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Throw in the fact that the piece looks like an MG42, and the Congressional disease NMH/NIH (not made here/not invented here), and the desire to 'pass the pork' to their constituents, and you can see why the Ameli wasn't considered. In fact I'm amazed that the Minimi (M249 SAW) was even adopted. Belgian? Do they even have an army? (General at Ordnance Board asks, scratching his head)
 
Nothing wrong with the Minimi/M249. But the ones in US service now need to be replaced.

One major candidate is the Mk 46, a modified para minimi. Others are a belt-fed M16 and the Ultramax from Singapore.

I am afraid the Ameli is a non-starter. The US won't issue a SAW with a 1200 rpm cyclic rate, and I have heard the Ameli doesn't handle sand well.
 
Originally posted by Uncle Bob:
One major candidate is the Mk 46, a modified para minimi. Others are a belt-fed M16 and the Ultramax from Singapore.
I hope M-61 belt fed isn't the Shrike converstion. It looks to be a decent system but the people building are either incompetatnt or crooks. They've been takeing people's money for the last 5 years and so far as I know they still haven't delivered any.

I am afraid the Ameli is a non-starter. The US won't issue a SAW with a 1200 rpm cyclic rate, and I have heard the Ameli doesn't handle sand well.
That's new to me, and to The Mexican army. They selected the Ameli because it performed will in the sand test (among other reasons). And you'd think the US would be more receptive to a high cyclic rate MG after being on the receiving end of the MG-42. Still, one can always put in the reducer kit (different buffer and bolt) and get 800rpm.
 
Originally posted by Corejob:

That's new to me, and to The Mexican army. They selected the Ameli because it performed will in the sand test (among other reasons). And you'd think the US would be more receptive to a high cyclic rate MG after being on the receiving end of the MG-42. Still, one can always put in the reducer kit (different buffer and bolt) and get 800rpm.
The M-60 saga suggests that the US Army is allergic to high rates of fire - they had the opportunity to have a 1200rpm GPMG and managed a not terribly good 600-odd rpm gun.

Of course we used (and use) British built FN MAGs, so when we could have bought MG3s, so it's not just the US Army that doesn't like 1200rpm guns. In fact only the Germans and Yugoslavs seems to have a real passion for them.
 
Think like a grunt, you know the guy who may get stuck carrying all that ammo into combat; higher rate of fire means more ammo used= more weight for me to carry. Now think like an accountant, higher rate of fire = more chance of rounds missing the target = waste of supplies = more money spent per casualty inflicted = lower cost efficiency. :confused: :(
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The burp gun was intimidating to the Allied GIs, but it was indeed more psychological than physical. Other armies didn't feel that higher rates of fire were more effective at hitting stuff.
 
Originally posted by Rupert:
Of course we used (and use) British built FN MAGs, so when we could have bought MG3s, so it's not just the US Army that doesn't like 1200rpm guns. In fact only the Germans and Yugoslavs seems to have a real passion for them.
It is particularly curious when one notes that research carried out by the US indicates that high ROF machineguns are more effective in producing casualties. The MG-42 had it's fearsome reputation for a reason. However, if you look at the design specs for the M-60 (which cam about around the same time as the M-14) Col. Studler and Dr. Carten were not about to let facts derived from scientific research interfere with deeply held (but false) conviction. 'If the facts don't support the theory get new facts.'

The primary consideration of the M-60 was it's ability to provide suppressive fire, and not actually hurt anyone. This was the principle reason for the low rate of fire. Of course the effectiveness of suppressive fire is much harder (if not impossible) to quantify than hit probability on actual targets. The ideal rate of fire was based on older water-cooled machineguns, whose ROF was thought to be close to 'ideal' - never mind that the ROF of the older machineguns was set to a completely arbitrary number, going back to Maxim, whose gun had a max rate of fire of 666 round per minute for reasons ahving nothing to do with battlefield effectiveness.

It is further worth noting that the US, to this very day, considers the MG a support weapon. The Germans (rightly) realized that the MG is the principle killer in the infantry squad/platoon and built their infantry units around the MG.
 
Originally posted by jwcarroll60:
Think like a grunt, you know the guy who may get stuck carrying all that ammo into combat; higher rate of fire means more ammo used= more weight for me to carry. Now think like an accountant, higher rate of fire = more chance of rounds missing the target = waste of supplies = more money spent per casualty inflicted = lower cost efficiency. :confused: :(
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But the accountant would be wrong.

Presuming you actually aim the MG before firing, A higher rate of fire *increases* the hit probability - i.e. higher ROF = more casualties.
 
Originally posted by Rupert:
The M-60 saga suggests that the US Army is allergic to high rates of fire - they had the opportunity to have a 1200rpm GPMG and managed a not terribly good 600-odd rpm gun.
Only the US Ordnance department could take ideas from the best of the GPMGs out there and create an abortion like the M-60. I for one am not sorry to see it go.

Of course we used (and use) British built FN MAGs, so when we could have bought MG3s, so it's not just the US Army that doesn't like 1200rpm guns.
A few others use some kind of MG-42 derivative. The Spanish and Mexico, for example. It is however curious how the Belgians have managed to build such a reputation as weapopns makers when their military's performance has been so marginal in the last 150 years. And in truth, even some of the famous FN guns has proven less that perfect in real battle. The Israelis had a less than ideal experience with the FN-FAL. True the desert is a harsh environment. But most of the FAL reputation comes from armies that don't fight wars (or only very limited ones). Mind you, I like the FAL and consider it a great rifle. But it is really not battle proven.

I wonder why the West hasn't paid more attention to Russian weapons. These tend to be simple, reliable and most have been in service long enough to have see real action. I wonder how the FN MAG compares to the PKM in terms of cost, reliability and durability.
 
Originally posted by Straybow:
The burp gun was intimidating to the Allied GIs, but it was indeed more psychological than physical. Other armies didn't feel that higher rates of fire were more effective at hitting stuff.
On the contrary, the MG-42 was one of the most effective weapons the Germans fielded in terms of casualties produced - so much so that for the most part it counterbalanced the fact that most German infantry were equiped with bolt action rifles. German infantry almost always gave better than they got, and this was due in large measure to the MG-42.

After the war, there were advocates in both England and the US who puched for the adoption of an allied version. But reactionary forces, particularly in the US were more concerned about conservation of ammunition. Besides, to the US mind, it was the rifleman that decided battles. The MG was merely a weapon to support infantry.
 
But most of the FAL reputation comes from armies that don't fight wars (or only very limited ones). Mind you, I like the FAL and consider it a great rifle. But it is really not battle proven.
Erm...it was used by the Australians in Vietnam, and by the British everywhere from Northern Ireland to the Falklands (where it was also used by the Argentinians).
 
And the Canadians used the FN in tens (possibly hundreds) of countries doing peace keeping and other work. If you don't think that proved the technology, I've got a news flash for you - it got tested in mud, in dirt, in sand, in snow and ice, in rain, in slush, etc.

Corejob, I won't deny your undoubted experience with firearms. But did you ever serve in the infantry? The logic about the MG isn't really a bit question - the German MGs, at the time, were very effective when facing enemies using the tactics they did at the time. Whether this would hold true today remains an open point of contention. But as far as how much ammo you end up toting.... ARGH.

Today's soldier already is getting overburdened. The amount he can carry is about the same as ever (humans being about the same). But he has to carry body armour, possibly with insert, a helmet, a rucksack and LBE, his canteen (possibly a camelback if in nasty hot areas), possibly NBC gear, commo, now they're heading into telemetry and personal health monitoring, hand grenades, his long arm, ammo for his long arm, spare ammo for the support weapons, LAWs, larger AT weapons, plus all his camp gear, etc.

Every pound counts. And if you get a faster firing MG (faster than the optimal, whatever that might be), you eat more ammo. And someone has to carry that.

Your best chance to survive a gunfight is probably not to be exposed for long and to find complete cover and possibly not to be seen. The loadouts the modern soldier carries militate against this. The more you heap on, the slower you move. The more you heap on, the harder it is to hide and easier it is to be seen.
 
Originally posted by Andrew Boulton:
Erm...it was used by the Australians in Vietnam, and by the British everywhere from Northern Ireland to the Falklands (where it was also used by the Argentinians).
Technically, the L1A1, which departs in several key ways from the FAL, notably sand cuts on the bolt. And it's performance was less than perfect in Vietnam - but better than the initial outing of the M-16 in the hands of regular troops.

One particular problem of the L1A1 was that continual dry firing would cause a burr in the extractor way to protrude into the chamber. If the burr was large enough, this would lead to ruptured cases when firing live ammunition, causing a class III stoppage.

Further, wear on certain internal parts will cause sear and hammer overlap, as well as cartridge case overlap. Both very serious conditions.

Lastly, it should be noted that the FAL was to a large part displaced by the M-16/M-203 for use by Australian SAS troops in Vietnam.

Vietnam is really the only long term employment of the L1A1, and there in the hands of elite troops - hardly true soldier testing. The Falklands war was so brief that one can hardly consider any equipment deployed there to have been really 'tested', IMHO.
 
Originally posted by kaladorn:
And the Canadians used the FN in tens (possibly hundreds) of countries doing peace keeping and other work. If you don't think that proved the technology, I've got a news flash for you - it got tested in mud, in dirt, in sand, in snow and ice, in rain, in slush, etc.
Peacekeeping is not combat. How many rounds were fired per weapon, in the field, under combat conditions? What was the rate of stoppages under field conditions? These factors are knows for weapons like the AK and M-16.

Corejob, I won't deny your undoubted experience with firearms. But did you ever serve in the infantry?
Yes, as both an elisted man and as an officer. Got my blue cord at Ft. Benning May 1980. Comissioned May 1985.

The logic about the MG isn't really a bit question - the German MGs, at the time, were very effective when facing enemies using the tactics they did at the time. Whether this would hold true today remains an open point of contention. But as far as how much ammo you end up toting.... ARGH.
See my previous posts regarding the Hitchman study - whose conclusions have been continously proven in just about every fracas since the ORO published "Operational requirements for an infantry hand weapon." The single most important factor determining whether a hit was achieved was time and degree of exposure of the target. As th SALVO studies, and SPIW showed, the nest way to maximize hits was the use of either swarms of munitions (shotgun like) or burst of automatic weapons delivered at a high cyclic rate.

Today's soldier already is getting overburdened. The amount he can carry is about the same as ever (humans being about the same). But he has to carry body armour, possibly with insert, a helmet, a rucksack and LBE, his canteen (possibly a camelback if in nasty hot areas), possibly NBC gear, commo, now they're heading into telemetry and personal health monitoring, hand grenades, his long arm, ammo for his long arm, spare ammo for the support weapons, LAWs, larger AT weapons, plus all his camp gear, etc.

Every pound counts. And if you get a faster firing MG (faster than the optimal, whatever that might be), you eat more ammo. And someone has to carry that.
The key word is 'optimal'. My contention is that optimal is not 650-850rpm. That's too slow, particularly as warfare becomes more and more mobile.

Your best chance to survive a gunfight is probably not to be exposed for long and to find complete cover and possibly not to be seen. The loadouts the modern soldier carries militate against this. The more you heap on, the slower you move. The more you heap on, the harder it is to hide and easier it is to be seen.
However, one thing that is neglected is that almost all infantry is mechanized. It is extremely rare for the soldier to be carrying every piece of equipment he owns. Sure, the modern soldier has more gear, but the amount he carries all the time is about the same as in WWII, and in many cases, the gear has become lighter.

Further, higher rates of fire do not necessarily mean expending more ammunition. Large amounts of MG ammo is wasted with thing like 'walking fire'. The correct technique with high ROF weapons is to aim furs, and then fire bursts at the target area - the bursts are the same number of rounds - the bursts just happen to be shorter in duration. Rather than firing one round after another is slow sequence, the idea is to fire a cloud of rounds that compensate for aiming errors - the same theory behind why the G11 fired it's bursts at 2,000 rpms.

The US Army has comissioned dozens of studies that all support the above: SPIW, SALVO, ACR, etc. My question is, why do they keep ignoring their own conclusions?
 
Originally posted by Corejob:
Peacekeeping is not combat.
Sometimes it is not, sometimes it is. And not all UN missions are peackeeping. Some are interventions. And some non-UN missions have involved activity that looked suspiciously like combat to those involved.

How many rounds were fired per weapon, in the field, under combat conditions? What was the rate of stoppages under field conditions? These factors are knows for weapons like the AK and M-16.
And I am fairly certain the Canadian Army did gather data on this stuff - they did on every other thing. Heck, one thing we have no shortage of (and could use as a weapons system if we had the airlift) is documentation.

See my previous posts regarding the Hitchman study - whose conclusions have been continously proven in just about every fracas since the ORO published "Operational requirements for an infantry hand weapon." The single most important factor determining whether a hit was achieved was time and degree of exposure of the target. As th SALVO studies, and SPIW showed, the nest way to maximize hits was the use of either swarms of munitions (shotgun like) or burst of automatic weapons delivered at a high cyclic rate.
Maybe so. But there is also a factor of how tired are your troops? How worn out? How sore and beaten down? Load has a factor in that, especially for infantry or light infantry who end up doing a lot of movement using the two-step Black Cadillacs.

I'm not saying lethality isn't a concern, or even that exposure isn't a key determiner as well as number of projectiles. OTOH, if weight increases *your* exposure, and if you don't operate as well because you're too tired (miss stuff, don't think clearly, or just aren't where you need to be due to fatigue) and part of that is carrying too great a load.... that'll be a factor too. And the studies you quote don't address that, do they?

]The key word is 'optimal'. My contention is that optimal is not 650-850rpm. That's too slow, particularly as warfare becomes more and more mobile.
Well, the difference between 600 RPM and 1200 RPM is twice the ammo consumption, and twice the ammo weight. When we carried the FN C2, a bunch of us used to carry spare ammo for it. I can't imagine carrying twice as much, honestly. Even with the C9, carrying twice as much ammo would be a pox (not to mention, not likely, since you always loaded out to your max a lot of the time anyway). The only thing you'd do is half your time-in-contact where you could engage. You might score more kills, but you'd run out of ammo sooner.

However, one thing that is neglected is that almost all infantry is mechanized. It is extremely rare for the soldier to be carrying every piece of equipment he owns.
Every piece? Well, I saw a lot of soldiers in both Gulf Wars and in Kosovo carrying a lot of weight, even just patrolling or engaging in movement to contact or the like. Is that every bit of kit? Probably not. But when your threat environment is getting so broad, you leave stuff behind at your peril. Now, you can usually make sane decisions, but troops do still (despite the mechanization) have to do a lot of foot patrols and foot movements... and the weight still counts.

Give me a Grav Belt or Grav Backpack and I might feel differently.... but I carried too many pounds over too many miles not to feel sympathy for a troopie I see with a backpack, rucksack, support weapon ammo/anti-armour disposable, extra water, extra ammo for the squad weapons, etc. walking somewhere. Yes, he doesn't always carry this kit, and there is always the dreaded 'emergency breakaway' (Lord, don't forget to undo the chest strap...) to lighten you up fast. But the point is, it is still weight. And having something back in the AFV might seem a long way off just when you require it....

Sure, the modern soldier has more gear, but the amount he carries all the time is about the same as in WWII, and in many cases, the gear has become lighter.
It had to, in order to pile on more.

I think if you look back to Roman times, you'll find light infantry loadouts haven't changed much. They are limited by the man.... and that hasn't changed much.

Further, higher rates of fire do not necessarily mean expending more ammunition.
Hmmm. In theory, you are right. Whether this is the case in practice, I can't say.

Large amounts of MG ammo is wasted with thing like 'walking fire'. The correct technique with high ROF weapons is to aim furs, and then fire bursts at the target area
Agreed.

- the bursts are the same number of rounds - the bursts just happen to be shorter in duration.
If you get too high or an ROF, unless your SAW has some sort of burst limiter, you will get longer bursts. A 3-5 round burst becomes a 6-10 round burst. Etc.

Rather than firing one round after another is slow sequence, the idea is to fire a cloud of rounds that compensate for aiming errors - the same theory behind why the G11 fired it's bursts at 2,000 rpms.
Yes, but IIRC, it had a burst setting which limited the weapon to discharging N rounds at once (I forget what N was.. was it 3, 5, or 6?). Do most SAWs have this kind of feature? Not to my knowledge. Most rely on firer trigger control, and doubling the ROF will make this a more precise activity.

The US Army has comissioned dozens of studies that all support the above: SPIW, SALVO, ACR, etc. My question is, why do they keep ignoring their own conclusions?
Is it just possible they have other contrary data?
Or that they have reason to question this data?

Those are, of course, only some of the possibilities. Those ones are benign. There are various malign ones... stupidity, NIH syndrome, lobbyists, etc.
 
Originally posted by kaladorn:
Is it just possible they have other contrary data?
Or that they have reason to question this data?

Those are, of course, only some of the possibilities. Those ones are benign. There are various malign ones... stupidity, NIH syndrome, lobbyists, etc.
That was a rhetorical question. The answer is no and no. The US military, in particular in the area of small arms, never lets facts interfere with cherished beliefs. The whole history of the British .280 round and the EM2 is a great example. For those interest, I highly recommend "The Great Rifle Controversy" by Ezell.

There is no question, based on evidence collected on the battlefield, that the machinegun is by far the most deadly small arm. The reality is that the rifle is npot very effective - a major reason that modern armies don't spend a lot of time or money on it. The infantry squad would probably benefit more by having each man carrying more SAW ammo than increasing his individual ammo load. Of course, if one is clever, the rounds are interchangeable.

A lot of people find this hard to swallow, but it is one of the dark truths of infantry combat.

As to other factors mentioned above, I direct you to the standard literature for serious students of this area. Certainly, Hitchman ("Operational requirements for an infantry hand weapon") and Hall ("An effectiveness study of the infantry rifle"), numberous documents published as part of the SPIW and SALVO projects, the ACR trials and a number of other standard works.

A bibliography will be provided upon request, but the basic material can be gleaned from the already mention "Great Rifle Controversy", "The Black Rifle", "SPIW: the deadliest weapon that never was", "US Rifle M-14", "The FAL rifle".

At some time in the near future, I will be detailing the salient material on my guntech website. It is certainly too long (and boring) for this venue.
 
It should be noted that the above represents my opinion. YMMV. As the topic no long even vaguely relastes to Traveller, perhaps the matter should be taken off list.

Tod
 
Don't take this discussion off list. I have found the arguments being made by all parties useful from an "explanation of how things work" view.
I have a better understanding now of where autofire bonuses come from and what is required of a Traveller ACR or LMG.
 
Corejob, if you want to get back to a more Traveller like topic how about you let us know your thoughts on future infantry weapon systems, i.e. what can we expect over the next 25 years or so. From this it should be possible to extrapolate Traveller slug thrower technologies.
I'm sure there's more than just me interested in this.
 
However, one thing that is neglected is that almost all infantry is mechanized. It is extremely rare for the soldier to be carrying every piece of equipment he owns.
It's very dangerous to assume that you'll always have a vehicle available. Maybe your helicopters have be grounded by bad weather, or the terrain is too difficult for your APCs to cross, or the enemy have inconsiderately sunk the ship carrying all your vehicles.
 
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