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traveller military orginization

Ranger training has definitely become more common. but actual Ranger Batalions are still few and far between. I have never thought of the Marines, as a whole to be SOF. (Though Marines think they are elite as do the members of the 82nd Airborne.) THough I do consider Force Recon to be SOF.

I am not saying there aren't other countries using British and or other European models out there. But as a large cohesive, modern force from which to draw history and tradition, there aren't as many choices. While there are a few Colonial hold overs there are also quite a few countries that are adopting the US model. (Which in all honesty draws alot from the lessons of both the WWII German and the Post WWII Soviet Model.)

As for Efreytor (Actually pronounced Yefreytor.) we were told it is a rank like PFC. Sort of Senior Private. In the Soviet Model, which is a conscripted force, the Sergeants are picked out of the conscripts for various reasons, usually as part of a hey you roster, and sent to do their first six months at a "Sergeant" School. The First Six months is Initial training for all the COnscripts, though most are trained at their units. At the end of the six months these graduates of Sergeant School are sent to their units with ranks ranging from Junior Sergeant to Senior Sergeant. (In most cases Starshina is actually someone that has voluntarily reenlisted at the end of their two years.) The NCO Corps is
generally inexperienced and less motivated so aren't trusted to make decisions or display initiative. THe Platoon is the absolute lowest level anything is done in the old Soviet Army. (Though most things were done at the Batalion Level.) Even SPETZNATZ NCOs are generally first termers.

Praporschiki (THeir Warant Officers.) Were enlisted that reenlist for certain hard to fill specialities, like Truck Driver. They aren't nearly in the same league, (in general) as the US equivalent Warant Officer, which except for Helicopter Pilots and Gunners, are long service specialists and experts in their field. Soviet NCOs and Warants are not equivalent to US NCOs and Warants.


Originally posted by Aramis:
Technically, a Ranger Unit is a SOF, since there are non-ranger LtInf units, rangers have special traaining required to be assigned in unit, and that training is (supposedly) not routinely available and is (supposedly) harder than MOS trainging.

Special Operations Forces are not of need Elite; by many measures, the entire USMC is a SOF... I disagree, but hey...
<SNIP!>

And I was thinking, and I recalled that not all soviet GF used Caporal... I think the other term is Efreytor, but I am not certain...
 
Really, according to soviet sources (both translated and not), the corporal/efreytor is a 1st term NCO. He's picked from amongst his basic trainees as a potential leader, then if he's good during initial training, goes off to a 2-3 month course similar to US Army BNOC. If these guys reenlist, they usually get sent to Sgt School formally. First enlistement durng most of the soviet period was 2 years conscript, 6 or 8 year reenlistment
Almost all higher NCO's are 1st renlistees (bringing them to 6 or 8 years service), and Starshina's are second reenlistment.

Most praporshiki are, according to soviet material, chosen from the top 3-5 % of both the yefreytor/corporal's school, and from the NCO course... and from there are trained further.

Non-yefretor Renelistees usually become yefretors upon reenlisting.

BTW, I tend to transliterate by sound... Most of the ranks I have seen in russian, not english.

This pattern, however, dates back to the tsarist period...

(My BA degree paper was on the retsarification of the soviet army by Trotskii.)
 
Which sources are you reading? Of the non-classified sources I have found that Inside The Soviet Army being the best for that. In the Soviet Army there is not alot of promotions going on during the 2 years of Conscription. You are either a Sergeant before you join your unit or you aren't.
Their Sergeant school is 6 months long and only accessable, basically when you report for duty. (In otherwords it is your first 6 months of service or it doesn't happen.) Everything I have read, and heard, says that everything below Starshina is 1st term enlistment. (Matter of fact after the first 6 months of enlistment.)

My expertise on the subject is 9 years active duty as an US Army Interrogator with Russian and Czech designators.
(I used to read Pravda without a dictionary.
) I am not very good at transliterating Russian because I want it to look like Czech.



Originally posted by Aramis:
Really, according to soviet sources (both translated and not), the corporal/efreytor is a 1st term NCO. He's picked from amongst his basic trainees as a potential leader, then if he's good during initial training, goes off to a 2-3 month course similar to US Army BNOC. If these guys reenlist, they usually get sent to Sgt School formally. First enlistement durng most of the soviet period was 2 years conscript, 6 or 8 year reenlistment
Almost all higher NCO's are 1st renlistees (bringing them to 6 or 8 years service), and Starshina's are second reenlistment.

Most praporshiki are, according to soviet material, chosen from the top 3-5 % of both the yefreytor/corporal's school, and from the NCO course... and from there are trained further.

Non-yefretor Renelistees usually become yefretors upon reenlisting.

BTW, I tend to transliterate by sound... Most of the ranks I have seen in russian, not english.

This pattern, however, dates back to the tsarist period...

(My BA degree paper was on the retsarification of the soviet army by Trotskii.)
 
Originally posted by Bhoins:
Which sources are you reading? Of the non-classified sources I have found that Inside The Soviet Army being the best for that. In the Soviet Army there is not alot of promotions going on during the 2 years of Conscription. You are either a Sergeant before you join your unit or you aren't.
Their Sergeant school is 6 months long and only accessable, basically when you report for duty. (In otherwords it is your first 6 months of service or it doesn't happen.) Everything I have read, and heard, says that everything below Starshina is 1st term enlistment. (Matter of fact after the first 6 months of enlistment.)

My expertise on the subject is 9 years active duty as an US Army Interrogator with Russian and Czech designators.
(I used to read Pravda without a dictionary.
) I am not very good at transliterating Russian because I want it to look like Czech.



</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Aramis:
Really, according to soviet sources (both translated and not), the corporal/efreytor is a 1st term NCO. He's picked from amongst his basic trainees as a potential leader, then if he's good during initial training, goes off to a 2-3 month course similar to US Army BNOC. If these guys reenlist, they usually get sent to Sgt School formally. First enlistement durng most of the soviet period was 2 years conscript, 6 or 8 year reenlistment
Almost all higher NCO's are 1st renlistees (bringing them to 6 or 8 years service), and Starshina's are second reenlistment.

Most praporshiki are, according to soviet material, chosen from the top 3-5 % of both the yefreytor/corporal's school, and from the NCO course... and from there are trained further.

Non-yefretor Renelistees usually become yefretors upon reenlisting.

BTW, I tend to transliterate by sound... Most of the ranks I have seen in russian, not english.

This pattern, however, dates back to the tsarist period...

(My BA degree paper was on the retsarification of the soviet army by Trotskii.)
</font>[/QUOTE]1950's and 1970's field manuals, including uniform manuals, and a training manual for soldiers (1960's era). Amee v Sovetski Soyuz Socialisti Republiki. discussions with approximately 20 defectors, including 1 Starshi praporshik, 2 captains, and one spetnatz sergeant. All covers the period pre 1980. (IE, still Sovient, and not post perestroika, nor fall of the USSR.

Also, numerous historical texts upon the tsarist period.

Modern (post 1980) useage may be different; I've heard from recent immagrants that the yefreytor stage is somewhat ignored these days... then again, so is retention.

Ee, ya tozheh vilayu chitayuskoi v «Pravda», eelee v lyeti 1990-1992...

I suspect a lot of changes occured during the 80's... they were coming.

The one constant is that the junior NCO's were 1st term soldiers. during the tsarist period, One either made yefreytor and promoted during basic training, or stayed a privat/soldat/armeyat for the entire 10 year enlistment... Unless one was the son of a noble, which guaranteed sergeantry. If one graduated the military schools, one went to field as an officer.
 
If you are talking about Rank. Not quite. Warant officers and officers are the same. Enlisted is a little different.

US Army
E-1 Private
E-2 Private-2
E-3 Private First Class
E-4 Corporal/Specialist
E-5 Sergeant
E-6 Staff Sergeant
E-7 Sergeant First Class
E-8 First Sergeant/Master Sergeant
E-9 Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant Major

USMC
E-1 Private
E-2 Private First Class
E-3 Lance Corporal
E-4 Corporal
E-5 Sergeant
E-6 Staff Sergeant
E-7 Gunnery Sergeant
E-8 First Sergeant/Master Gunnery Sergeant
E-9 Sergeant Major

Now in those cases when two names for a rank are listed the first is for one with a Leadership position. (For example a First Sergeant is the Company Senior NCO and the Company Commander's right hand. the other is for an enlisted person not in a leadership role.(A company may have several E-8s but only one will be the Company First Sergeant.) Technically a Company can have several Master Sergeants and several Sergeants Major but will still have only one First Sergeant. (Possible, for example, in a Headquarters company for a unit at Brigade level or higher.)

In the Army you address anyone, Sergeant and above, except for First Sergeants and Sergeants Major as Sergeant. In the USMC you address them by their full rank, though Gunnery Sergeant and Master Gunnery Sergeant can sometimes, unofficially, be addressed as Gunney. (Similar to calling the Captain of a ship Skipper.)

Confused yet? Wait until we add the Air Force and the Navy.
(And the Navy Officer ranks aren't even close to the other three.)

I had to know all this better than most because I did two tours in Monterey, CA which serves all four branches of the service. (Knowing what the individual uniform regs were was even more fun.
)

Originally posted by Vargas:
Do the US Marines use the same basic structure as the US Army or something different?
 
Actually I meant in terms of unit structure (same number of indiviudals in a squad, platoon, etc. as Army or different).
 
Originally posted by Vargas:
Actually I meant in terms of unit structure (same number of indiviudals in a squad, platoon, etc. as Army or different).
Actually, no, but then again the Army doesn't even use the same unit structure. Light Infantry and Mech Infantry are totally different. There was (still is I think) even a significant difference between Light and Airborne Infantry at the Battalion level.

When I was a Platoon Leader in the 82d Abn (a long time ago) the differences between Army and Marines were pretty significant on paper. The Army had a squad of two 4 man fire teams while the Marines had squads of three 4 man fire teams. Just before I got to "Division" the Army had switched over from 11 man squads of two 5 man fire teams.

I've read the MC manuals on how the 3 fire team squad is supposed to work, and I still don't get it. My guess is that in the field it doesn't. In the 82d we always had to strip out our weapons squad to fill out our rifle squads (since we had two 2 man Dragon teams in the weapons squad that we never used in training the Dragon teams were on paper only). My suspicion is that the Marines used their third fire team the same way, using its personel to ensure they always had two full strength fire teams in every squad all the time.

At the Battalion level the 82d has an extra Company in each Battalion. That Company is a vehicle mounted Anti-Tank Company that was starting to get used as a Light Cav troop to provide forward and flank screens to the Battalion.
 
Originally posted by Vargas:
Actually I meant in terms of unit structure (same number of indiviudals in a squad, platoon, etc. as Army or different).
Ranger has it right. There is one thing to consider. When I was Infantry I was in the Indiana Army National Guard. The 76th Infantry Brigade (Seperate) is based on the 101st model. Virtually no vehicles. Transport was to be accomplished by the Helicopters of the 101st. (To which we were supposed to be affiliated.) Apparently we had even less vehicles than a Brigade of the 82nd.

In the US Military you will find that the structure changes depending on the role and equipment of the unit. Now the 82nd and the 101st are special cases. The US Army Infantry has basically 7 structures. Light Infantry, Mech Infantry, Airborne, Air Assault, Ranger, Armored Cav, and Non-Armored Cav (Or however the Second Cav Regiment is designated.) For a while there was an eighth, the 9th Infantry Division was "Light Motorized."

Most of the structure was designed around vehicles and transport. For example a Mech Squad is the size of what fits in a Bradley (Or 8 guys plus crew.) An Air Assault Squad is based on what fits in a Blackhawk. Cav has the weirdest mixes as they are integrated combined arms at a much lower level. (But usually infantry in a Cav unit are 4 man teams + Bradley Cav Vehicle.)

Now Ranger Bns and Airborne units are the only real Infantry where the size of the squad isn't dictated by the size of the transport, or should be. But I would guess it is based in a way on what fits in a transport aircraft.

Since the Army has so many choices, comparing it to the Marines, well they have three different kinds of ground transport and all of them have different capacity. (The LVTP-7 (or whatever the current version of the tracked vehicle is,), the LAV-25 and neat hovercraft. They also use lots of Helicopters. (In differing sizes, from the Blackhawk and UH-1 all the way up to the CH-53.)

Combine all that and you have a manual for what is supposed to be there. However there are always shortfalls in manpower, in some cases, and excess manpower in other cases.

Coincidentally the Soviet Army used 10 man squads plus two man vehicle crews. (Because that is what fit in the BMP and the BTR Carriers.)

To extrapolate to Traveller. A Mech unit is going to have its infantry sized to fit the Transport (IE the Astrin). The Imperial Marines will fit their transport.

Which is why IMTU an Imperial Marine Squad is 8 (Fits in a Type-T), Platoon 35 (Fits in a Kinunir and neatly is four squads of 8 plus 3 man Platoon HQ.), and a Company is 150 (Fits in an AHL and is neatly 4 platoons and a 10 man HQ element.).

As you design your Traveller military remember the Infantry Axioms. Everyone has a buddy. (Two equals one one equals none.) Most fireteams are going to consist of two two man buddy teams. Most Infantry squads will have some kind of firepower multiplier. (Squad Automatic Weapon equivalent (or IMTU Imperial Marine Fireteams will have an FGMP and 3 Gauss Rifles.))

Most Infantry Platoons will have a Weapons Squad, to provide a base of fire so the Platoon can maneuver, and to provide the platoon with anti-armor capability. (IMTU the Imperial Marines Weapon Squad is the reverse of the standard squad, two teams of 3 FGMP and one Gauss Rifle) (The Anti-Armor part isn't as important if the unit is mechanized and the vehicles are designed to be the Anti-Armor capability.)

Now the Soviet model didn't use a weapons platoon. The Soviet Army didn't maneuver below the Company level. (And there is a Weapons Squad equivalent at Company level.)
 
APCs vs. IFVs

Organizing Mech Infantry is significantly affected by the transport. The first question to ask is what is the purpose of the transport. The two basic options are Armored Personel Carriers (APC) and Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV).

The APC is designed as a "battlefield taxi" to protect the infantry up to the attack position (usually the last covered and concealed spot short of the objective). The infantry then dismounts and proceeds to the objective on foot with the APCs providing a base of fire. The APC isn't designed to face heavy weapons fire, it's intended to protect the infantry from indirect fire on their way to the attack position.

The Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) is designed to carry the infantry onto the objective where the infantry dismounts to secure the objective. The IFV was a Soviet innovation (the BMP), but the US copied it with the Bradley.

The US Army used a 3 + 1 platoon structure for both light and mech infantry from roughtly the late 50s up until the early 90s. The 3 were rifle squads the 1 was a weapons squad to provide heavy weapons support. With the advent of the M113 APC each squad rode in 1 APC. With the advent of the Bradley the problem became carrying all the dismounts. The first thing the Army did was drop the weapons squads because the IFV had a chain gun, a TOW launcher, and a 7.62 coax machine gun. There didn't seem to be much need for dismounts with M60 machine guns and Dragons with all the firepower on the Bradley. That still didn't solve the problem, so the number of dismounts was cut to 2 squads. The Bradley platoons were organized into 2 sections of 2 squads each, one mounted (4 Bradleys in 2 squads of 2 vehicles) and one dismounted (2 x 9 man rifle squads). Each dismout squad works habitually with the same vehicle squad.

This solved the carring capacity problem, but leaves the Bradley company with only 6 squads of dismounts and the battalion with only 24 squads (each Mech battalion has 4 line companies though I heard rumors that they were talking about cutting them back to 3). Given that each battalion usually has to give up one company to cross attach with a Tank battalion the normal infantry company in the field only has 18 squads of dismounted infantry. In contrast, a light infantry battalion has 27 squads of infantry plus 9 weapons squads.

So, organic transport has it's advantages, but you end up loosing rifle squads in the process.
 
Of course, all this is based on the US military model. No reason why you couldn't come up with a model for Traveller militaries that's totally original (or at least follows one of the two classic militry org lines)
 
To answer Ranger's comment about 3 fire team squads in the USMC, they do work. I spent the 70's and the 80's in the USMC and the 3 fire team squad worked well. It allowed the Squadleader to manuver with 2 teams while one formed a base of fire for an assault.
 
Any organizational structure can and will work if
1) Adequate training is provided
2) the leadership ratio is low enough
3) a clear chain of command is present
4) a clear understanding of authority is established.

The leadership ratio is where things get interesting. Most medaevil armies have leadership ratios in common infantry of 25:1 Troops to leaders, or worse; noble units often were at ratios of 15:1 for cavalry.... Modern organizations try to keep the numbers down to 10:1 or so. In 12-16 man squads, this is usually done by forming teams.

Also, modern organizations practice several types of drill, plus field exercises and realistic simulation (to various degrees).

Ideally, a unit leader should have direct command over 2-4 subunits... most people have trouble coordinating larger numbers of subunits without grouping. (The exceptions make excellent armor and air command officers.)

Also, leaders, be they NCO, warrant, officer, brevet, or chieftain, need to know the boundaries of command. Both how far he can push his troops, subleaders, and himself, and what types of orders higher authority will permit without repercussions. Also useful is how laterally his/her/its authority will be accepted.

Leaders also need to trust their chain of command. Not just know it, but trust it. Trust that there are valid reasons for orders given. Trust that fair treatment exists for command decisions which are not made with full information available. Trust that the officially permitted authority is the same as the actually permitted authority. (This last is two edged. If the unofficial authority exceeds the official authority, we wind up with Mi Lai, contragate, and Dachau. If the official authority exceeds the unofficial permitted authority, leaders walk a fine line between initiative and being cashiered. )

The chain of command also needs to maintain a sense of supervision. (Rome really started having problems when the legions were deployed so far that their patrons & senatorial supervision could not go out and back to rome in a single marching season reliably.)

If you can balance the above factors, and keep communication lines flowing, any ordering works.

A case in point: The Soviet Red Army during the first couple years. By decree, ranks had been abolished. Leaders were either elected or assigned (varies by specific month, unit, and military district; pure chaos). Political officers were assigned. rudimentary regimental structures were maintained, and military districts were kept. THese units were essentially armed mobs. They fought that way, too. Those units which reverted to clear sub-leaders and chains of command (IE, had PO's who were smart enough to let the former NCO now-leader-by-election/appointment/fate run the unit...)were much more successful than the "Brotherhood of soldiers" the party aporatshiks demanded. By 1927, experience had taught Trotskii, and Trotskii had secured permission, that units needd hierarchies of leaders, and clear authority chains to survive combat chaos.

Additionally, the soviet model of the Early days showed that elected leaders often were elected for the wrong skills. Not bad for garrison units, lousy for combat effectives. Trotskii then went, and recreated the same model that was used by the Tsarist army... it worked, it was familiar to the cadre he had to work with (Mostly former Tsarist NCO's), and the insignia were still well known... or more correctly, close enough that most russians already recognized the various lower ranks insignia, and the officer insignia followed the same pattern, but with communist rather than tsarist decorative patterns.

The officer ranks are delineated in a Prikaz (lit: Instruction. Fig: Proclimation) by Peter the Great... the same pattern (with various title nudges) is still used by Russian and other former soviet Armies.

And despite the soviet satellite army failures in real combat (certain units during Korea; the Balkans, certain NVA units), when well trained and disciplined troops use the soviet tactics, they can be terrifyingly effective; these techniques, according to OpFor officers, are rather terrain dependant, however. (see also published reports by NBC, CBS, USArPAO on the effectiveness of the USArmy OpFor... Propaganda... but propaganda supported by personal experiences of many soldiers I've talked to who had to train against them....)
 
Originally posted by PBI:
Of course, all this is based on the US military model. No reason why you couldn't come up with a model for Traveller militaries that's totally original (or at least follows one of the two classic militry org lines)
In one case I did come up with a model for an Imperial Marine ship's troops company which was unfortunately lost in a hard disk crash. It was modeled after the USMC MEU(SOC) organization.
 
I personally don't see the problem with 3 fireteam squads. I mean one team can't provide a base of fire, under most combat situations where you are fairly close to the enemy, but two can lay down fire while one maneuvers. And it might actually work better that way since you are laying down fire, two people shooting for everyone moving. (Using that would slow you down but make your moving units safer. And that would, at platoon level make for a hell of a weapons squad. You could lay down enough fire with the weapons squad to move a large platoon.

Originally posted by jwcarroll60:
To answer Ranger's comment about 3 fire team squads in the USMC, they do work. I spent the 70's and the 80's in the USMC and the 3 fire team squad worked well. It allowed the Squadleader to manuver with 2 teams while one formed a base of fire for an assault.
 
Originally posted by Ranger:
APCs vs. IFVs
The US Army used a 3 + 1 platoon structure for both light and mech infantry from roughtly the late 50s up until the early 90s. The 3 were rifle squads the 1 was a weapons squad to provide heavy weapons support. With the advent of the M113 APC each squad rode in 1 APC. With the advent of the Bradley the problem became carrying all the dismounts. The first thing the Army did was drop the weapons squads because the IFV had a chain gun, a TOW launcher, and a 7.62 coax machine gun. There didn't seem to be much need for dismounts with M60 machine guns and Dragons with all the firepower on the Bradley. That still didn't solve the problem, so the number of dismounts was cut to 2 squads. The Bradley platoons were organized into 2 sections of 2 squads each, one mounted (4 Bradleys in 2 squads of 2 vehicles) and one dismounted (2 x 9 man rifle squads). Each dismout squad works habitually with the same vehicle squad.

This solved the carring capacity problem, but leaves the Bradley company with only 6 squads of dismounts and the battalion with only 24 squads (each Mech battalion has 4 line companies though I heard rumors that they were talking about cutting them back to 3). Given that each battalion usually has to give up one company to cross attach with a Tank battalion the normal infantry company in the field only has 18 squads of dismounted infantry. In contrast, a light infantry battalion has 27 squads of infantry plus 9 weapons squads.
Actually cutting the number of dismounts in the mid 90s sounds like a compromise for political purposes. During that time frame, early to mid 90s, the US Army was drastically downsized. (It happens to be when the Army paid me $25,000 to get out.) Organizing that way means you cut your manpower requirements without ticking off significant Senators and Congress Critters because you are still building the same number of vehicles in their districts. In a Tactical sense it makes little sense for an Infantry company to have no Infantry. If you want Armor then use an Armor Company. If you want Armor with a little infantry then use Cavalry. When you need Infantry then you really need Infantry. A Bradley is a slightly up armored slightly more heavily armed battle taxi. It is not a Tank, it is not designed to get in up close and personal with the enemy. (Which is what the Infantry's job is.) It is not designed to shrug off more than small arms fire. You can still penetrate one with a .50 Cal Machinegun. And LAWs, and their equivalent, while being unable to penetrate a Tank are quite effective against a Bradley. I can see, with Bradleys, losing the Weapon squad. I can't see having only two squads per platoon. You would now need a Company to do what a Platoon previously could do. Or even what a Light Infantry Platoon can do.

Attaching an Infantry Platoon to a Tank Company no longer makes sense either. Neither does Attaching Infantry Companies to Armor Batalions. (In the 80s-early 90s Common practice was to have them integrated in combat. For example, we went to NTC with two Batalions that were - an Armor Company and + an Infantry Company and one that was minus two Infantry Companies and plus 2 Armor Companies. On paper one was an Infantry Batalion and the other two were Armored Batalions. In reality, on the ground, there was no difference between TF 5/16th Infantry and TF 4/37th Armor. (1st Infantry Division (Mech) which was actually organized, in the late 80s, as an Armored Division, with two Armored Brigades and one Mech Brigade (And the Mech Brigade was deployed forward in Germany while we were at Ft. Riley, KS.)

So, organic transport has it's advantages, but you end up loosing rifle squads in the process.
There is no reason to lose dismounts simply by becoming Mechanized. You just design your vehicles better. The LAV25 is every bit as capable as the M-2 Bradley. It is faster on the road and has the same off road capability. It has a little less armor, so it doesn't have the ability to only get penetrated by a .50 from the front only 30% of the time. (When you are talking about machineguns firing 150 rounds per minute does it really matter if you are penetrated 30% of the time vs 50% of the time?) The LAV25 has larger troop capacity, can be driven up the ramp onto a C-5 (Which the Bradley can't do.) has a lower/smaller profile and the same guns. The only thing an LAV25 doesn't have that a Bradley has is a TOW missile launcher. Since, in desert Storm, they found out that the 25mm can penetrate the front of a T72 do you really need a TOW? (YOu can always use the ITV hammerhead on an LAV25 like the Marines do, or go back to carrying Dragons.) Oh and LAV 25s can do river crossings with little preperation. Bradleys need bridges. Hummers cross rivers better than Bradleys do. But the Military doesn't actually control its own procurement, at least in the US. If they did we probably wouldn't have the Bradley, or the F-16. When the people designing the weapons listen to the people actually using them, which does happen occasionally, you get truly world beating systems. (The M1A2 Tank, the Cobra, the Apache, the Mk23 SOCOM, the F-15 and the soon to be deployed, with a little luck, F-22.)
 
First you have Doctrine, then you develop force structure. In a real world sense, this is how you get the Bradley. The US Army adopted AirLand Battle doctrine, and the Bradley and the Bradley battalion was developed to support that doctrinal decision. In Traveller terms, you need to decide what a given force's doctrin is going to be, then design a force structure that fits that doctrine.

A second issue is military sociology. I notice a lot of people design infantry units with three or four of the same weapon in a fire team (a lot of armies do it that way too). If you buy into S.L.A. Marshall's view that means that most of your soldiers will not actively participate in combat. The reason the US Army give every member of a fire team a different weapon is to make them feel their individual participation in combat in necessary because they bring a unique element of combat power to the battle. My way of translating this into Traveller terms (if you are using Striker) is to only roll once to hit for each weapons type in the fire team. For each additional weapon in the team you get a +1 to the roll, but you don't get three rolls for three of the same weapon.
 
Originally posted by Bhoins:
I personally don't see the problem with 3 fireteam squads. I mean one team can't provide a base of fire, under most combat situations where you are fairly close to the enemy, but two can lay down fire while one maneuvers. And it might actually work better that way since you are laying down fire, two people shooting for everyone moving. (Using that would slow you down but make your moving units safer. And that would, at platoon level make for a hell of a weapons squad. You could lay down enough fire with the weapons squad to move a large platoon.
Recent USMC propaganda released via Television shows marines training in 3 teams of 4... A moves, B & C cover; next B Moves, A&C cover. Next, C moves while A&B cover.
 
Originally posted by Aramis:
</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Bhoins:
I personally don't see the problem with 3 fireteam squads. I mean one team can't provide a base of fire, under most combat situations where you are fairly close to the enemy, but two can lay down fire while one maneuvers. And it might actually work better that way since you are laying down fire, two people shooting for everyone moving. (Using that would slow you down but make your moving units safer. And that would, at platoon level make for a hell of a weapons squad. You could lay down enough fire with the weapons squad to move a large platoon.
Recent USMC propaganda released via Television shows marines training in 3 teams of 4... A moves, B & C cover; next B Moves, A&C cover. Next, C moves while A&B cover. </font>[/QUOTE]Makes sense to me. When maneuvering a company generally two platoons fire while one moves.
 
Well I can see there has been much debate over heavy and light Infantry organization. LOL Having spent all my time in the 75th Rangers and Airborne Infantry I do admit that I am partial to the light structure.

That aside I want to discuss my "pet" project of the Zhodani/Sword Worlds Forces. (You can surmise that my favorite JTAS was the one with the Zhodani Commando and Light Infantry Battalion TO&Es.) So I have been looking at the modern Soviet/French models. As well as the WWII British and German Models for unit composition. My failure is the fusion of the technology tree (from Striker and Mercenary CT Books)with the TO&E. For example I have ended up with really heavy artillery parks (plasma/Fusion guns, Meson Artillery and etc). I often have to sit back and think about the destructive firepower that just one TL12-14 infantryman can carry. Often I use the Starship Troopers measureing stick of one "[armored Infantryman can wipe out a platoon of modern tanks(my paraphrase)]" I have found the Soviet Division model helpful with the Zhodani, and the soviet rocket battalion is a cool concept that I am trying to translate in the CT.

Currnetly I am toying the the model of the 5th Light Division from Rommel's DAK for a TL 11 Sword Worlds Light Armored Division.

The inspiriation that I believe is one that points the way is the US/NATO embracing of C7I command and control. SATCOM and various other tech advances in commo, control (blue force tracker), the digital battlefield, heck even orbital artillery are things I am still mulling over. My reading on this has drawn me to the stryker brigades in the US Army for some TO&E ideas. Also I am wrestling with the idea is a brigade or division in Traveller a complete package with complete supporting elements? Can it control its own orbital space? Questions still to ponder over.

Anyway cheers,

Spiff
 
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