons and equipment are shipped in in pieces or made in small high tech workshops after hours.

The equipment is smuggled and used all at once in a string of 'big showy' attacks. The terrs move to pre-planned positions outside camera range and assemble weapons, and attack at the same time throwing prismatic smoke to cover their pull out. Weapons are either assembled near powerlines or old fashioned slug throwers are used. Weapons are left where they can be found but booby trapped.

Take a page from the weather underground in America (late 1960s-70s) ...

An interesting idea. However, note that "mere" terrorism is not the same as a full scale insurgency. How could an insurgent group mass the forces necessary in an urban setting for Phase 2 and Phase 3 operations?

 

[epicenter00]

An interesting idea. However, note that "mere" terrorism is not the same as a full scale insurgency. How could an insurgent group mass the forces necessary in an urban setting for Phase 2 and Phase 3 operations?

I think it can be posited that the phase system of "traditional" insurgency may be outdated.

Many other governments have successfully used tactics similar to the US in Iraq to win over insurgencies (the Russians in Chechnya especially come to mind) after Viet Nam from the lessons learned analyzing the American failure there. In addition, the "Cold War" era insurgency we're all familiar with essentially needs a powerful external agency to fund, train, and encourage agitators to become violent - a situation that may not be realistic in all cases in the 3I.

It may indeed be that the "countryside model" of insurgency funded by an outside source may be as outdated as lining up in huge lines in open fields and exchanging volleys. While this probably isn't completely the case, I don't think any examination insurgencies in Traveller would be complete without examining how insurgencies would deal when the other side learns techniques and develops technologies to neutralize some or most of their advantages.

 

[BlackBat242]

However, in many respects, the Iraq model does fit the model of successful counter-insurgency operations from earlier in the 20th century... Malaysia (outside aid from Indonesia), Peru (outside aid from Cuba, China, etc) and others.

Whether the insurgency is purely home-grown or outside-supported, the techniques for combating them are pretty much the same (with the addition of border security efforts for O-S versions).

For a good overview of time-proven, successful techniques, see the Small Wars Manual (a United States Marine Corps manual on tactics and strategies for engaging in certain types of military operations).

The USMC tried to get Gen. Westmoreland and others to conduct operations in Vietnam according to its principles from 1965 (when the US mission changed from "advise and support" to "engage and combat") on, but only got some of its procedures implemented after ~1970.

free PDF download here: http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/sw_manual.asp

Also, this 1996 study:
Accession Number : ADA312699

Title : The Small Wars Manual and Military Operations Other Than War.

Descriptive Note : Master's thesis, 2 Aug 95-7 Jun 96,

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s) : McMonagle, Richard C.

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA312699

This study examines the applicability of the United States Marine Corps' small wars doctrine in current Military Operations Other Than War.

Between 1898 and 1934, the Marine Corps was employed extensively in fighting the nation's small wars. These small wars included long-term occupations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua and interventions in a number of other countries. From these experiences, the Marine Corps developed, during the 1920s and 1930s, a small wars doctrine, which was published in 1940 in its final form as the Small Wars Manual.

This study examines the conditions under which the Marine Corps was employed in small wars, and how from this experience developed a doctrine for fighting small wars. The study then develops three thematic criteria for the examination of a small war, and, then, applies these criteria to a case study of Operation Uphold Democracy, the 1994 intervention in Haiti.

The principle conclusion of this study is that the Small Wars Manual defines a time-proven formula for the conduct of small wars or Military Operations Other Than War. When read within the context of the small wars era, the Small Wars Manual provides valuable insights into these types of operations.

 

[samuelvss]

A couple of thoughts to add.

The application of force is only part of counter-insurgency (COIN's the new acronym), as has been very well-discussed in this thread. The insurgent's target is not the trooper in battle dress, but the school-teacher, the robot technician, and the politician. To attack these, he does not need gauss rifles, but molotov cocktails. Indeed, what is to keep him from the starport, if he intends to kill only with a leather thong?

Technology is actually, according to Galula, a disadvantage in COIN; more support troops who are targets.

A source of outside supply and support of the populace are absolute essentials. An "island" makes for the perfect COIN campaign.

 

[tbeard1999]

I think it can be posited that the phase system of "traditional" insurgency may be outdated.

It can be posited, but I don't think that the evidence supports such a conclusion. As noted previously, most post-Vietnam insurgencies fit the template fairly well.

In any case, the three phase construct is useful for a Traveller referee because it provides a line of development for the insurgency so that he can structure his campaign logically.

Many other governments have successfully used tactics similar to the US in Iraq to win over insurgencies (the Russians in Chechnya especially come to mind) after Viet Nam from the lessons learned analyzing the American failure there. In addition, the "Cold War" era insurgency we're all familiar with essentially needs a powerful external agency to fund, train, and encourage agitators to become violent - a situation that may not be realistic in all cases in the 3I.

Agreed, of course, with the last part. However, the fact that a number of insurgencies have failed does not necessarily mean that the 3 phase model is obsolete. The model is merely a way of explaining the "natural course" of an insurgency, whether it succeeds or fails.

It may indeed be that the "countryside model" of insurgency funded by an outside source may be as outdated as lining up in huge lines in open fields and exchanging volleys.

Actually, the Maoist model does *not* assume external sources of supply. Mao developed his guerilla warfare model in the 1930s during the Japanese invasion of China, *before* the US began to provide supplies. (And in any case, the lion's share of US supplies went to the Nationalists, rather than the Communists). Mao flatly states that the Japanese (read "government" for other scenarios) will provide supplies for the insurgents.

While this probably isn't completely the case, I don't think any examination insurgencies in Traveller would be complete without examining how insurgencies would deal when the other side learns techniques and develops technologies to neutralize some or most of their advantages.

This is the case in any analysis of warfare. Obviously, each side will attempt to counter the other and the iterations are important. But merely re-stating this doesn't really get us very far. What specific countermeasures do you think need to be dealt with by Traveller-era insurgencies (that I haven't already mentioned, such as superior reconnaisance, airmobility, hearts and minds campaigns, etc.)?

 

[Garyius2003]

An interesting idea. However, note that "mere" terrorism is not the same as a full scale insurgency. How could an insurgent group mass the forces necessary in an urban setting for Phase 2 and Phase 3 operations?

Overeaction by plantary/3I forces. They (whichever terr they) ambush the deputy trade commissioner and his party, they leave their equipment powered up in an out building and E&E, with one staybehind with an FGMP next to a power main who pops a few troopers who unload from the grav APC in the air.

He escapes or dies, the responding troops lose three other troopers in the boobytrapped outbuilding.

The 3I overacts and does some not so nice things. One trooper kills a little kid smashing a sensor position. They rough up some women while tossing houses. Bam. A few of those and then they only need a supply of monkey model weapons and officers/cell leaders to get phase two started.

 

[tbeard1999]

The USMC tried to get Gen. Westmoreland and others to conduct operations in Vietnam according to its principles from 1965 (when the US mission changed from "advise and support" to "engage and combat") on, but only got some of its procedures implemented after ~1970.

The problem I have with this oft-stated thesis is that Vietnam was *not* a "small war" as projected by the Small Wars manual. Rather, as I've noted before, it was a blend of "small war" and large scale conventional war, involving formations as large as divisions on the NVA/VC side and brigades on the US/ARVN side.

Forces optimized for a small war style insurgency would have been annihilated in the major battles of the war.

And I personally doubt that *any* reasonable counterinsurgency strategy could have prevailed in Vietnam so long as (a) the Soviets were free to pour tremendous quantities of material into the NVA and VC without any fear of reprisals from the US; and (b) the US was unwilling to invade and conquer North Vietnam.

So...and it's just my opinion...the common assertion that there was a "better" way to fight the Vietnam War (whether using the Marine Corps doctrine or the PROVN report) is nothing more than 20:20 hindsight. And not supported by the facts IMHO.

In any case, the Marines currently accept Mao's three phase model (going so far as to publish a Marine officer's translation of "On Guerilla Warfare").

Traveller referees should consider this argument--there is no such thing as a perfect counter to an insurgency. Nor is there a perfect strategy that will ensure the success of an insurgency. Instead, there are numerous factors that tend to make it more or less likely that a particular insurgency will succeed. And the actual outcome will usually depend on decisions made by a relatively small number of commanders, luck and external factors.

Merely outlining a theory of how an insurgency war will develop does *not* equal an assertion that an insurgency will succeed. Indeed, Mao's insurgency against the Japanese did not succeed. He never had a successful Phase 3 against them. He did, however, have one against the Nationalists. So did the Vietminh against the French and the Afghans against the Soviets. (As noted before, South Vietnam fell to a conventional, combined arms external assault, so the VC never had a successful Phase 3 there).

 

[tbeard1999]

Overeaction by plantary/3I forces. They (whichever terr they) ambush the deputy trade commissioner and his party, they leave their equipment powered up in an out building and E&E, with one staybehind with an FGMP next to a power main who pops a few troopers who unload from the grav APC in the air.

He escapes or dies, the responding troops lose three other troopers in the boobytrapped outbuilding.

The 3I overacts and does some not so nice things. One trooper kills a little kid smashing a sensor position. They rough up some women while tossing houses. Bam. A few of those and then they only need a supply of monkey model weapons and officers/cell leaders to get phase two started.

Well, one insurgent goal, especially in Phase 1, is to encourage overreactions like this. But the insurgents have to find a way that they can organize large forces for the attacks in Phase 2 and the conquest in Phase 3.

<scratches head> Maybe it *could* be done in an urban environment. I've never considered the possibility, frankly, since most historical models involved rural guerilla campaigns. Iraq might offer some guidance there. At various points, the insurgents took over various cities. However, they were driven out with relative ease by Coalition forces. You'd have to explain why this wouldn't happen (assuming you want an insurgency "with legs").

Still, that's why re referees get paid the big bucks.

 

[samuelvss]

Overeaction by plantary/3I forces. They (whichever terr they) ambush the deputy trade commissioner and his party, they leave their equipment powered up in an out building and E&E, with one staybehind with an FGMP next to a power main who pops a few troopers who unload from the grav APC in the air.

He escapes or dies, the responding troops lose three other troopers in the boobytrapped outbuilding.

The 3I overacts and does some not so nice things. One trooper kills a little kid smashing a sensor position. They rough up some women while tossing houses. Bam. A few of those and then they only need a supply of monkey model weapons and officers/cell leaders to get phase two started.

Indeed!

Think about heavily armed societies. The militias in Moghadishu were able to create an effective levee en mass within the city, based upon local general the resentment of U.S. high-handedness, all within an afternoon.

The phase 1,2 & 3 model is useful, but not authoritative. Remember, Westy used that model, but he believed they were in phase 3, because Regiments of NVA were coming down the Ho Chi Mihn trail. Well, some were moving that way, but the VC were still very much in phase 2, poised to move into phase 3. Abrams won the rest of the phase 2 fight, even though we forfieted in the 9th inning by going home. Then '73-'75, phase 3 came rolling down, even though phase 2 was lost by the VC.

Even the most useful model is not the truth.

 

[tbeard1999]

Indeed!

Think about heavily armed societies. The militias in Moghadishu were able to create an effective levee en mass within the city, based upon local general the resentment of U.S. high-handedness, all within an afternoon.

While I think that Blackhawk Down can be turned into a great Traveller scenario (done it myself), I don't know how applicable that situation is to an insurgency.

For starters, there was no insurgency per se in Somalia, since there was no government. The US and Allied forces were not there to prop up any particular regime. Originally, they were there to distribute food and prevent mass starvation. Mission creep got them half-arsed into "nation building" (which, best I can figure, means whatever the author opposes).

And this was only a single battle, that was shaped by very unusual facts. While Aidid's militia did overwhelm a relatively tiny American force, it suffered horrendous casualties in doing so. Aidid expected the Americans to return the next day and wipe his forces out. In essence, this trick worked once; I seriously doubt it could have worked again. The Americans would have also significantly changed their approach the second time around. Remember--the Americans did not expect a large pitched battle. They were executing a precision raid and their forces were optimized for that mission. Had they considered a pitched fight to be possible, they probably would not have attempted the mission. If they had, the forces would have been much larger, better equipped and reserves would have been ready to go.

I never considered the effect that a heavily armed society might have on an insurgency, but I agree with you that it could be significant. Insurgents might be more dangerous, but an armed populace might be a lot harder for insurgents to intimidate.

The phase 1,2 & 3 model is useful, but not authoritative. Remember, Westy used that model, but he believed they were in phase 3, because Regiments of NVA were coming down the Ho Chi Mihn trail. Well, some were moving that way, but the VC were still very much in phase 2, poised to move into phase 3. Abrams won the rest of the phase 2 fight, even though we forfieted in the 9th inning by going home. Then '73-'75, phase 3 came rolling down, even though phase 2 was lost by the VC.

A couple of comments. First, different areas and groups can be in different phases (and almost certainly will be).

Second, the only phase 3 in the US stage of the Vietnam War was the Tet Offensive, which was a crushing military defeat for the insurgents and pushed them back to Phase 2. The fall of South Vietnam was due to a large, conventional combined arms invasion from another country, not the mass insurgent uprising (ala Tet) contemplated by Mao in Phase 3. Now, for the record, I think that the VC could probably have pulled off a Phase 3 victory in the late 1970s. But the fall of South Vietnam was a conventional invasion, not a phase of an insurgency. Essentially, the conventional invasion "interrupted" the insurgency (which was in the late stages of Phase 2) and defeated the government.

Even the most useful model is not the truth.

Agreed. As I noted in another post, describing the course that an insurgency will probably take does not equal an argument that the insurgency will win. Implicit in the model is that the insurgency is successful at each Phase and can therefore transition to the next phase. And I'd note that Mao acknowledged that defeat in a Phase can cause a retraction to a previous phase.

And variations on the classic model are possible--and have happened. Vietnam itself was a variation -- a hybrid of a Maoist insurgency and a conventional war.

But the framework posited by Mao is logical, well-supported by historical evidence and very helpful to a Traveller referee.